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Abstract 
Even after the summit meeting between US President Donald Trump and 
North Korea’s Head of State Kim Jong Un in Singapore on 12 June 2018, the 
crisis surrounding North Korea’s nuclear programme and weapons of mass 
destruction programme remains one of the most dangerous and complex 
in the world. The conflict is centred on the unresolved tense relationship 
between North Korea and the USA, and in particular the issue of nuclear 
weapons possession. Grouped around this are other conflicts characterised 
by clashes of interests between China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea and the USA. In addition, within these conflicts, security policy, 
human rights policy and economic policy have great impact on each other. 
For Germany and Europe, finding a peaceful solution to the conflict – 
or at least preventing military escalation – is key. Europe can and should 
work to ensure that North Korea is treated as a challenge to global gov-
ernance. Addressing the set of problems subsumed under the term “North 
Korea conflict” in such a way as to avoid war, consolidate global order 
structures, and improve the situation of the people in North Korea requires 
staying power and can only lead to success one step at a time. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Facets of the North Korea Conflict: 
Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests 
The conflict over North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction programmes 
remains one of the most dangerous and complex 
crises in the world, even after the summit between 
US President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Head 
of State Kim Jong Un in Singapore on 12 June 2018. 
The risk of military escalation is enormous. Given the 
involvement of four nuclear weapon possessors, the 
use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. But the 
conflict remains explosive even below the threshold 
of open violence. North Korea has openly and directly 
challenged the international community by ignoring 
UN Security Council decisions and other global norms 
and rules. The proliferation of weapons and weapons 
technology threatens to fuel instabilities in other 
parts of the world. The credibility of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime is in question. Asymmetric strat-
egies, such as North Korean cyber attacks and cyber 
raids, pose new challenges for the international com-
munity. 
The Trump administration is striving for a sustain-
able conflict resolution based on an agreement at 
the highest political level between Pyongyang and 
Washington. Such a dialogue is an important, but not 
sufficient prerequisite for a sustainable solution. The 
North Korea conflict is the focal point of a mix of 
various, confounding problem constellations. To un-
ravel them will require a step-by-step approach that 
takes into account the diverging interests of the actors 
involved and their historical sensitivities. 
The conflict focuses on the unresolved question 
of the relationship between North Korea and the USA, 
and is centred on the issue of nuclear weapons pos-
session. Pyongyang sees its nuclear deterrent against 
the United States as a guarantee of its security. 
Washington, on the other hand, is not prepared to 
accept mutual vulnerability and has threatened mili-
tary escalation. 
However, further conflicts are grouped around 
this antagonism, which are characterised by clashes 
of interests between China, Japan, North Korea, 
Russia, South Korea and the USA. Neighbouring states 
are following the conflict between Pyongyang and 
Washington with concern, not only because of the 
Issues and Recommendations 
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immediate effects of any war, but also with regard 
to their own foreign and security policy interests. 
China’s great power ambitions are challenged by a 
nuclearised North Korea and would suffer a setback 
through a military escalation that ended in reunifica-
tion under South Korean-American auspices. South 
Korea, which is particularly exposed and seeks recon-
ciliation and détente with the North, has been trying 
to promote dialogue between the USA and North 
Korea without damaging its relations with other par-
ties. While Russia has a direct presence in East Asia, 
it views its policy on the North Korea conflict more as 
a variable that is dependent on its relations with the 
USA. Moscow would probably only aspire to a mediat-
ing role under certain circumstances. 
North Korea’s totalitarian rule, its catastrophic 
human rights situation and its opacity are further ob-
stacles to integrating the country into international 
contexts in a way that promotes peace. 
Historical legacies also make conflict resolution 
more difficult. Tainted by colonial times, the Korean 
War and the Cold War continue to influence percep-
tions today and restrict important actors’ room for 
manoeuvre. For example, Japan’s historically charged 
role in Korea, the unresolved question of Japanese 
citizens abducted by North Korea, and its dependence 
on the United States for security policy all put Tokyo 
in a precarious position. 
In addition, there are numerous interferences 
between the various conflicts. Such interactions, for 
instance between security, human rights and economic 
policies, may be deliberate (e.g. when an easing of 
sanctions is offered as an incentive for disarmament 
efforts) or unintended (e.g. when security guarantees 
vis-à-vis North Korea weaken US alliances with allies). 
For Germany and Europe, finding a peaceful solu-
tion to the conflict – or at least avoiding military 
escalation – is key. The consequences of a war in 
Korea would be felt in Europe. In addition to the eco-
nomic implications of a military conflict in one of the 
world’s economically most important regions, such 
a conflict would also be a tremendous shock to the 
global security architecture. East Asia could become 
a permanent crisis region. Europe’s alliance with the 
USA would be affected, for example, if the NATO 
collective defence clause was activated. 
Europe and Germany are not actors in East Asia 
that could have a direct impact on the conflict. How-
ever, Europe has opportunities to exert indirect in-
fluence on the powers involved in the conflict. It can 
contribute European experience in conflict manage-
ment, and provide positive incentives through politi-
cal, economic and humanitarian offers. It should 
warn the USA against military responses and urge 
China to implement the sanctions adopted by the 
UN Security Council. 
Europe can use its economic and political influ-
ence to urge third countries to strictly implement 
the sanctions regime. Europe can and should work 
to ensure that North Korea is treated as a challenge 
to the global order. Partial and interim solutions with 
Pyongyang may be necessary to defuse the conflict. 
However, such solutions must not violate the norms 
and rules agreed in multilateral regimes. A de facto 
recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons pos-
session, for instance, may be a prerequisite for agree-
ing on a disarmament process. A formal upgrading 
of North Korea to a nuclear weapons state would, 
however, permanently affect the non-proliferation 
regime. In human rights policy, Europe also needs to 
maintain visible and lasting pressure on North Korea, 
while at the same time keeping the issue strictly 
separate from security policy. 
There is a great deal to suggest that addressing the 
set of the problems subsumed under the term “North 
Korea conflict” in a way that avoids war, consolidates 
global governance structures and improves the situa-
tion of the people in North Korea, requires staying 
power and will only lead to success one step at a time. 
The political dialogue with North Korea that was 
launched by the Trump administration in Singapore 
can promote such a process. It is unlikely to be 
enough. 
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In Singapore on 12 June 2018, the heads of state and 
government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America met 
for the first time. Assessments of the outcome of this 
historic summit between Kim Jong Un and Donald 
Trump could hardly be more different. While the US 
President spoke of a breakthrough and tweeted on 
his way home that North Korea no longer presented 
a nuclear threat,1 others consider the summit’s sparse 
final declaration2 to be lacking in substance and per-
spective. They deplore the fact that North Korea re-
ceived a substantial political upgrade without having 
to offer any meaningful concessions in return; they 
point out that Pyongyang has not promised any con-
crete steps towards disarmament; and they are unsure 
how any future political process to agree such steps 
might unfold.3 
For now, the only remaining hope is that the un-
precedented attempt to defuse – or even permanently 
resolve – a conflict that has lasted for more than half 
 
1 Donald J. Trump, twitter.com, 13 June 2018, https:// 
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1006837823469735936 
(accessed 10 August 2018). 
2 The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. 
Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim 
Jongun of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at 
the Singapore Summit”, Sentosa Island, Singapore, 12 June 
2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-
statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-
chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-
singapore-summit (accessed 1 July 2018). 
3 See, e.g., the statements by experts Michael Green (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies) and Bruce Klingner 
(The Heritage Foundation) before Congress on 20 June 2018: 
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 
Hearing (ed.), “The Trump-Kim Summit: Outcomes and Over-
sight”, Testimony by Michael Green, Senior Vice President 
for Asia, Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Testimony by Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fel-
low for Northeast Asia, Asian Studies Center, Washington 
D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 20 June 2018. 
a century by initiating talks at the highest level will 
be successful. Such a breakthrough would be equiva-
lent to the proverbial cutting of the Gordian knot: 
the problem commonly referred to as “the North 
Korea conflict” is actually a whole complex of diverse 
interwoven problems. The different interests of the 
actors involved and the historical legacies complicate 
resolving these conflicts. 
Yet it is clear that the significance of this multi-
dimensional conflict for security and world peace can 
hardly be overestimated. The first issue are the living 
conditions of the people of North Korea, whose right 
to a safe and good life is persistently and massively 
violated by their own government. The division of 
Korea is also an unresolved legacy of the Cold War, 
which continues to cause tensions. The Korean pen-
insula is one of the world’s most militarised regions. 
Moreover, North Korea threatens its neighbourhood 
with its missiles and weapons of mass destruction. 
Following its successful tests of long-range missiles, 
it also represents a security risk for more distant 
regions: its missiles can reach North America and 
Europe as well. North Korea’s asymmetric military 
activities, for example in cyberspace, present global 
security with a complex and novel challenge. 
Finally, there is a danger that the continued and 
serious violations of multilateral regulations will 
undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of inter-
national governance structures. For more than 20 
years, Pyongyang has provoked the international 
community by refusing to implement UN Security 
Council resolutions. North Korea has repeatedly tried 
to exploit the conflict between China and the USA to 
its own advantage. However, a united international 
community, and in particular a coordinated approach 
by the relevant major powers and North Korea’s re-
gional neighbours, is a prerequisite for peaceful reso-
lution of the conflict. 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier 
Interests, Interdependencies and a 
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Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier 
SWP Berlin 
Facets of the North Korea Conflict 
December 2018 
8 
Focus on North Korea 
Despite all this, North Korea is not the irrational 
hermit state it is occasionally portrayed as. Although 
Pyongyang’s policy tries to minimise external influ-
ences on its society, it is not isolationist.4 Even though 
parts of the political leadership have repeatedly had 
(and continue to have) international contacts, the 
decision-makers are socialised differently from their 
counterparts in most other countries. The DPRK, a 
totalitarian state and society ruled by a family dyn-
asty that is now in its third generation, has developed 
a unique form of government. 
Its political leadership views the international 
order solely through a hard power lens. In North 
Korea, military capabilities and their display hold an 
importance that seems anachronistic to many in the 
West. The fact that North Korea was the first and only 
state ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) is an indication that Pyongyang 
has an instrumental relationship towards international 
agreements and treaties. 
At best, the government considers human rights to 
be of lesser importance. However, it is certainly inter-
ested in good economic development of the country, 
inter alia to strengthen its own position.5 This has led 
to a social and economic dynamic whose consequences 
are still difficult to assess. 
In view of the multilayered nature of the North 
Korean conflict and the differences in the partici-
pants’ social and political understanding as outlined 
above, it is all the more important for any academic 
analysis to keep in mind the different interests and 
strategies of the most relevant actors, and not to 
reduce the conflict to dealing with North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons and missile programmes. The vari-
ous contributions collected in this study illuminate 
the set of problems grouped under the collective term 
of the “North Korea conflict” from different perspec-
tives. They initially look at the problem of dealing 
with North Korea from the perspective of relevant 
 
4 Eric J. Ballbach, “North Korea’s Engagement in Inter-
national Institutions: The Case of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 26, 
no. 2 (2017): 35–65. 
5 Rüdiger Frank, “Die Wirtschaft Nordkoreas: Status und 
Potenzial, Reformen und Gegenreformen”, in Länderbericht 
Korea, ed. Eun-Jeung Lee, Schriftenreihe Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, vol. 1577 (Bonn, 2015), 551–73. 
states and their interests. The second part is dedicated 
to individual problem and conflict areas. 
Two questions are the thread running through the 
respective analyses: (1) Which of the interests of the 
actors involved must be taken into account to achieve 
progress towards a sustainable, comprehensive and 
peaceful resolution of the conflict? And what are 
the lines of conflict within in different issue areas? 
(2) What European interests are affected, and what 
instruments can Europe apply to contribute to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict? 
This study is complemented by a dossier on the 
subject available on the SWP website (http://bit.ly/ 
SWP18DNK_Introduction). Here you will find the 
contributions collected in this study, other SWP 
analyses, and further information. By scanning the 
QR codes in the articles, you can go directly to the 
corresponding sections of the dossier. 
  
 Online dossier to the Research Paper 
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The North Korean Problem: 
A Brief History 
The contributions in this study predominantly refer 
to the current conflict and constellation of interests. 
At its core, the crisis between Pyongyang and Washing-
ton is about security: North Korea sees its security 
threatened by the USA and believes it can only deter 
attacks on its sovereignty by nuclear means. The US 
and its regional allies are not prepared to accept such 
a North Korean deterrent.6 
The current conflict has its roots in the Korean 
War (1950–53). This conflict cemented the division 
of Korea into a South Korea allied with the USA 
(Republic of Korea, RK) and a North Korea, once allied 
with the Soviet Union but now independent. Unlike 
Germany, Korea was unable to overcome this division 
after the end of the East-West conflict. In 1992, the 
IAEA detected that North Korea had secretly attempted 
 
6 See, e.g., Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, Chart-
ing a New Course on North Korea’s Nuclear Programme? The Options 
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, SWP Comments 19/ 
2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
aktuell/2013A31_hlp_mro.pdf (accessed 6 June 2018). 
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to reprocess plutonium. Pyongyang refused special 
inspections by the Agency and, in 1993, for the first 
time announced its withdrawal from the NPT (which 
it subsequently “suspended”). The first nuclear crisis 
culminated in 1994 in North Korea’s threat to extract 
plutonium from spent fuel rods.7 Former US President 
Jimmy Carter defused the conflict during a visit to 
Pyongyang and thus paved the way for agreement 
on the 1994 Agreed Framework.8 This agreement was 
only possible because the USA did not insist on clari-
fication of North Korea’s nuclear power status. North 
Korea declared a renunciation of nuclear weapons 
and in return received commitments for the annual 
supply of 500,000 tons of fuel oil and the construc-
tion of two light water reactors, for which purpose 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organiza-
tion (KEDO) was set up. Both sides declared that in 
the long term they aimed to recognise each other 
diplomatically and to conclude a peace treaty. The 
IAEA verified a “freeze” of the nuclear programme. 
The second nuclear crisis began in the early 2000s, 
following the election of George W. Bush as US Presi-
dent. He placed North Korea alongside Iraq and Iran 
on his “axis of evil” and, in 2002, accused the country 
of operating secret uranium enrichment facilities. 
North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT for 
the second and final time. To defuse the conflict and 
resolve it peacefully, South Korea, China, Japan and 
Russia, along with North Korea and the USA, met for 
six-party talks lasting several years (2003–2007). The 
joint declarations of September 2005 and February 
2007 provided a framework for settlement of the con-
flict whereby North Korea agreed to nuclear disarma-
ment in exchange for aid and security guarantees. 
Once again, participants had not even tried to reach 
agreement on the question of whether North Korea 
was a nuclear power. However, the agreements of 
the six parties were not implemented. The DPRK con-
tinued its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons 
programmes, and declared in April 2009, in response 
to the UN Security Council’s condemnation of a mis-
sile test, that it would no longer participate in the six-
party talks. 
 
7 The typology of the three crises surrounding the North 
Korean nuclear programme can be found in Robert S. 
Litwak, Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout (Washington, 
D.C.: Wilson Center, February 2017). 
8 KEDO, Agreed Framework between the United States of America 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in kedo.org, 21 Oc-
tober 1994, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf 
(accessed 7 May 2018). 
The first North Korean nuclear test in 2006 had 
already tipped the conflict into a new phase: the in-
ternational community continued to insist on North 
Korea’s comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable 
nuclear disarmament, but the prospects for such a 
solution deteriorated in proportion to the progress 
North Korea made in its nuclear programme. US Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” 
was a de facto admission that the international com-
munity lacked the means to bring about the desired 
comprehensive disarmament. 
We are currently in the third nuclear crisis, in 
which North Korea is pushing for reaffirmation of 
its own nuclear weapons possessor status. Since Kim 
Jong Un’s accession to power in North Korea in 2011, 
its nuclear and missile programmes have accelerated. 
In 2017, the country successfully tested three long-
range missiles that could theoretically hit the US 
homeland.9 On this basis, Kim Jong Un announced in 
his New Year’s address on 1 January 2018 that he had 
achieved his goal of creating a nuclear deterrent 
against the USA.10 The USA, however, does not intend 
to accept such a capacity. Until the beginning of 2018, 
the Trump administration pursued a policy of “maxi-
mum pressure”. The Singapore summit then marked 
the much-publicised return to diplomacy. 
Does the current situation create an opening for 
stabilising the situation on the Korean peninsula? 
Or, on the contrary, does the crisis risk worsening 
if diplomacy fails again? How can we in Europe con-
tribute to preventing war in Korea and promoting 
the disarmament of North Korea? This study’s authors 
address these questions from different perspectives. 
 
9 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “North Korean 
Nuclear Capabilities, 2018”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, 
no. 1 (2018): 41–51. 
10 Kim Jong Un, “New Year’s Address”, Pyongyang, nklea-
dershipwatch.org, 1 January 2018, http://www.nkleadership 
watch.org/2018/01/01/new-years-address/ (accessed 6 June 
2018). 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier 
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North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are undoubtedly 
among the most pressing problems in international 
politics. If this challenge is to be met realistically, it 
is essential to make sense of the motives instructing 
Pyongyang’s foreign policy approach. Since an offi-
cial North Korean nuclear doctrine is lacking, these 
driving forces can best be identified through a care-
ful analysis of the dynamic discourse in which they 
occur. What basic features – and above all what 
changes – can be discerned? Seen from this perspec-
tive, it becomes clear that the significance of the 
nuclear programme for the decision-makers in Pyong-
yang goes far beyond security policy considerations; 
rather, it functions as a central component of both 
national identity formation and power stabilisation. 
The government in Pyongyang thus follows – con-
trary to the still widespread perception of North Korea 
as “inherently Other” – a rational and consistent 
argument based on foreign and domestic political 
motives. 
North Korea’s Changing Patterns of 
Legitimisation 
To understand North Korea’s motives in the nuclear 
question, it is essential first to identify the patterns 
of legitimisation postulated by Pyongyang itself with 
regards to its own nuclearisation strategy. This is pos-
sible because North Korea regularly provides informa-
tion about its nuclear programme in the form of lead-
ership statements, tangible legislative initiatives and 
legal provisions, and unveils its own driving forces in 
this regard. North Korea’s statements are not merely 
propaganda without analytical value, as is widely 
assumed. Instead, these explanations show a high de-
gree of coherence, even though Pyongyang’s attempts 
to legitimise maintaining a nuclear programme are 
undergoing constant change. 
Change of Discourse during the 
Iraq War 2003 
Until the early 2000s, North Korean sources da capo 
emphasised that the nuclear programme was only 
used to generate energy and that the leadership did 
not seek to possess nuclear weapons. Only the Iraq 
War of 2003 marked a discernible turning point and 
the ensuing legitimacy argument for the nuclear 
programme changed in line with the country’s gen-
eral foreign and security policy strategy. Since then, 
North Korea has increasingly referred to its “natural 
right” to produce nuclear weapons to protect the state 
and nation from the US’s “hostile policies”.1 A 2003 
agency report on the subject declared the key lesson 
from the Iraq war to be that only a “powerful military 
deterrent” could prevent a war on the Korean penin-
sula and preserve the security of the Korean nation.2 
North Korea’s Nuclear Breakthrough 
North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006 rep-
resented a further crucial turning point in both the 
country’s foreign and security policy strategy and its 
main attempts at legitimising its nuclear programme. 
In a message addressed to national and international 
observers by the North Korean Foreign Ministry, the 
DPRK presented itself as the victim of a permanent 
policy of foreign aggression, which made a powerful 
defence capability indispensable: 
 
1 See, e.g., Institute for the Reunification of the Fatherland, 
“North Korea: Eligible for Military Deterrence”, in Quo Vadis 
North Korea? Social Conditions, Development Tendencies, Perspectives, 
ed. Hyondok Choe, Du-Yul Song and Rainer Werning 
(Cologne: PapyRossa, 2003), 30, 36. 
2 See “Statement of FM Spokesman Blasts UNSCs Discus-
sion of Korean Nuclear Issue”, Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA), 6 April 2003. 
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“A people without reliable war deterrent are bound 
to meet a tragic death and the sovereignty of their 
country is bound to be wantonly infringed upon. 
[…] The DPRK’s nuclear weapons will serve as reli-
able war deterrent for protecting the supreme in-
terests of the state and the security of the Korean 
nation from the U.S. threat of aggression and avert-
ing a new war and firmly safeguarding peace and 
stability on the Korean peninsula under any cir-
cumstances. The DPRK will always sincerely imple-
ment its international commitment in the field of 
nuclear non-proliferation as a responsible nuclear 
weapons state.”3 
As the quotation shows, this self-portrait as a re-
sponsible nuclear power plays a key role alongside 
the threat/defence nexus in North Korea’s attempts 
to legitimise its own nuclear programme. Given that 
North Korea’s transition to a nuclear power took 
place outside of international order structures fol-
lowing its withdrawal from the NPT, DPRK officials 
offered repeated assurances that the country would 
comply with international non-proliferation obli-
gations. Furthermore, in November 2006, the North 
Korean Foreign Ministry stressed that the nuclear 
programme was exclusively defensive in nature and 
that the country would therefore never use nuclear 
weapons in a first strike or proliferate them.4 
After the first nuclear test, North Korea repeatedly 
underlined the historical significance of its status as 
a nuclear power. The test was presented as a national 
event of the utmost importance: the fulfilment of 
the long-cherished desire for national and military 
strength.5 Nevertheless – and this is a crucial obser-
vation for the theoretical possibility of finding a 
diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue – North 
Korea has maximised its diplomatic leeway by re-
peatedly referring to its fundamental commitment 
to the ultimate goal of a completely denuclearised 
Korean peninsula.6 
 
3 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure 
to Bolster War Deterrent”, KCNA, 3 October 2006. 
4 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Totally Refutes UNSC 
Resolution”, KCNA, 17 October 2006. 
5 See Rodong Sinmun, quoted in Jongwoo Nam, The Geo-
graphical Construction of National Identity and State Interests by 
a Weak Nation-State: The Dynamic Geopolitical Codes and Stable 
Geopolitical Visions of North Korea, 1948–2010 (Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, University of Illinois, 2012), 186. 
6 For instance, high-ranking North Korean diplomats also 
emphasised that a completely denuclearised peninsula was 
The Institutionalisation of 
Nuclear Power Status 
While North Korean statements until 2008 suggest 
that North Korea’s transition to a nuclear power 
state could still be revised, the domestic discourse 
has changed significantly since then, in parallel with 
the country’s foreign policy behaviour. 
On the one hand, Pyongyang has pushed its self-
portrayal as a “nuclear outlaw”. North Korea, accord-
ing to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, is not striving to 
be recognised as a nuclear power by the international 
community. Rather, it is content with the pride and 
self-confidence in being able to reliably defend the 
security and sovereignty of the nation.7 This line of 
argument is also found in the first detailed contri-
bution to a gradually forming nuclear doctrine. A 
memorandum published on 21 April 2010, which 
also provides information on North Korea’s percep-
tion of the deterrent dynamics on the Korean penin-
sula, states that North Korea is not bound by the pro-
visions of the NPT or international law. The primary 
mission of nuclear armament is clearly mentioned 
as defending against aggression and attacks on the 
nation. At the same time, however, the memorandum 
stated that the DPRK would without exception con-
tinue its policy of not using or threatening to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, as long 
as they did not participate in an invasion in coopera-
tion with nuclear states.8 
Since 2008, internal propaganda has 
blended North Korea’s identity with 
the image of a strong nuclear state. 
Secondly, Pyongyang has increasingly emphasised 
the importance of its nuclear programme beyond 
mere security motives. In the critical years since 2008, 
domestic propaganda has closely linked the identity 
 
the last wish of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. See “North 
Korea Repeats Offer for Nuclear Talks”, Reuters, 19 June 2013, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-china/north-
korean-envoy-in-beijing-seeking-to-mend-ties-experts-idUS 
BRE95IO6K20130619 (accessed 19 March 2018). 
7 KCNA, 24 May 2010, quoted in Peter Hayes and Scott 
Bruce, “North Korean Nuclear Nationalism and the Threat of 
Nuclear War in Korea”, NAPSNet Policy Forum, 21 April 2011, 
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/11-09-hayes-
bruce/ (accessed 23 March 2018). 
8 “Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on N-Issue”, 
KCNA, 21 April 2010. 
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of the North Korean state with the image of a strong 
nuclear power. Especially after the death of Kim Jong 
Il in 2011, his political legacy was immediately merged 
with the country’s status as a nuclear power.9 In 
an article published in the party newspaper Rodong 
Sinmun shortly after Kim’s death, North Korea’s 
transition to a nuclear power was not only described 
as an epochal event – the historical significance of 
which was only surpassed by Kim Il Sung’s revolu-
tionary struggle for liberation – but it was also 
praised as Kim Jong Il’s exclusive and most important 
achievement.10 In a constitutional amendment passed 
by the Supreme People’s Assembly in 2012, North 
Korea codified its self-proclaimed status as a nuclear 
power in its constitution as well. The new preamble 
states that Kim Jong Il transformed the DPRK into a 
politically and ideologically powerful nuclear state – 
an assessment also to be found in “Nuclear Weapons 
and Peace,” one of North Korea’s most significant 
recent texts on nuclear strategy.11 The text’s key 
message is unequivocal: North Korea has successfully 
completed the transition to nuclear power, leading 
also to a fundamental change in North Korea’s status 
within the international community. A report pub-
lished by the North Korean news agency KCNA reads 
accordingly: “[I]f the D.P.R.K. sits at a table with the 
U.S., it has to be a dialogue between nuclear weapon 
states, not one side forcing the other to dismantle 
nuclear weapons”.12 These self-descriptions suggest 
that North Korea’s path to denuclearisation is likely 
to be arduous, complex and extremely costly – both 
politically and economically. 
Since 2015/16, another key term has found its way 
into North Korea’s nuclear state discourse: the pre-
emptive strike option. Such nuclear attacks would be 
conceivable if “imminent attempts to destroy North 
Korea” were identified. For example, Li Yong Pil, the 
director of a research institute on relations with the 
USA that is affiliated with the North Korean foreign 
 
9 Hayes and Bruce, “North Korean Nuclear Nationalism” 
(see note 7); See also Eric J. Ballbach, “North Korea’s Emerg-
ing Nuclear State Identity: Discursive Construction and 
Performative Enactment”, The Korean Journal of International 
Studies 14, no. 3 (2016): 391–414. 
10 “Kim Jong-il tongjiŭi hyŏngmyŏngyusan” [The Revolu-
tionary Legacy of Kim Jong Il], Rodong Sinmun, 28 December 
2011. 
11 See “Haekkwa p’yŏnghwa” [Nukes and Peace], Rodong 
Sinmun, 24 April 2013. 
12 “Rodong Sinmun Urges U.S. to Give Clear Answer to 
Just Demand of DPRK”, KCNA, 23 April 2013. 
ministry, said that nuclear pre-emptive strikes were 
not exclusive to the USA: “If we see that the US would 
do it to us, we would do it first. […] We have the tech-
nology.”13 
North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: 
between Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Motives 
Grasping North Korea’s motives in the context of the 
nuclear question is made more difficult by the fact 
that these motives are apparently not static. This not-
withstanding, a careful analysis of North Korean pub-
lications and statements makes it possible to identify 
some key motivations, which are summarised below. 
The Nuclear Programme as a 
Security Project 
As with all nuclear powers, the security factor, under-
stood as protection against military intervention and 
maintenance of state sovereignty and regime stability, 
is also essential for North Korea’s pursuit of its own 
nuclear armament. North Korea has an all-encom-
passing and historically consistent perception of 
threat. Thus, the leadership sees the country as being 
in a state of constant threat from outside, combined 
with an existential and incessant anti-imperialist 
struggle. In addition to historical experiences such as 
Japanese colonial rule or the Korean War, this threat 
perception was and is based in particular on the sta-
tioning of tactical US nuclear weapons in South Korea 
(from 1958 to 1991), the joint US-South Korean mili-
tary manoeuvres that have taken place (almost) an-
nually since 1976, and the presence of US troops in 
East Asia. 
The perception of such a threat has further intensi-
fied since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, 
developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s led 
to the de facto collapse of North Korea’s defence alli-
ances with Moscow and Beijing, concluded in the 
1960s. On the other hand, the repeatedly rhetorically 
heated relations with the USA (which in 1994 even 
 
13 “North Korea Warns It Would Use Nuclear Weapons 
First If Threatened”, NBC News, 17 October 2016, https://www. 
nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korea-warns-it-would-use-
nuclear-weapons-first-if-n665791 (accessed 22 March 2018): 
“A preemptive nuclear strike is not something the U.S. has 
a monopoly on.” 
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escalated to the brink of a new war) have contributed 
to North Korea regarding the possession of a nuclear 
deterrent as an indispensable guarantor of its sover-
eign existence, given the military superiority of the 
USA and its regional allies. 
Conversely, since 2012 North Korea has regularly 
pointed out that the nuclear programme “under the 
given framework conditions in East Asia” was not 
negotiable for the North Korean leadership (anymore). 
Given the existential threat to North Korea said to be 
posed by the USA’s foreign policy, Pyongyang repeat-
edly stressed that ultimately only its own nuclear 
deterrent had saved the country from a fate similar 
to that of Iraq or Libya.14 Seen in this light, regular 
missile and nuclear weapons tests are not provoca-
tions without any rationality, but an indispensable 
and inherent part of this deterrence logic. For the 
rulers in Pyongyang, a credible demonstration of their 
own deterrent potential both domestically and exter-
nally is all the more important because the logic of 
deterrence does not go hand in hand with an external 
recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power. 
The Nuclear Programme as an 
Identity Project 
The fact that immaterial factors such as national 
self-confidence, prestige and pride are repeatedly 
addressed in the texts already shows that the signifi-
cance of nuclear weapons for the rulers in Pyongyang 
extends far beyond military and security policy 
dimensions. If the analysis takes into account state-
ments by North Korean representatives involved in 
direct negotiations on the nuclear project, in addition 
to the official declarations, it becomes clear that the 
nuclear programme today represents a key identity 
project of and for the North Korean state – even if 
its self-perception as a “great and strong nation” is 
increasingly removed from reality. Based on the per-
ception that the country has always been under 
threat from outside forces and is therefore involved 
in a lasting anti-imperialist struggle, this identity 
 
14 North Korean negotiators, for example, made it clear 
to the USA after their invasion of Iraq that their behaviour 
there was being closely observed: “The lesson we learn [from 
the Iraq war] is that [...] only possession of a nuclear deter-
rent weapon can prevent an invasion.” See Jonathan D. Pol-
lack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International 
Security (New York: Routledge, 2011), 141. 
formation is of outstanding relevance to North 
Korean rulers for several reasons. 
These constructions serve to draw 
permanent boundaries between 
Self and Other. 
These constructions serve the purpose of drawing 
permanent boundaries between inside and outside, 
between Self and Other: they “write” North Korean 
identity and expedite domestic political unity in the 
face of external enemies. Such historically consistent 
threat discourses continue to permeate the state’s 
entire rhetoric about the USA and thus contribute to 
normalising and institutionalising the public’s fears. 
Such discourses have a powerful effect, especially 
in authoritarian states such as North Korea, where 
threat discourses are strictly hegemonically controlled 
and access to free information is also severely limited. 
At the societal level, they foster the formation of a 
“permanent siege mentality,” which the North Korean 
leadership regards as a strategic component in its 
efforts to hold society and the political class together.15 
North Korea can therefore certainly be regarded as a 
“camp society” in Giorgio Agamben’s sense: a society 
in which the state of emergency becomes a paradigm 
of governance and an element inherent in the leader-
ship’s legitimisation strategy. 
The omnipresent threat scenarios also suggest ap-
propriate reactions for the state to pursue. Represen-
tations of dangers and conflicts thus serve to justify 
political measures aimed at containing these threats. 
The discourse emphasises the significance of security 
policy measures as well as the status of security 
actors, ensures the preferred supply of these actors 
with resources for certain national projects – be they 
ideological and/or political – and at the same time 
distracts the public from more pressing social prob-
lems. Seen in this light, the threat constructions make 
North Korea’s nuclear programme appear appropriate 
and logical from a domestic political point of view. 
It is more than likely that without these pronounced 
threat and conflict constructions, the nuclear pro-
gramme in North Korea could not be maintained in 
the long term. For even in a totalitarian state, the 
implementation and maintenance of such a cost- and 
resource-intensive project requires a minimum of 
 
15 Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification 
and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), xvii. 
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domestic legitimacy – especially in view of the 
multitude of urgent economic and social challenges. 
The Nuclear Programme as a 
Historical Project 
The North Korean discourse attaches outstanding his-
torical importance to the nuclear programme. The 
origin of this motif lies in the experience of “national 
ruin,” the complete loss of state independence, sover-
eignty, and Korean identity through Japanese colonial 
rule in Korea (1910–1945). This experience repre-
sents the starting point of North Korean nation build-
ing: in addition to the demarcation from external 
Others, the discourse also demarks the present DPRK 
from its own history as a formerly colonised and 
militarily inferior state.16 Consequently, preventing 
the loss of national independence and sovereignty by 
all necessary means is seen as a key lesson from the 
experience of national ruin, which in social and 
political discourse is constructed as North Korea’s 
“Never Again”. 
North Korea draws a direct line from this historical 
experience to the current clashes with the USA over 
its nuclear programme, which it has repeatedly called 
a “showdown” that will decide its sovereignty and 
independence.17 Since peace can never be guaranteed 
and war can only be prevented by deterrence, accord-
ing to the DPRK military clout is the only option to 
secure these primary goals of the North Korean state.18 
Locating the nuclear programme within this over-
arching historical frame of reference defines the con-
frontation with the United States to be the current 
chapter in Korea’s historical efforts to achieve in-
dependence and sovereignty. 
The Nuclear Programme as a 
Bargaining Chip 
In the past, the nuclear programme has time and 
again served the rulers in Pyongyang as a means of 
wringing concessions from the international com-
munity. North Korea, which to a substantial degree 
 
16 See Eric J. Ballbach, “The History of the Present: Foun-
dational Meta-Narratives in Contemporary North Korean 
Discourse”, S/N Korean Humanities 1, no. 2 (2015): 79–100. 
17 See, e.g., Ri Jong Chol, Songun Politics in Korea (Pyong-
yang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2012), 41. 
18 Song Baek Jo, The Leadership Philosophy of Kim Jong-il 
(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1999), 
200. 
relies on external assistance, has repeatedly attempted 
to extort such assistance from abroad by strategically 
using foreign policy confrontations and nuclear 
threats. Most recently, North Korea committed itself 
in February 2012 in the so-called Leap Day Agreement 
to a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests and to 
returning to the negotiating table, in return for which 
it received food aid.19 Nevertheless, North Korea’s de 
facto transition to nuclear power has fundamentally 
changed the portents. Since then, Pyongyang has 
repeatedly stressed that North Korean nuclear weap-
ons are no longer negotiable. And yet it has now 
promised exactly this in the wake of the recent rap-
prochement with the international community, 
which raises the question of how such policy vola-
tility can be explained. 
North Korea’s Nuclear Foreign Policy: 
Between Striving for Autonomy and 
Maximising Influence 
North Korea’s foreign policy on the nuclear issue co-
incides in many respects with the country’s general 
foreign policy strategy, which is based on a “clearly 
realpolitik view of the world of states” and in which 
sovereignty and power are “the key categories in the 
cognitive perception and evaluation of international 
contexts”.20 In concrete terms, this is reflected in a 
dual strategy of autonomy-seeking and influence-
maximising policies, which are understood as two 
forms of power politics.21 While an autonomy-seeking 
 
19 See, e.g., Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, Chart-
ing a New Course on North Korea’s Nuclear Programme? The Options 
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, SWP Comments 19/ 
2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
aktuell/2013A31_hlp_mro.pdf. 
20 Patrick Köllner, “Nordkoreas Außen- und Sicherheits-
politik im Zeichen der Krisen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
no. 35/36 (25 August 2003): 25–31 (26). Unless otherwise 
indicated, quotations in English are the author’s trans-
lations. 
21 See Eric J. Ballbach, “Between Autonomy and Influence? 
Multilateralism and North Korean Foreign Policy in the 
Six-Party Talks”, in Korea 2013 – Politics, Economy and Society, 
ed. Rüdiger Frank et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 
215–39; Paik Hak-soon, “Die Außenpolitik Nordkoreas: 
Autonomie oder Annäherung”, in Länderbericht Korea, ed. 
Eun-Jeung Lee and Hannes B. Mosler (Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung, 2015), 497–507. 
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policy serves “to maintain or strengthen one’s own 
independence from other states”, or “to ward off new 
dependencies or to reduce existing dependencies on 
other states”, countries try to use a policy of influence 
to “steer certain interaction processes with other 
states and the policy results resulting from them in 
their own interest”.22 In practice, North Korea there-
fore relies on a defence policy whenever it considers 
its security or the survival of the regime to be threat-
ened, when autonomy gains are possible, or when it 
risks losing autonomy compared to other states. The 
repeated non-compliance with, or dissolution of, 
existing obligations under bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, as well as the rejection of new obliga-
tions, are just as much a part of this as its fundamen-
tally sceptical attitude towards cooperation, which 
threatens to create or strengthen asymmetric inter-
dependencies, i.e. dependencies to the detriment of 
Pyongyang. 
If, on the other hand, North Korea pursues a poli-
cy of influence-maximisation in the context of the 
nuclear issue, it seeks means that are suitable for 
enabling, guaranteeing and expanding its desired 
influence. Pyongyang therefore works to secure a 
voice among the more powerful states of East Asia, 
both bilaterally and within the framework of multi-
lateral institutions.23 
Prospects 
The inter-Korean rapprochement observed since the 
beginning of 2018 and the resumption of a dialogue 
between North Korea and the USA, which culminated 
in a first summit meeting of the two heads of state in 
June 2018, have given the international community 
hope for a definitive and peaceful solution to the 
nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Particularly 
against the backdrop of the gradual escalation of 
tensions between North Korea and the USA, the 
 
22 See Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang 
Wagner, Macht und Machtpolitik: Neorealistische Außenpolitik-
theorie und Prognosen für die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der 
Vereinigung, Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen 
Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 30 (Tübingen, 1998), 
https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/ 
handle/10900/47201/pdf/tap30.pdf (accessed 6 June 2018). 
23 See also the seminal analysis in Joseph M. Grieco, 
“The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and 
the Neo-Realist Research Programme”, Review of International 
Studies 21, no. 1 (1995): 21–40. 
recent rapprochement undoubtedly represents a 
significant step. Although both the USA and North 
Korea are currently making increasing reference to 
the possibility of denuclearising the Korean penin-
sula, no significant change in the discourse in North 
Korea has been discernible since the summit between 
Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un’s state-
ment at the end of 2017 that North Korea had attained 
its “nuclear defence capability” is extremely signifi-
cant in this context. Since then, North Korea has in 
fact increasingly turned to the second pillar of the 
national Byungjin strategy, which propagates the 
simultaneous development of the nuclear programme 
and the national economy. From Pyongyang’s per-
spective, given the intensified sanctions against North 
Korea since 2017, this makes a resumption of dia-
logue with the international community imperative 
to soften the latter’s unity on the issue of sanctions 
in the medium term. The probability that the nuclear 
programme will be completely abandoned, however, 
is currently rather low, for a variety of reasons: the 
enormous political and economic capital invested 
by North Korea; the continuing distrust between the 
actors involved; and the importance of the nuclear 
programme for those in power in Pyongyang which 
greatly transcends security factors. 
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After the liberation from its Japanese colonial rulers 
in 1945, the Korean peninsula was divided into two 
occupation zones. Following UN-mandated elections 
and the creation of a constitution, the American zone 
in the South proclaimed the Republic of Korea (RK) in 
1948, while Kim Il Sung proclaimed the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North with 
the support of the Soviet Union and China. The Ko-
rean War, which began in 1950 with North Korea’s 
invasion of the South and ended in 1953 with the 
Korean Armistice agreement, consolidated the con-
frontation between the two Korean states. 
The seventy-year-long division and the de facto 
state of war continue to shape South Korea’s domes-
tic and foreign policy to this day. While its military 
alliance with the USA has guaranteed its national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the South has 
definitely won the competition of political systems 
against the North. The Republic of Korea, with over 
50 million inhabitants, has developed into a mature 
democracy and modern industrialised country, which 
ranks among high-income countries and is a member 
of the OECD and G20, among others. 
Diverse Threats from the North 
However, North Korea continues to threaten South 
Korea’s national security, state existence, political 
identity and socio-economic stability. 
The DPRK regards the RK as a puppet state with a 
colonial-level dependency on the USA. It generally 
denies the South any legitimacy in national and secu-
rity affairs. North Korean attempts to bring about 
reunification by military force, as in the Korean War, 
remain plausible for South Korean security politi-
cians. Indeed, the RK has repeatedly been exposed to 
military aggressions from the North in the past: South 
Korean President Park Chung-hee survived two assas-
sination attempts, South Korean ships were repeatedly 
attacked along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and the 
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) along the 38th parallel was 
the scene of numerous military incidents. In 2010, 
the South Korean corvette Cheonan was sunk by a 
torpedo and the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong 
came under North Korean artillery fire. As a result, 
North Korea’s demands for fraternal cooperation are 
often met with suspicions in the South. 
The military threat posed by the DPRK is both 
conventional and nuclear in nature. South Korea has 
superior military technology; in a military conflict, 
the more so with American support, the RK would 
prevail over the North in the long run. Still, South 
Korea fears a North Korean surprise attack – similar 
to the one in 2010 – or retaliation in response to an 
actual or perceived pre-emptive or preventive strike 
by the USA.1 South Korea’s capital city, Seoul, is 
located only 50 kilometres south of the 38th parallel 
and thus within immediate range of part of the ap-
proximately 15,000 artillery pieces stationed there 
by North Korea. According to estimates, the Seoul-
Incheon metropolitan area would have to expect 
400,000 to 3,800,000 civilian deaths in the event of a 
nuclear or thermonuclear attack.2 The entire territory 
of the RK is within range of North Korean short-range 
missiles. Nuclear warheads can be mounted on these 
missiles.3 The DPRK could also equip its artillery and 
 
1 Léonie Allard, Mathieu Duchâtel and François Godement, 
Pre-Empting Defeat: In Search of North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine, 
Policy brief 237 (London: European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, November 2017), 5. 
2 Michael J. Zagurek, “A Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on 
Seoul and Tokyo: The Human Cost of War on the Korean 
Peninsula”, 38NortH, 4 October 2017, https://www.38north. 
org/2017/10/mzagurek100417/ (accessed 23 March 2018). 
3 Jung H. Pak, Sue Mi Terry and Bruce Klingner, “Ex-CIA 
Analysts Explain Why a Bloody Nose Policy on North Korea 
Would Backfire” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 12 February 
2018); Allard, Duchâtel and Godement, Pre-Empting Defeat (see 
note 1), 4f. 
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short-range missiles with biological and chemical 
warfare agents. 
The political and economic instability of the DPRK 
is the second major source of threat. Not only would 
a collapse of the regime pose unforeseeable security 
risks, but subsequent reunification would impose 
enormous economic costs on South Korea: to rebuild 
the northern part of the peninsula and to raise living 
conditions there. The RK itself would experience 
domestic conflicts due to the immense social burdens 
and political divisiveness. 
Dilemmas 
South Korea’s foreign policy constellation is extreme. 
The country is in the immediate neighbourhood of 
heavyweights China, Russia and Japan. Due to its 
deep integration into global markets, the RK is eco-
nomically exceptionally vulnerable. Its overarching 
foreign policy goals – first, to ward off threats from 
the North; second, to maintain a thriving relationship 
with China despite intensifying Sino-American power 
competition; and third, to keep the door open to re-
unification with the North – are almost impossible 
to reconcile. Moreover, South Korea’s politics and 
society are deeply divided into a conservative and 
a progressive camp about how to deal with North 
Korea. 
Conservatives see North Korea as an enemy and 
regional threat that necessitates joint action in con-
cert with the US and the international community. 
They regard military deterrence and sanctions against 
North Korea as well as political pressure on China 
as proven means to denuclearise the DRPK, force 
reforms and enable reunification after regime col-
lapse. In contrast, the progressives emphasise national 
autonomy and independence – especially in Korea’s 
relations with the USA – and see the North as an 
“impoverished compatriot” whose actions stem from 
insecurity. For them, dialogue and normalised rela-
tions are necessary to overcome political confronta-
tion and allow mutual confidence-building and 
peace-building. In the meantime, humanitarian and 
economic cooperation presumably incentivise posi-
tive development in the North.4 
 
4 Kim Choong-Nam, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s 
Policy toward North Korea”, International Journal of Korean 
Studies 9, no. 2 (2005): 1–33 (8). 
Divergences within South Korean 
society weaken the coherence of its 
foreign policy. 
This ideological division within South Korean 
society weakens the coherence of its foreign policy. 
Consequently, changes of presidency often mark 
turnarounds and reversals of policy. 
Although the US-South Korean alliance, existing 
since 1953, has succeeded in reliably safeguarding 
the RK against the North, the alliance partners do not 
always agree in their threat assessments or foreign 
and security policy priorities. Seoul, for example, 
focuses primarily on the risk of war on the Korean 
peninsula; Washington on proliferation risks and 
nuclear threats to its territory.5 With regard to its ally, 
South Korea fears two things: an isolationist USA could 
withdraw from the Korean peninsula, as Donald 
Trump announced in his presidential election cam-
paign and at the Singapore press conference. Or the 
US could disarm North Korea by military force, as 
security advisor John Bolton argued four weeks before 
his appointment.6 While the Singapore summit did 
ease the security situation on the Korean peninsula – 
at least for the time being – South Korea’s security 
policy remains utterly at the mercy of US actions. To 
make things worse, the DPRK sees the USA as the sole 
relevant interlocutor on security policy and particu-
larly nuclear issues. In fact, the RK is not party to the 
1953 ceasefire agreement. 
South Korea’s view of China is ambivalent. The RK 
is economically highly dependent on China; a diplo-
matic solution to the conflict with North Korea, a 
peace regime, and future Korean reunification all re-
quire China’s endorsement. On the other hand, there 
are numerous reasons for scepticism and distrust.7 
Above all, China’s geopolitical claim to power in Asia, 
the authoritarian nature of its regime, and its ambi-
valent North Korean policy have repeatedly shown 
South Korea the limits of this partnership. Although 
 
5 On South Korea’s alliance dilemma, see Scott Snyder, 
“A Comparison of U.S. and South Korean National Security 
Strategies: Implications for Alliance Coordination toward 
North Korea”, in Philip W. Yun and Gi-wook Shin, North 
Korea: 2005 and Beyond (Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shoren-
stein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2006), 149–66. 
6 John Bolton, “The Legal Case for Striking North Korea 
First”, Wall Street Journal, 28 February 2018. 
7 See Jae Ho Chung and Jiyoon Kim, “Is South Korea in 
China’s Orbit? Assessing Seoul’s Perceptions and Policies”, 
Asia Policy 21 (January 2016): 123–45. 
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Beijing disapproves of North Korea’s nuclear arma-
ment and aggressive foreign policy behaviour, it 
views the conflict in the context of Sino-American 
superpower rivalry and prioritises stability and the 
seventy-year-old status quo on the Korean peninsula. 
While avoiding condemnation of Pyongyang’s 
military aggressions in 2010, China sanctioned South 
Korean companies in 2016/17 following the installa-
tion of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defence) missile defence system by the US in the RK. 
Beijing has now suspended its sanctions, but the 
conflict has taught Seoul not to expect China’s com-
placency regarding pressure on North Korea nor 
understanding concerning its security needs. 
Options for Exerting Influence 
In principle, South Korea can influence the DPRK 
through military deterrence, sanctions and diplomacy. 
South Korea’s military deterrence and defence base 
on the Mutual Defence Treaty with the USA. About 
28,500 US soldiers are stationed in South Korea. To-
gether with the approximately 630,000 South Korean 
soldiers, they are subject to the Combined Forces 
Command whose wartime operational control is 
under US command. Joint annual manoeuvres de-
monstrate military strength and exercise operational 
readiness; these have been unilaterally suspended by 
President Trump at the Singapore Summit. Moreover, 
the US’s extended nuclear deterrence also shields the 
RK. In 1991, Washington withdrew all its remaining 
nuclear weapons from South Korea. It is the declared 
wish of the current Moon administration for this 
to remain the case.8 However, the THAAD system 
was newly installed in 2017, primarily to protect the 
southern part of the country and the US military 
bases stationed there. South Korea is also working 
on its own missile defence system. The RK’s military 
already has a number of drone systems, cruise 
missiles and self-developed ballistic missiles.9 
South Korea not only implements unilateral and 
UN Security Council sanctions, but also proactively 
influences third countries in their sanctions imple-
 
8 Jesse Johnson, “South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical 
of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won’t Be 
Reintroduced to Peninsula”, Japan Times, 29 January 2018. 
9 For an overview, see Edward Kwon, “South Korea’s 
Deterrence against North Korea’s WMD”, East Asia 35, no. 2 
(2018): 1–21. 
mentation. South Korean diplomats draw foreign 
authorities’ attention to the activities of North Korea’s 
illegal networks, or protest against sanctions viola-
tions. Inter-Korean economic cooperation, once con-
siderable, was reduced to virtually zero by the conser-
vative administrations under Presidents Lee Myung-
bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017). 
In this respect, the RK has no leeway for additional 
sanctions of its own. However, it can provide positive 
incentives for the North by relaxing the sanctions 
regime and resuming economic cooperation. 
President Moon Jae-in is convinced 
that talks de-escalate tensions. 
For the time being, diplomacy remains the pre-
ferred tool. The progressive government under Presi-
dent Moon Jae-in, who assumed office in May 2017, 
is convinced that talks de-escalate tensions, prevent 
future conflicts and facilitate persuasion. President 
Moon’s mantra of South Korea’s leadership role in 
multilateral diplomacy and of pan-Korean responsi-
bility addresses the virulent ethos of ethnic national-
ism and independence in both North and South. 
South Korea’s diplomacy can also exert indirect 
influence on North Korea. As an ally of the United 
States, Seoul’s security needs and preferences should 
be taken into account in Washington’s deliberations 
and decisions. It remains to be seen, however, to 
what extent South Korea and Japan still feature in 
the Trump administration’s foreign policy, which 
primarily emphasises US interests. 
In theory, South Korea’s society, economy and 
politics is virtually predestined to influence North 
Korea on an individual and civil society level due 
to spatial proximity, common language and culture. 
However, the National Security Act of 1948 strictly 
controls any cross-border contacts. This inhibits South 
Korean civil society groups from exchange with or 
work in the North.10 
Inter-Korean Relations 
Two agreements from 1991 and 1992 remain crucial 
for inter-Korean relations: the “Basic Agreement” lays 
down the principles of improved relations and inter-
 
10 Diane B. Kraft, “South Korea’s National Security Law: 
A Tool of Oppression in an Insecure World”, Wisconsin Inter-
national Law Journal 24, no. 2 (2006): 627–59. 
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Korean reconciliation; the “Joint Declaration on De-
nuclearisation” contains the promise of both Korean 
states not to produce, test or station nuclear weapons. 
These principles of peaceful cooperation were re-
instated at the historic summit meetings of Presidents 
Kim Dae-jung (2000) and Roh Moo-hyun (2007) with 
North Korea’s then ruler Kim Jong Il. During this 
phase of progressive governments (1998–2008), the 
so-called “sunshine policy” was bilateral and multi-
faceted. This policy of détente, reconciliation and 
development produced positive results in the hu-
manitarian and economic domains: it facilitated 
numerous family meetings, stabilised food supplies 
in the North, and allowed South Korean visitors 
and investors access to the Mount Kumgang Tourist 
Region and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
Over the course of the Six-Party Talks, the ruling 
Roh administration was sympathetic to North Korea’s 
security demands. It remained reticent regarding the 
human rights situation. Despite such accommoda-
tions, however, Seoul was unable to re-direct North 
Korea’s foreign policy behaviour. On the contrary: 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests – most no-
tably its first nuclear test in 2006 – contravened 
the South’s policy of détente. This intensified threat 
situation, among other things, led the ensuing con-
servative presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-
hye to end all policies of accommodation and strictly 
condition all humanitarian and economic coopera-
tion. The sunshine policy was followed by a new ice 
age (2008–2017). 
President Moon’s inauguration (2017) marked the 
return to the basic principles of the sunshine policy. 
The new president announced his will to initiate dia-
logue with the North, a diplomatic process culminat-
ing in a peace arrangement and the complete, verifi-
able and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea. 
In July 2017, in his Berlin speech, he promised to prior-
itise peace-building and set aside the issue of reunifi-
cation. He set out for the DPRK two conditions for the 
North-South dialogue: an end to security provocations 
against South Korea and its allies, and a readiness to 
dialogue on the nuclear issue with the USA. 
The Moon administration seeks to soften Washing-
ton’s overt scepticism vis-à-vis inter-Korean talks 
through transparency (with regard to its own goals 
and principles) and close coordination with its ally.11 
Since Seoul explicitly supports the international 
 
11 Bryan Harris, “US Ties Denuclearization to North Korea 
Talks”, Financial Times, 26 February 2018. 
pressure and sanctions campaign against North 
Korea, South Korea’s approach remains compatible 
with the Trump administration’s approach of “maxi-
mum pressure and engagement”. However, in a speech 
to parliament in November 2017, President Moon 
clarified that there can be no US military attack on 
North Korea without Seoul’s consent. 
Over the course of 2017, Moon’s consistent over-
tures for talks initially met Pyongyang’s disinterest. 
However, the Winter Olympic Games in February 
2018 provided an opportunity for sport diplomacy 
and the initiation of direct inter-Korean contact. In 
early March, Seoul’s special envoy delegation con-
veyed the agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit 
on 27 April in Panmunjom, on the South Korean side 
of the border, as well as Pyongyang’s willingness to 
hold a summit meeting with US President Donald 
Trump. North Korea had previously announced a 
nuclear and missile test moratorium, refrained from 
criticising the annual South Korean-US military exer-
cises, and thus fulfilled Seoul’s conditions for inter-
Korean dialogue. At their first summit meeting in 
April, Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un signed the Pan-
munjom Declaration and vowed to work towards 
reconciliation, peace and prosperity. Both sides 
agreed on the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue 
and cooperation, the reduction of military tensions 
along the demarcation line and sea borders, and joint 
efforts towards a peace regime. Both also declared a 
nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula to be their 
common goal. Through the Panmunjom Declaration, 
the DPRK recognises the RK for the first time as a 
negotiating partner regarding security issues as well 
as a peace regime. The swiftly initiated implemen-
tation of the summit agreements, particularly the 
resumption of military talks whose agenda includes 
the withdrawal of North Korean artillery from the 
border line, gives cause for optimism. 
The Struggle for a Voice and 
Co-Determination 
North Korean military threats, Chinese economic 
sanctions, scepticism and concern vis-à-vis Washing-
ton: most obviously in 2017, the RK was caught 
squarely in the middle, seemingly without support 
or visible influence on a national issue of existential 
importance. President Moon first aimed to resume 
dialogue with the North, pursued an active modera-
tion and mediation strategy vis-à-vis Washington, and 
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sought diplomatic backing in Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, 
Berlin and Brussels. In the wake of inter-Korean rap-
prochement since the beginning of 2018, the Moon ad-
ministration has shaped the public narrative concern-
ing North Korea and dialogue with the US, repeatedly 
emphasising Pyongyang’s readiness to disarm and 
President Trump’s special (peace-promoting) role.12 
The Moon administration viewed the Singapore 
Summit on 12 June 2018 as a confirmation of its 
moderation and facilitation efforts. It understands the 
summit agreement as a political declaration of intent 
to bring about denuclearisation and peace, and the 
explicit reference to the Panmunjom Declaration as 
recognition of its role. President Trump’s erratic and 
unpredictable policy (style) is undoubtedly also dis-
turbing for South Korea. Neither his threat to cover 
North Korea with “fire and fury” nor his announce-
ment to suspend joint military exercises indefinitely 
were agreed with Seoul. Still, the South’s current 
administration regards the Singapore Summit as a 
historically unique opportunity, allowing for the 
peaceful turn of events. The sobering insight of 
decreasing reliability on Washington for security, 
however, is fading from public debate. 
Even though the overarching geopolitical confron-
tations and conflicting interests in the region remain 
unresolved and limit Seoul’s range of action, the RK 
has succeeded in manoeuvring itself out of a foreign 
policy impasse. The RK has proven capable of pro-
activeness, shaping public narratives and taking 
diplomatic action. The country has grown in stature 
especially vis-à-vis its heavyweight neighbours. For 
the DPRK, too, which prioritises economic develop-
ment, the RK is an indispensable partner to balance 
out China. Seoul remains in the middle between all 
relevant actors, but seems to be effectively mediating 
from the middle right now. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
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Since Donald Trump took office in January 2017, 
US policy towards North Korea has moved between 
extremes. On the one hand, no American administra-
tion from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama had so openly 
threatened North Korea with preventative military 
strikes. On the other hand, before Trump, no other 
US president had taken the frankly courageous step 
of attending a summit meeting with a North Korean 
ruler. 
At the same time, the entire political spectrum of 
the United States remains mistrustful of the inten-
tions of the North Korean leadership. The failure of 
past negotiations since the early 1990s has reinforced 
Washington’s impression that the Pyongyang regime 
is not seriously interested in abandoning its nuclear 
weapons and missile programme. This distrust also 
has historical roots. The USA and North Korea have 
been hostile to each other since the Korean War 
(1950–1953). While this war ranks far behind Viet-
nam in the collective memory of the USA, it was 
nevertheless one of the “hardest and most casualty-
heavy military conflicts in US history”.1 Although 
estimates of the number of victims of the Korean War 
vary widely, it is assumed that more than two million 
Koreans, 600,000 Chinese and 36,500 US soldiers died 
in the conflict.2 
The Korean peninsula’s influence on the USA and 
the latter’s significance for developments there stem 
not least from Washington’s considerable military 
potential in the region. As part of its bilateral security 
and defence agreements, the USA stationed around 
28,500 soldiers in the Republic of Korea and almost 
40,000 in Japan in 2017.3 Overall, the US Pacific Com-
mand has over 375,000 soldiers and civilian forces in 
 
1 Alexander Emmerich and Philipp Gassert, Amerikas Kriege 
(Darmstadt: Theiss, 2014), 188. 
2 Allan R. Milett, “Korean War”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(last update 11 May 2018), https://www.britannica.com/event/ 
Korean-War (accessed 7 June 2018). 
3 “Chapter Three. North America”, The Military Balance 118, 
no. 1 (2018): 60. 
the India-Asia-Pacific region.4 In its Defence White 
Paper 2016, the South Korean Ministry of Defence 
estimated that in the event of a war with the North, 
the USA could send up to 690,000 soldiers, 160 war-
ships and 2,000 aircraft.5 
The rapprochement between Seoul and Pyongyang, 
which culminated in an inter-Korean summit in April 
2018, and the summit meeting between the heads of 
state of the USA and North Korea on 12 June 2018 
have boosted hopes for a diplomatic solution to the 
conflict over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and mis-
sile programmes. For the time being, they have sig-
nificantly reduced the risk of war. 
However, this cannot hide the fact that the results 
of the meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong 
Un fell far short of the expectations of even pessimis-
tic observers. The risk of military escalation on the 
Korean peninsula has by no means been averted. 
Should the diplomatic process fail or become mired, 
the debate about military options in the USA will 
in all probability gain in virulence again. 
From “Strategic Patience” to 
“Massive Pressure” 
Since the early 1990s, successive US administrations 
have attempted to stop or dismantle North Korea’s 
nuclear programme. They used a mixture of positive 
and negative incentives: economic sanctions, the mili-
tary expansion of alliances with regional partners, the 
 
4 Kathleen J. McInnis et al., The North Korean Nuclear Chal-
lenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, CRS Report, 
R44994 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 
[CRS], 6 November 2017), 52, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ 
R44994.pdf (accessed 6 March 2018). 
5 Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defence, 2016 
Defence White Paper (Seoul, December 2016), 53, http://www. 
mnd.go.kr/cop/pblictn/selectPublicationUser.do?siteId=mnd 
EN&componentId=51&categoryId=0&publicationSeq=777& 
pageIndex=1&id=mndEN_031300000000 (accessed 18 April 
2018). 
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prospect of normalising diplomatic relations, security 
guarantees and economic aid for North Korea. Even 
though the Trump administration always endeavours 
to make its actions seem like a radical departure from 
the policies of the previous administration, Obama’s 
policy of “strategic patience” towards North Korea 
and Trump’s approach of “massive pressure and en-
gagement”6 have some things in common. Both presi-
dents pursued and continue to pursue the goal of 
nuclear disarmament in North Korea, relying on bi-
lateral and multilateral sanctions as well as China’s 
influence.7 
The parameters and framework 
conditions of US policy on North 
Korea have changed fundamentally. 
Nevertheless, the parameters and framework con-
ditions of US policy on North Korea have changed 
fundamentally. First, there is the Trump factor: the 
President’s unpredictable political style, often ex-
pressed in twitter tirades, martial threats, or initia-
tives not coordinated with foreign partners or his 
own government, has contributed significantly to 
the general uncertainty about the goals and means 
of American policy on North Korea. In addition, 
the mindset of US security bureaucracy has shifted. 
Already during Obama’s second term in office, a 
pessimistic view based on realpolitik and military 
power prevailed in the Pentagon, in particular. Its 
focus was on Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, 
which were seen as “revisionist powers”.8 This kind 
 
6 Initially, the Trump administration consistently referred 
to applying “maximum pressure” on North Korea. As part of 
a political change of direction on the sidelines of the Winter 
Olympics in South Korea, US Vice President Mike Pence then 
spoke of “maximum pressure and engagement at the same 
time”. See Josh Rogin, “Pence: The United States Is Ready to 
Talk with North Korea”, Washington Post (online), 11 February 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-
opinions/pence-the-united-states-is-ready-to-talk-with-north-
korea/2018/02/11/b5070ed6-0f33-11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_ 
story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c8ebc8f06687 (ac-
cessed 13 August 2018). 
7 McInnis et al., The North Korean Nuclear Challenge 
(see note 4), 26f. 
8 This change of perspective was already evident in the 
Obama Administration’s military strategy. See Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
2015. The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security 
(Fort Belvoir, VA, June 2015), 2f., http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/ 
of assessment complicates pursuing a policy that 
relies more on diplomacy. 
Finally, North Korea’s surprisingly rapid progress 
in the development of nuclear weapons and long-
range ballistic missiles has significantly increased 
the decision-making pressure on US President Trump. 
Previous US administrations could still afford to post-
pone the problem of North Korea’s nuclear programme. 
When North Korea successfully tested an Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) for the first time in July 
2017, the US military intelligence service came to the 
conclusion that North Korea would be able to produce 
a nuclear-capable ICBM capable of reaching the USA 
in 2018.9 It remains unclear whether North Korea is 
already capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on a 
missile that would survive re-entry into the Earth’s 
atmosphere. 
In the US, it has long been the view that North 
Korea should not under any circumstances gain the 
ability to directly threaten the US with long-range 
nuclear missiles,10 as General Joseph Dunford,11 the 
US’s highest ranking soldier, reaffirmed in July 2017.12 
Yet since North Korea’s successful test of an ICBM, the 
nuclear threat to the USA has become a reality. How-
ever, a strategy of military deterrence and contain-
ment, as practised towards the Soviet Union, Russia 
and China, has so far been rejected as a model for US 
North Korea policy. 
The conviction that classic deterrence would not 
work in North Korea’s case is also related to US 
 
36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.
pdf (accessed 9 August 2018). 
9 Ellen Nakashima, Anna Fifield and Joby Warrick, “North 
Korea Could Cross ICBM Threshold Next Year, U.S. Officials 
Warn in New Assessment”, Washington Post, 25 July 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ 
north-korea-could-cross-icbm-threshold-next-year-us-officials-
warn-in-new-assessment/2017/07/25/4107dc4a-70af-11e7-
8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html (accessed 13 August 2018). 
10 Jim Sciutto and Diana Bash, “Nuclear Missile Threat a 
‘Red Line’ for Trump on North Korea”, CNN Politics, 1 March 
2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/01/politics/north-korea-
trump-nuclear-missile-threat-red-line/index.html (accessed 
12 March 2018). 
11 Dunford was already chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff under Obama, which makes it clear that the perspective 
described is not an invention of the Trump administration. 
12 Nahal Toosi, “Dunford: Military Option for North Korea 
Not ‘Unimaginable’”, Politico, 22 July 2017, https://www. 
politico.com/story/2017/07/22/dunford-north-korea-military-
option-not-unimaginable-240851 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
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assumptions about Pyongyang’s intentions.13 From 
Washington’s point of view, by developing a nuclear 
weapons programme the regime is not only concerned 
with its own preservation, but also with being able 
to blackmail the USA and its regional allies under the 
protection of its own bomb (e.g. to compel US troops 
to withdraw from South Korea, coerce donors to sup-
ply economic aid or, in the longer term, even force 
through the reunification of Korea under North Ko-
rean auspices).14 The additional concern that North 
Korea could expedite the export of its nuclear and 
missile technology to the world is not only held by 
the Trump administration. 
Diplomatic and Political Contradictions 
of US Policy 
The Trump administration has sent out highly contra-
dictory signals as to whether it would be prepared 
to engage in talks or formal negotiations with North 
Korea, and under what conditions.15 The US President, 
for example, initially denigrated the gestures of ap-
proach by South Korean President Moon Jae-in as an 
“appeasement policy”.16 
Until March 2018, the following line seemed to 
prevail in the Trump administration: a moratorium 
was to be called on North Korean nuclear weapons 
and missile testing and (vague) steps to be taken 
towards disarmament as a precondition for initial 
talks (but not formal negotiations), while pressure 
in the shape of economic sanctions would be main-
tained. In March, Trump then surprisingly promised 
to attend a summit meeting with Kim, although fun-
damental US demands had not yet been met. 
The course and outcome of the summit meeting 
between Trump and Kim on 12 June 2018 have 
 
13 See International Crisis Group, The Korean Peninsula 
Crisis – I. In the Line of Fire and Fury, Asia Report, 293 (Brussels, 
23 January 2018), 14, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-
east-asia/korean-peninsula/293-korean-peninsula-crisis-i-line-
fire-and-fury (accessed 6 March 2018). 
14 See ibid., 14; Victor Cha, “Giving North Korea a ‘Bloody 
Nose’ Carries a Huge Risk to Americans”, Washington Post, 
30 January 2018. 
15 See Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Emma Chanlett-Avery and 
Mark E. Manyin, Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: In Brief, 
CRS Report (Washington, D.C., 4 December 2017), 1, https:// 
fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45033.pdf (accessed 6 March 2018). 
16 Mark Landler and Choe Sang-Hun, “U.S. Shifts on Hold-
ing Discussions with Kim”, New York Times, 14 February 2018. 
fuelled further doubts inside and outside the US 
about the course US policy towards North Korea. The 
meeting itself was already a significant concession to 
North Korea, as it politically and diplomatically up-
graded the regime in Pyongyang. In return, however, 
the USA received only vague assurances. For example, 
the Trump-Kim Joint Declaration does not contain a 
clear commitment by North Korea to complete, veri-
fiable and irreversible denuclearisation – demanded 
not only by the US but also by the UN – or a road-
map or review mechanism for further disarmament.17 
It is clear that North Korea has so far understood the 
term denuclearisation to mean something fundamen-
tally different from the USA – namely a process that 
also calls into question America’s extended nuclear 
deterrence in the region. 
The impression that President Trump did not con-
sult with his ally in Seoul concerning the announce-
ment that the American-South Korean military exer-
cises would be suspended, and his statements about 
a possible withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, 
also damaged the credibility of US security policy in 
the region.18 
Against this backdrop, Trump received much criti-
cism in Washington. Even Republican Congressmen 
were diffident.19 The Speaker of the House, Republi-
can Paul Ryan, felt compelled to make it clear that 
the only acceptable outcome of negotiations with 
North Korea was “complete, verifiable irreversible de-
nuclearisation”.20 Others in Washington even claim 
that the Trump administration has effectively aban-
doned its policy of “maximum pressure”.21 It also 
 
17 The White House – Secretary of the Press, “Joint State-
ment of President Donald J. Trump of the United States 
of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”, Singa-
pore, 12 June 2018. 
18 Niharika Mandhana, “The Singapore Summit: U.S. Deal 
Tests Ties with Asian Allies. South Korea, Japan Try to Assess 
Trump’s Plan to Scrap Military Exercises in the Region”, Wall 
Street Journal, 13 June 2018. 
19 Eli Stokols, “Trump’s GOP Allies Skeptical This Time. 
Republicans in Congress Are Wary or Even Critical of the 
Summit Result”, Los Angeles Times, 13 June 2018. 
20 Rebecca Shabad, “Trump-Kim Summit Draws Mixed 
Reaction on Capitol Hill”, NBC News, 12 June 2018, https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/trump-kim-summit-
draws-mixed-reaction-capitol-hill-n882416 (accessed 9 August 
2018). 
21 Max Boot, “A Summit without Substance”, Washington 
Post, 13 June 2018. 
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remains unclear how the USA will implement in 
detail the promise of security guarantees made to 
North Korea during the summit. 
After the Trump-Kim Summit, the question looms 
of how the USA will deal with China, its most impor-
tant international co-actor on North Korea. On the 
one hand, Trump himself has repeatedly acknowl-
edged that the key to a diplomatic solution lies in 
Beijing. On the occasion of his visit to China in No-
vember 2017, he declared that the People’s Republic 
could solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear 
programme “simply and quickly”.22 On the other 
hand, Trump’s China policy generally follows a con-
frontational course, not least with a view to his trade 
policy agenda, which often overlays his political and 
security policy requirements.23 
The Debate on Military Options 
The easing of the Korean conflict since the 2018 
Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang has also pushed the 
US debate about military options against North Korea 
into the background, at least temporarily. Previously, 
Trump’s multiple threats of military action against 
North Korea had fuelled fears both inside and outside 
of the region that war might result. In August 2017, 
the President had promised “fire and fury” and 
pointed out via Twitter that military solutions were 
available (“locked and loaded”). The threat was under-
pinned by other important actors both in the execu-
tive branch and in Congress. The then National Secu-
rity Advisor H. R. McMaster described the tightening 
of sanctions as “the last best chance” to prevent a 
war.24 Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a member 
of the Armed Forces Committee, put the probability 
 
22 “Remarks by President Trump at Business Event with 
President Xi of China, Beijing, China”, The White House – 
Secretary of the Press, 9 November 2017, https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
business-event-president-xi-china-beijing-china/ (accessed 
19 April 2018). 
23 James Griffiths, “Tariffs Show Trump Doesn’t Want 
China’s Help with North Korea”, CNN, 23 March 2018, https:// 
edition.cnn.com/2018/03/23/asia/trump-xi-china-trade-war-
north-korea-intl/index.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
24 “Remarks by LTG H.R. McMaster at U.S.-UK Policy Ex-
change Event”, The White House, Secretary of the Press, 
12 December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-ltg-h-r-mcmaster-u-s-uk-policy-exchange-
event/ (accessed 6 June 2018). 
of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula at 
30 percent, based on his conversations with Trump.25 
Even if the threatened US pre-emptive 
strikes were only a bluff, they carried 
considerable escalation risks. 
Whether the pre-emptive strikes threatened by 
the White House or Congress were a bluff or not, they 
entailed considerable escalation risks. US debates on 
military options tend to be based on rather optimistic 
assumptions.26 The threatening military gestures from 
Washington also influenced the threat perception in 
Pyongyang. This makes military moves by the USA, 
for example in connection with the annual major 
manoeuvres in the region, appear even more danger-
ous from North Korea’s point of view. It also increases 
the risk of events developing their own momentum, 
and of miscalculations. One result of the Trump-Kim 
Summit – the announcement suspending such large-
scale exercises for the time being – could thus contrib-
ute to regional security. However, such a step would 
be problematic without prior coordination with the 
US’s regional partners who rely on US security pledges. 
Military alternatives to preventive strikes against 
the North Korean nuclear weapons programme have 
also been aired in Washington, though not yet at the 
forefront of public debate. These include, for exam-
ple, establishing a sea blockade to prevent North 
Korea from exporting proliferation-relevant goods, 
and expanding military alliances as part of a strategy 
to deter and contain Pyongyang. Occasionally, the 
idea of re-stationing American nuclear weapons in 
South Korea is also brought back into play in Washing-
ton, for example by the former Republican chairman 
of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, John McCain.27 
 
25 Uri Friedman, “Lindsay Graham: There’s a 30 Percent 
Chance Trump Attacks North Korea”, The Atlantic, 14 Decem-
ber 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 
2017/12/lindsey-graham-war-north-korea-trump/548381/ 
(accessed 6 June 2018). 
26 E.g. the Congressional Research Service’s discussion 
of seven different military options against North Korea was 
based on the premise that neither Russia nor China would 
intervene militarily in the conflict. McInnis et al., The North 
Korean Nuclear Challenge (see note 4), 25. 
27 Eli Watkins, “John McCain: North Korea Must Know 
Price for Aggression Is ‘Extinction’”, CNN Politics, 10 Septem-
ber 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/10/politics/john-
mccain-north-korea-defense-cnn-tv/index.html (accessed 
9 March 2018). 
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However, this option does not seem to have been 
adopted by the Trump administration so far. 
Prospects 
Since Donald Trump took office, the USA has pursued 
a policy of extremes. Washington has threatened 
military strikes against North Korea more frequently 
and blatantly than under previous administrations. 
At the same time, however, President Trump has ex-
pressed his willingness to go further than other US 
presidents to find a diplomatic solution to the con-
flict. In the past 25 years, the USA and the inter-
national community have (in vain) tried and tested 
almost all available diplomatic instruments to per-
suade North Korea to disarm – except for a summit 
meeting between the US President and the North 
Korean ruler. 
In the best of all worlds, this summit diplomacy 
would result in a “big deal”, the actual implementa-
tion of which would ease tensions on the Korean 
peninsula in the years to come. North Korea would 
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons programme 
and in return receive security guarantees from the 
USA and a relaxation of international sanctions. The 
chances that this scenario will become reality, how-
ever, are low not only because North Korea has re-
peatedly promised to carry out nuclear disarmament 
in recent decades and has actually taken the opposite 
path, but also because the first US-North Korea Sum-
mit has raised considerable doubts about the goals 
and means of Washington’s policy on North Korea. 
The extent to which the Trump administration is able 
and willing to engage in a protracted diplomatic 
process with Pyongyang remains uncertain. 
But even if no “big deal” is concluded, talks and 
negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang can 
help to bring about a (preferably) permanent stop to 
nuclear bomb and missile testing by North Korea. 
This would already be a great benefit because, with 
the current threat perception in Washington, each 
additional test runs the risk of provoking a harsh US 
counter-reaction. 
However, if the diplomatic process for disarming 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme ob-
viously fails, or becomes mired for a longer period 
of time, we should expect the US debate on military 
options to reignite. Yet sooner or later, this negative 
scenario would raise the question for the USA of how 
credible it still is to threaten military preventive or 
pre-emptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons and missile programme. In that scenario, 
given the great progress made by North Korea’s pro-
gramme, it would make sense for the discussion to 
turn instead to the issue of shaping a policy of mili-
tary deterrence and containment against Pyongyang. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Regional_Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation 
 SWP Berlin 
 Facets of the North Korea Conflict 
 December 2018 
 27 
The People’s Republic of China is often ascribed a key 
role, if not the key role, in solving the North Korean 
problem. This opinion is particularly widely held in 
the USA. Like previous US presidents, Donald Trump, 
who prioritised the issue of North Korea’s nuclear 
and missile programme after taking office, called on 
China to support him and declared that Beijing could 
solve the problem “easily and quickly”.1 China, North 
Korea’s largest trading partner and main supplier of 
energy and food, is believed to be best placed to exert 
effective pressure on the Pyongyang government. For 
its part, China holds the United States mainly respon-
sible for the problem, by not taking North Korea’s 
security needs into account. 
One of China’s most important goals, apart from 
denuclearising and preventing war on the Korean 
peninsula, is to prevent North Korea from collapsing. 
The summit meeting of US President Trump with the 
North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June 
2018 makes achieving all three goals seem possible, 
but presents China with the challenge of remaining 
relevant as an actor on the Korean peninsula, given 
its own growing rivalry with the USA. 
Historical Overview 
In October 1951, the People’s Republic of China – 
founded only two years previously, following the 
Communist army’s victory over the nationalist Kuo-
mintang troops under Chiang Kai-shek – surprisingly 
intervened in the war between North and South Korea 
and fought alongside the North until the armistice in 
July 1953, despite heavy casualties of its own. China 
 
1 As recently as November 2017 in a speech to business 
leaders in Beijing: see Charlie Campbell, “President Trump 
Says China Could ‘Easily’ Rein in North Korea”, time.com, 
9 November 2017, http://time.com/5016617/donald-trump-
china-north-korea-2/ (accessed 8 February 2018). 
remained a close friend to North Korea and helped 
to rebuild the country.2 In July 1961, the two states 
signed a friendship and defence treaty containing, 
inter alia, mutual assurances of military assistance 
in the event of an armed attack on one or the other.3 
This assistance pact has so far been extended twice 
and formally remains in force until 2021. In March 
1993, when North Korea threatened to withdraw from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its secret 
reprocessing programme triggered a crisis, the latter 
was resolved by direct negotiations between Pyong-
yang and Washington. China did not play a key role 
in the establishment of the Agreed Framework in 
1994. However, it subsequently took part in the four-
party talks organised with the USA and the two 
Koreas stipulated by the Framework.4 
The Agreed Framework failed at the end of the 
1990s, a situation for which North Korea is not solely 
responsible. The US did not keep its promises either. 
After taking office in 2000, US President George W. 
Bush ordered a review of America’s North Korea 
policy and thereafter labelled North Korea as part of 
the “axis of evil” and as a “rogue state”. When the 
 
2 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Destruction and Reconstruc-
tion of North Korea, 1950–1960”, The Asia-Pacific Journal 7 
(16 March 2009), http://apjjf.org/-Charles-K.-Armstrong/3460/ 
article.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
3 For the full text of the treaty, see “Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea”, 11 July 1961, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/ 
documents/china_dprk.htm (accessed 8 February 2018). For 
China’s interpretation of the treaty, see Ankit Panda, “China 
and North Korea Have a Mutual Defense Treaty, But When 
Would It Apply?”, The Diplomat, 14 August 2017, https:// 
thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-and-north-korea-have-a-
mutual-defense-treaty-but-when-would-it-apply/ (accessed 
6 June 2018). 
4 See Wendy Frieman, China, Arms Control, and Non-Prolifer-
ation (London: Routledge, 2014), 127ff. 
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fact that North Korea was running a uranium enrich-
ment programme became known, and it again an-
nounced its withdrawal from the NPT, the crisis 
reignited. Beijing then took on a much more active 
diplomatic role and initiated six-party talks with both 
South and North Korea, the USA, China, Russia and 
Japan, which were held for the first time in Beijing 
in 2003. In the following years, China consistently 
advocated a diplomatic solution and simultaneously 
attempted – albeit largely unsuccessfully – to per-
suade the then North Korean head of state Kim Jong Il 
to support economic reforms in his country.5 
After the suspension of the six-party talks in 2008, 
China sought to revive them and repeatedly urged all 
sides to exercise restraint, including after Pyongyang 
sank a South Korean warship in March 2010 and fired 
on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong the fol-
lowing November. 
Goals and Strategies of China’s Policy on 
the Korean Peninsula 
China pursues three fundamental goals on the Korean 
peninsula: no war, no chaos and no nuclear weapons 
(bu zhan, bu luan, bu he). The Chinese government pri-
oritises stability in the region and thus maintaining 
the status quo – with North Korea as a buffer zone 
between itself and South Korea, which is allied with 
the USA – over the denuclearisation of North Korea. 
At times, the three objectives might be conflicting 
with each other. Moreover, their order of importance 
may shift in response to the overall situation on the 
Korean peninsula and the behaviour of the other 
actors involved. In 2017, for instance, China’s pri-
mary concern was preventing war, after Trump stated 
that “all options are on the table” to the resolve the 
North Korean conflict, including military action. 
Bilateral economic relations are an 
important pillar of China’s foreign 
policy towards North Korea. 
An important pillar of China’s foreign policy to-
wards North Korea is bilateral economic relations. 
In particular since 2009, China has been steadily ex-
panding its investment and trade activities in North 
 
5 Through travels to Shanghai, Shenzhen, Vietnam and 
Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Northeast China 
between 2000 and 2011. 
Korea and promoting economic cooperation in the 
Chinese-North Korean border regions.6 In response to 
the failed six-party talks and out of concern that Kim 
Jong Il’s state of health might destabilise North Korea, 
China’s strategy of economic engagement initially 
aimed primarily at supporting a smooth transition of 
power in Pyongyang.7 Besides maintaining stability 
in the region, in the longer term Beijing hopes its 
economic commitment will lead to: 
1) The stabilisation of the social situation in North Ko-
rea. Through economic progress and opening up the 
economy the Kim regime might be more willing to 
renounce its nuclear weapons programme; 
2) The expansion of its own role in any future settle-
ment of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula 
by gaining more influence over Pyongyang. 
North Korea could also play an important role in 
revitalising the economies of Liaoning, Jilin and Hei-
longjiang provinces in north-eastern China. Projects 
in this region, along with neighbouring countries like 
Mongolia, Russia and the Korean peninsula are part 
of the “Belt and Road Initiative” – Chinese President 
Xi Jinping’s most important foreign policy project.8 
However, successful implementation depends on 
North Korea opening up economically. 
China’s North Korea Policy in Transition 
Whereas the two neighbours were once “as close as 
teeth and lips”, the Chinese government today merely 
refers to a “normal state-to-state relationship”. The 
bilateral relationship deteriorated significantly after 
Kim Jong Un took power in North Korea upon the 
death of his father, Kim Jong Il, in December 2011, 
and reached a low point in 2017. Kim has pursued 
the nuclear and missile programme much more con-
sistently than his predecessor, increasingly provoking 
 
6 Nadine Godehardt, Pekings zweigleisige Politik gegenüber 
Pjöngjang, SWP-Aktuell 32/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, June 2013), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2013A32_gdh.pdf (ac-
cessed 6 June 2018). 
7 Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell, China’s Policy on 
North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament, 
SIPRI Policy Paper 40 (Solna: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute [SIPRI], December 2013), https://www.sipri. 
org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP40.pdf (accessed 6 June 2018). 
8 Anny Boc, “North Korea and China, Friends Again?”, 
The Diplomat, 7 June 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/ 
north-korea-and-china-friends-again/ (accessed 5 July 2018). 
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displeasure and criticism among the Chinese leader-
ship. The state of their bilateral relations was reflected, 
inter alia, by a sharp decline in high-level visits be-
tween the two countries.9 In the first five years since 
Xi Jinping took office as Chinese President in March 
2013, there was no official meeting with Kim Jong Un. 
When Kim Jong Un’s Uncle Jang Song Taek, an 
advocate of economic reforms, was executed in De-
cember 2013, Beijing lost its most important contact 
to the leadership in Pyongyang. The North Korean 
ruler has also not shied away from repeatedly 
snubbing China. In early September 2017, North 
Korea conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test – 
coinciding with the start of the summit meeting of 
the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) in the Chinese city of Xiamen. Similarly, 
Pyongyang had launched a ballistic missile in May of 
that year – shortly before the opening of a two-day 
summit in Beijing on the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Chinese experts interpreted Kim’s timing as being 
directed against China,10 and as an attempt to damage 
Xi’s reputation as a “great leader”. 
While in the past the Chinese leadership believed 
that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme 
posed a threat to the US (and its allies), but not directly 
to China, developments on the Korean peninsula in 
2017 prompted Beijing to reassess the situation. Many 
international experts saw a real risk of war in the 
region as a result of the war of words and mutual 
threats between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. 
There was also a growing concern in China that ten-
sions could escalate into military confrontation or 
affect its own nuclear safety. North Korea’s Punggye-ri 
nuclear test site (now allegedly unusable)11 is close to 
 
9 Andy Lim and Victor Cha, “New Dataset: China-DPRK 
High Level Visits since 1953”, beyond parallel, 17 March 2017, 
https://beyondparallel.csis.org/china-dprk-high-level-visits-
since-1953/ (accessed 15 January 2018). 
10 “Jinzhuan huiyi kaimu zhi ji guanfang bu xiwang min-
zhong jujiao chaoxian heshiyan” [At the opening of the 
BRICS summit it is hoped on the official (Chinese) side that 
public attention will not be focused on North Korea’s nu-
clear weapons test], Lianhe zaobao, 4 September 2017, http:// 
www.zaobao.com.sg/znews/greater-china/story20170904-
792367 (accessed 10 December 2017). 
11 North Korea blew up an entrance to the mountain in 
the presence of foreign journalists in May 2018. However, 
international observers do not see this as a real concession, 
as the plant had already been severely damaged during the 
last nuclear test in September 2017. 
the Chinese border, and the provinces bordering 
North Korea are at risk of radioactive contamination. 
Pyongyang’s nuclear programme has 
direct implications for the regional 
security architecture and China’s 
security interests. 
Furthermore, Pyongyang’s nuclear programme has 
direct implications for the regional security architec-
ture and thus China’s security interests. North Korea 
provides the USA with good reasons to expand its mili-
tary presence and ballistic missile defence systems. 
Beijing fears in particular that the installation of the 
US missile defence system THAAD in South Korea 
could prove to be part of a large-scale American mis-
sile defence network in the Asia-Pacific region aimed 
at weakening China’s nuclear deterrent capability. 
There is also a risk that Japan and South Korea might 
consider deploying American nuclear weapons12 or 
even pursuing their own nuclear capabilities due to 
the increasing security threat posed by North Korea.13 
While in the past China has repeatedly blocked UN 
sanctions against North Korea, watered down resolu-
tions in the UN Security Council, and only partially 
implemented agreed sanctions, the Chinese leader-
ship is now more willing to support a harsher approach 
towards North Korea due to the rapid development of 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. In 2017, 
China supported a number of UN sanctions, including 
(for the first time) the restriction of oil supplies to 
reduce North Korea’s oil imports by 30 percent. While 
Washington is trying to get Pyongyang to abandon its 
nuclear weapons programme through diplomatic iso-
lation and economic sanctions, Beijing sees sanctions 
primarily as an instrument to get North Korea back to 
the negotiating table. China’s new stance on UN sanc-
tions reflects its dissatisfaction with North Korea’s 
 
12 “Mattis schließt Stationierung von Nuklearwaffen in 
Südkorea nicht aus”, Spiegel Online, 19 September 2017, http:// 
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nordkorea-us-verteidigungs-
minister-james-mattis-erwaegt-stationierung-nuklearer-
waffen-in-suedkorea-a-1168590.html (accessed 1 December 
2017); “Japan Should Discuss Deployment of US Nukes inside 
Country”, Japan Economic Newswire, 6 September 2017. 
13 Christoph Neidhart, “Warum in Japan und Südkorea 
wieder über eigene Atomwaffen diskutiert wird”, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 9 August 2017, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ 
atomwaffen-paragraf-des-friedens-1.3622408 (accessed 1 De-
cember 2017). 
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policy14 and at the same time signals its willingness 
to cooperate with the USA in order to prevent the 
American from any unilateral (including military) 
action against North Korea.15 
As a first step towards solving the North Korea 
problem, China has internationally promoted a 
“double freeze”, whereby North Korea would tem-
porarily forego further nuclear and missile tests while 
the USA and South Korea would halt their joint mili-
tary manoeuvres. The proposal was rejected by the 
USA (and Japan). But ultimately, this was in fact the 
(preliminary) outcome of the Trump-Kim Summit 
in Singapore in June 2018. After the surprising an-
nouncement of the summits not only between North 
and South Korea, but also between Donald Trump 
and Kim Jong Un, it initially seemed as if China 
would be left with the role of bystander in the evolv-
ing dynamics on the Korean peninsula. Since the 
meeting between Trump and Kim, however, it has 
become clear that China remains an important player 
in negotiations on North Korea’s future. The unex-
pected and initially secret visit of Kim Jong Un to 
Beijing at the end of March 2018 marks a turning 
point in Chinese-North Korean relations. The fact that 
Kim travelled to China both shortly before and after 
the Singapore Summit confirms the impression that 
the two leaders are once again coordinating their 
actions more closely. 
Kim’s change of direction – suspending nuclear 
and missile testing and focusing on the country’s eco-
nomic development – has been welcomed in Beijing. 
China’s long-standing efforts to persuade North Korea 
to open up its economy could now finally bear fruit. 
Shortly after the Trump-Kim Summit, China suggested 
that UN sanctions on North Korea could be partially 
lifted, but such a move has been firmly rejected by 
the USA since the goal of full nuclear disarmament 
has not yet been achieved. Given the warming ties 
between Pyongyang and Washington, however, there 
are signs that China has relaxed its enforcement 
of against North Korea.16 
 
14 See Justin Hastings, “Sanction Busting, North Korea-
style”, The Maritime Executive, 12 February 2018, https://www. 
maritime-executive.com/editorials/sanctions-busting-north-
korean-style#gs.K6gz50s (accessed 15 February 2018). 
15 Evan Osnos, “Why China Won’t Pressure North Korea as 
Much as Trump Wants”, The New Yorker, 19 September 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-china-isnt-
ready-to-put-pressure-on-north-korea (accessed 3 February 2018). 
16 Colin Zwirko and Oliver Hotham, “Kim Jong-un Making 
Two-day Visit to Beijing This Week: Chinese State Media”, 
Conclusion and Outlook 
The “historic” summit between the US President and 
the North Korean leader in June 2018 helps to put 
realising the three most important goals of Chinese 
policy on the Korean peninsula – no war, no chaos, 
no nuclear weapons – at least theoretically within 
the realm of the possible. Whether the very vague 
and general agreements reached in Singapore will 
actually lead to a sustainable disarmament and peace 
process, however, remains uncertain. Both Beijing’s 
commitment to supporting Pyongyang in its econom-
ic reforms and Seoul’s interest in intensifying inter-
Korean economic cooperation could help Kim to 
realise his plan of establishing a “socialist economy” 
without making any serious efforts in nuclear dis-
armament as agreed in principle at the summits. 
However, the assessment made by many commen-
tators that China is the true winner of the Singapore 
summit applies only partially. Although one of China’s 
core demands – to temporarily end the joint military 
manoeuvres with South Korea – has been fulfilled, 
Beijing has also lost its mediating role between Wa-
shington and Pyongyang for the time being. Thus, Bei-
jing continues to be concerned that a rapprochement 
between the US and North Korea could significantly 
affect China’s influence on the Kim regime. As ten-
sions between China and the USA continue to rise, 
Kim might make good use of the situation and play 
the two major powers off against each other and at the 
same time reduce North Korea’s dependence on China. 
Moreover, Beijing could lose Pyongyang as a “bargain-
ing chip” in the ongoing trade dispute with the US. 
Geostrategic competition with the US in the Asia-
Pacific region continues to play a primary role in 
China’s foreign policy strategy on the Korean penin-
sula. China can have no interest in seeing the diplo-
matic approach fail. At the same time, however, 
Beijing wants to make sure that it is not left out of 
further negotiations over the Korean peninsula, such 
as over a peace treaty. Finally, it must also be prepared 
in case the diplomatic process fails again after all. 
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As part of its turn to the East (povorot na vostok), Russia 
has been seeking a more significant role in East 
Asia – as one of the major regional powers that can 
influence key issues, such as the conflict over North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programme – 
since the second half of the 2000s. Moscow achieved 
its first success in this respect in 2003 with its inclu-
sion in the six-party talks. Since the suspension of 
talks in 2009, Russia has sought to expand its rela-
tions with North and South Korea to gain influence 
both regionally and globally. 
Russia’s Threat Perception 
Russia’s leadership has condemned North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile programme, pointing to the nega-
tive consequences that a weakening of the non-pro-
liferation regime might have. The proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile 
technology is considered a “military threat” in Rus-
sia’s 2014 military doctrine.1 Moscow is not only 
concerned that nuclear material or missile technology 
from North Korea could fall into the hands of terror-
ists, but also fears a loss of status if the previously 
exclusive circle of nuclear powers is extended. After 
all, Russia’s claim to being a major world power is 
also based on membership of this circle.2 
While Russia does not consider itself to be directly 
threatened by North Korea’s missile and nuclear pro-
gramme, indirect dangers from the crash or launch of 
a (misguided) North Korean missile close to, or over, 
Russian territory cannot be ruled out. Moscow also fears 
the effects of a military conflict on the Korean penin-
 
1 Voennaja Doktrina Rossijskij Federatsii [Military Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation], Sovet Beopastnosti Rossijskoj Federa-
tsii – official website, 25 December 2014, http:// www.scrf. 
gov.ru/security/military/document129/ (accessed 7 June 2018). 
2 See Artjom Lukin, “Rossiya i severokorejskiy jaderniy 
krizis” [Russia and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis], Izvestiya 
Vostochnogo Instituta 2 (2017): 59–67 (63). 
sula, as it shares a 17-kilometre land border and a 22-
kilometre sea border with North Korea. To protect them-
selves against military risks, the Russian armed forces 
have strengthened their air and missile defence sys-
tems and early warning radars in the Far East in recent 
years.3 Russia could react to possible migrant flows by 
sealing off its relatively small border section; never-
theless, the consequences for the Russian leadership 
of any destabilisation or disintegration of state struc-
tures in North Korea would be difficult to calculate. 
In addition, the conflict threatens to change the 
configuration of military and political forces in 
the region to Russia’s disadvantage. Moscow accuses 
Washington of using the North Korean missile and 
nuclear programme merely as a pretext for an already 
planned military upswing in East Asia; it heavily criti-
cises the installation of missile defence systems in 
South Korea and Japan in particular, which it inter-
prets as forming part of a containment strategy that is 
also directed against Russia.4 There is also concern – 
not openly expressed – about a Chinese arms build-
up and a general increase in Beijing’s power. As a 
weak political actor in East Asia to date, Russia wor-
ries that the intensification of the North Korean prob-
lem could lead to a more bipolar regional order, and 
not, as it intends, a multipolar order with Russia as 
an important pole. Moscow therefore views the North 
Korea conflict not only with a narrow focus on the 
proliferation problem, but also in the broader context 
of regional strategic balance. 
 
3 “Boevyie razchety S-400 zastupili na dezhurstvo v Primor-
skom Krae” [Air Defence S-400 Deployed in the Primorsky 
Oblast], Izvestiya, 22 December 2017, https://iz.ru/686479/ 
2017-12-22/boevye-raschety-s-400-zastupili-na-dezhurstvo-v-
primorskom-krae (accessed 7 June 2018). 
4 See Konstantin Asmolov, “The Greater Evil”, Russia in 
Global Affairs, 26 December 2017, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ 
number/The-Greater-Evil-19264 (accessed 7 June 2018). 
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Possible Solutions 
Even though Russia has criticised the North Korean 
nuclear and missile programme, it assigns the respon-
sibility for the emergence of the conflict primarily to 
the USA. Pyongyang’s behaviour is not interpreted as 
irrational, but as a comprehensible defensive reaction 
to Washington’s offensive threat. The USA is accused 
of having created the incentives for North Korea’s 
leadership equating security with nuclear deterrence 
through its actively pursued policy of regime change 
(the “colour revolutions”, “Arab Spring”), terminating 
treaties or putting them in question (ABM Treaty, 
JCPoA, INF), and militarily upscaling in South Korea.5 
As a result, Russia utterly rejects the options for 
military action discussed in the USA. The Russian 
leadership has also categorised as ineffective the 
attempt to use further sanctions in the hope of per-
suading North Korea to give in.6 Although Moscow 
has agreed to UN sanctions, it believes the potential 
of economic sanctions has been largely exhausted 
since late 2017. According to President Putin, North 
Koreans “would rather eat grass than give up their 
nuclear weapons”.7 Russia may partly be arguing that 
sanctions are ineffective out of its own self-interest, 
wanting to discredit the West’s sanctions policy 
towards Moscow in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. 
Russia insists on a diplomatic solution to the con-
flict, but is pursuing much more limited goals than 
the USA. A complete denuclearisation of North Korea 
is considered unrealistic in the short to medium term, 
at least as long as Pyongyang feels threatened. Mos-
cow therefore advocates a three-step procedure: first, 
in a double freeze, North Korea should refrain from 
further missile and nuclear tests, and the USA and its 
regional allies from major military manoeuvres; then 
bilateral negotiations between Pyongyang and Wa-
shington as well as between North and South Korea 
would have to be launched; and, in a third step, ques-
tions relating to the denuclearisation and demilitari-
 
5 “Russia Lambasts Both North Korea’s Nuclear Gambling 
and US’ Provocative Conduct – Lavrov”, TASS, 2 December 
2017, http://tass.com/politics/978758 (accessed 7 June 2018). 
6 See Andrei Lan’kov, “Kak Rossii otnosit’sja k novym 
sanktsjam protiv Servernoj Korei” [How Russia reacts to new 
sanctions against North Korea] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow 
Center, 16 January 2018), https://carnegie.ru/commentary/ 
75259 (accessed 6 July 2018). 
7 “North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Putin Calls Sanctions Use-
less”, BBC, 5 September 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-asia-41158281 (accessed 7 June 2018). 
sation of the Korean peninsula would have to be ne-
gotiated within the framework of a regional security 
system yet to be established.8 
Moscow attaches particular 
importance to the establishment of a 
regional security system. 
Moscow is working closely with its “strategic part-
ner” China on diplomatic initiatives. In July 2017, 
Putin and Xi Jinping had already presented a joint 
“Freeze for freeze” plan.9 However, the “three-stage 
roadmap”, presented in November 2017 by Russia’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov, reveals a 
number of different priorities. Moscow attaches par-
ticular importance to the establishment of a regional 
security system, which is not mentioned in the 
“Freeze for freeze” plan. Such a system would give 
it a formal say, which would benefit its position in 
Northeast Asia. Beijing, however, has shown little 
interest in acting to facilitate Russia’s greater role in 
the region and has largely ignored long-standing Rus-
sian proposals to transform the six-party talks into a 
collective security system.10 The North Korean prob-
lem thus reveals both the advantages and the limits 
of Moscow’s “strategic partnership” with Beijing. 
Given Russia’s growing rapprochement with China 
following the crisis surrounding Ukraine, it can be 
expected to continue coordinating its policy towards 
Pyongyang closely with China. After all, both coun-
tries are united by the goal of weakening the US’s 
position in East Asia. Nevertheless, Russia cannot 
count on substantial support from China in its at-
tempts to use the North Korean conflict to realise 
its ambitions for a great power role in the region. 
 
8 “Valdai Club Asian Conference Focuses on Economic 
Cooperation and Security”, valdai.club (online), 27 November 
2017, http://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/valdai-
presser-seoul/ (accessed 7 June 2018). 
9 “Press Statement Following Russian-Chinese Talks” (Mos-
cow: The Kremlin, 4 July 2017), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/54979 (accessed 12 July 2018). 
10 See Artyom Lukin and Georgy Toloraya, “Moscow’s 
Diplomatic Game on the Korean Peninsula”, in Artyom 
Lukin et al., Nuclear Weapons and Russian-North Korean Relations 
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2017), 49–
63 (52); Georgij Toloraja, “Rossiya I problem korejskogo polu-
ostrova na sovremennom etape” [Russia and the problems on 
the Korean peninsula at the current stage], Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniya 4 (2014): 82–90 (90). 
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Against this background, Russia has welcomed 
the substantive results of the meetings between South 
and North Korea and between Kim and Trump, as 
they contain important elements of its own approach 
to conflict resolution and create an opportunity to 
reduce sanctions and thus improve trade relations 
with South and North Korea.11 However, Moscow was 
barely involved in the diplomatic process that led to 
the summits. While North and South Korea show in-
terest in integrating Russia more closely into the pro-
cess ahead, Moscow fears that the USA and China will 
marginalise it. To avoid being marginalised in the North 
Korean conflict, Moscow is therefore increasingly 
focusing on contacts with South and North Korea. In 
late June 2018, Putin received South Korea’s President 
Moon for talks in Moscow; in late May Foreign Minis-
ter Sergei Lavrov had already travelled to Pyongyang 
for a meeting with Kim Jong Un and had delivered an 
invitation for a state visit to Moscow. As these visits 
among demonstrate, Russia wants to become more 
visible in the North Korea conflict resolution.12 
Russia as Mediator? Arguments for ... 
In December 2017 Lavrov had already declared his 
country’s willingness to serve as a mediator in the 
conflict over North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
gramme.13 Even though it seems unlikely that Russia 
will be able to assume a prominent mediating posi-
tion following the Trump-Kim Summit, the demand 
for greater Russian involvement may increase if it 
turns out that the vague summit declaration between 
Trump and Kim is difficult to translate into substan-
tial concrete progress. 
First, the fact that Moscow maintains good rela-
tions with both North and South Korea speaks in 
favour of a Russian mediating role. In Soviet times, 
 
11 “Meeting with Chairman of the DPRK Supreme People’s 
Assembly Presidium Kim-yong Nam” (Moscow: The Kremlin, 
14 June 2018), http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/KP/ 
events/57784 (accessed 6 July 2018). 
12 The North Korean Foreign Minister travelled to Moscow 
on 4 April 2018; two days after the Trump-Kim Summit, 
the President of the Presidium of the North Korean Supreme 
People’s Assembly met Putin in Moscow. 
13 Catherine Wong, “Could Russia Replace China as Power 
Broker on North Korea?”, South China Morning Post (online), 
9 December 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ 
diplomacy-defence/article/2123562/could-russia-replace-
china-power-broker-north-korea (accessed 7 June 2018). 
Moscow supported Pyongyang ideologically, economi-
cally and technologically. The relationship cooled 
considerably in the first half of the 1990s, partly due 
to Moscow converting bilateral trade to a foreign 
exchange rate and thus terminating its subsidised 
energy supplies, as well as Russia opening up politi-
cally towards South Korea. However, its reduced 
political and economic relations with North Korea 
proved counterproductive. Since Moscow no longer 
had any channels of influence in Pyongyang, the 
other actors – such as Japan, South Korea and the 
USA – saw no added value in including Russia in 
conflict resolution formats. 
After taking office in 2000, President Putin there-
fore modified the previous policy on Korea, reviving 
and expanding economic and political relations with 
Pyongyang (though not to their original level). He 
was the first Russian President to travel to Pyongyang 
in 2000, and return visits by Kim Jong Il took place in 
2001, 2002 and 2011. In 2012, Moscow cancelled 90 
percent of Pyongyang’s $10 billion debt. Throughout 
Russia’s alienation from the West from 2014 on-
wards, bilateral relations further intensified, a fact 
reflected in high-ranking delegation visits.14 Russia’s 
post-Soviet leadership also cultivated relations with 
South Korea. Following the establishment of diplo-
matic relations in 1991, both sides have pushed ahead 
with their political and especially their economic rela-
tions, aiming since 2008 to establish a “strategic part-
nership”.15 With a trade volume of 12 billion US dol-
lars in 2017, South Korea now ranks seventh amongst 
Russia’s most important trading partners. 
Second, Russia’s role as a mediator is supported 
by the fact that Moscow would benefit politically and 
economically from an easing of the conflict. Since the 
1990s, Russia has wanted to link its own Far East to 
any new trans-Korean transport and infrastructure 
projects being created so as to expand its trade with 
South Korea, free itself from over-dependence on 
China as the most important trading partner and in-
vestor in the weakly developed and sparsely populated 
Far East, and extend its own political role on the 
 
14 See Serghei Golunov, Does North Korea Have a Place in 
Russia’s “Turn to the East”?, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 428 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for European, Russian and Eura-
sian Studies [IERES] at the George Washington University’s 
Elliott School of International Affairs, 2016). 
15 “Interview with South Korean Media” (Moscow: The 
Kremlin, President of Russia – official website, 9 January 
2010), http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/1277/print (accessed 
7 June 2018). 
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peninsula within the framework of trilateral projects. 
Moscow also believes these projects contribute to 
easing tensions between North and South Korea by 
creating incentives for cooperation through economic 
interdependence. Inter alia, Russia has launched the 
construction of a rail link and plans to build elec-
tricity lines and a gas pipeline. The sanctions imposed 
on North Korea from 2016 onwards prevent it from 
implementing further investment projects, such as 
modernising the North Korean railway system and 
power grid, and generally hamper the expansion of 
Russian-North Korean trade relations.16 
An easing of the North Korea conflict with prominent 
Russian participation would also represent a pres-
tigious domestic and foreign policy success for the 
Kremlin. Since the interventions in Donbas and Syria, 
Russia’s leadership has tried to dispel the impression 
domestically that it is plunging headlong into costly 
and unpredictable situations. Instead, the Kremlin 
seeks to present itself as a “force for peace” that solves 
conflicts set in motion by Western actors – above all 
the USA. Moscow may also feel motivated to cooper-
ate in resolving the North Korean conflict so as to im-
prove its shattered relationship with large parts of the 
US political establishment. Since the crisis over Ukraine, 
Moscow has been striving to “compartmentalise” its 
relations with the USA, so that individual areas of con-
flict – for example, the Euro-Atlantic security order 
or Ukraine – are put to one side, making transactional 
or even cooperative policies in other regions possible. 
... and against 
While Russia could benefit in many ways from suc-
cessfully mediating in the North Korean conflict, it 
is doubtful whether it could fulfil this role. First, its 
 
16 The state company “Russian Railways” has already com-
pleted the 54 kilometre connection from Russian Khasan to 
North Korean Ranjin for $171 million and invested $109 mil-
lion in a cargo terminal in Ranjin. These investments will 
only pay for themselves when the connection to South Korea 
is built. However, this project is on hold due to the current 
tensions, as are the gas pipeline and electricity connection to 
South Korea. The sanctions imposed in 2016 and 2017 inter 
alia restrict trade in coal and oil, complicate financing, and 
ban renewing employment contracts with North Korean 
migrant workers. Lake Artyom Lukin/Liudmila Zakharova, 
“Russia-North Korea Economic Ties: Is There More Than 
Meets the Eye?”, in Lukin et al., Nuclear Weapons and Russian-
North Korean Relations (see note 10), 15–29. 
ability to exert substantial influence on the leader-
ship in Pyongyang is questionable. Moscow has in-
deed expanded its communication channels to North 
Korea; it is also one of the few countries that trade with 
Pyongyang and is one of North Korea’s few connections 
to the outside world.17 However, these communica-
tion channels, trade relations and infrastructure con-
nections, only provide very limited opportunities for 
actual impact. Russia’s influence channels and coer-
cion potential are much weaker than that of China. 
While North Korea’s trade volume with Russia was 77 
million US dollars in 2016, it was more than 50 times 
as high with China: five billion US dollars.18 Even 
the fact that Russia plays a prominent role for North 
Korea – for example as a supplier of coal and oil and 
as the host country to the largest contingent of North 
Korean workers abroad (around 30,000) – has not been 
helpful for exerting political influence in the past. 
Moscow will probably not invest very 
much diplomatic capital in mediating 
between North Korea and the US. 
Second, it is debatable whether Russia could dem-
onstrate the necessary degree of impartiality to bring 
together the divergent approaches of the US and 
China, and South and North Korea. Moscow is less 
biased in the conflict between South and North Korea 
than Beijing or Washington, and maintains good rela-
tions with both states. However, as a major global 
power, Russia has since 2014 increasingly leaned on 
China, whilst its relationship with the USA suffers 
from geopolitical rivalries and a massive loss of con-
fidence due to the Ukraine crisis. Russia faces a dilem-
ma here. Given its increasing asymmetry of power 
with China – to its own disadvantage – there are 
certainly incentives for improving relations with the 
USA via the North Korea problem, and thus expand-
 
17 A rail link connects the Russian city Khasan with North 
Korean Ranjin. There are ferry connections across the river 
Tumen (since 2017), and twice weekly flights between Pyong-
yang and Vladivostok. Moreover, North Korea’s access to the 
Internet is partly via private Russian companies. 
18 While the Soviet Union still accounted for 50 percent 
of North Korea’s foreign trade in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
shrank to 1.2 percent in 2016. Russia’s real share is likely to 
be higher, since it is estimated that as much as one third of 
the goods delivered to North Korea via China originate from 
Russia – but this does not give Russia any influence in 
North Korea. See Lukin and Zakharova, “Russia-North Korea 
Economic Ties” (see note 16), 15ff. 
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ing its room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis China. But Mos-
cow would have to abandon its close coordination 
with Beijing and take American interests much more 
into account than before. In return, it would run the 
risk of deteriorating relations with Beijing.19 
Against this background, Russia is interested in 
a visible involvement in the negotiation process for 
status reasons and to safeguard its interests. Given its 
good relations with both North and South Korea, it 
can also play a supportive role in bringing the two 
countries closer together. However, it is unlikely 
that Moscow will invest much diplomatic capital in 
mediating between North Korea and the US or China 
and the US – especially as Russia would certainly 
benefit more from a solution than from an escalation 
of the dispute, but can live with a continuation of the 
conflict. Moscow’s perception of a military threat is 
comparatively low, and the expected economic gains 
from the withdrawal of sanctions are not crucial. 
Moscow could even capitalise on controlled instability 
in the region. After all, this ties up US military forces 
and intensifies its rivalry with China, a constellation 
that Moscow can use to maintain and expand its lee-
way vis-à-vis both Washington and Beijing. A much 
greater Russian commitment can only be expected if 
the conflict threatens to escalate militarily. 
Opportunities for Cooperation with 
Russia: Limited and Untapped 
Russia and the EU share common interests in the 
conflict over North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
gramme. Both want to prevent a military escalation, 
both are interested in preserving the non-proliferation 
regime, and both aim to establish a collective security 
system for the region. Nevertheless, the potential for 
cooperation between Moscow and Brussels is limited. 
This is due, first, to the fact that Russia and the EU 
differ on who is responsible for the conflict: Russia 
primarily blames the US, the EU blames North Korea. 
As a result, they have adopted diverging approaches 
to conflict resolution. While both sides advocate a 
path of diplomatic negotiations, they assess the ben-
efits of existing and potential new sanctions differently. 
 
19 See Alexandr Gabuev, “Global’noe sopernichestvo veli-
kich derzhav: vliyanie na Korejskiy poluostrov” [The global 
rivalry of the great powers: influence on the Korean penin-
sula] (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 19 June 2018), https:// 
carnegie.ru/2018/06/19/ru-pub-76620 (accessed 6 July 2018). 
Moscow had agreed to economic sanctions in 2016 
and 2017, but had partially softened them in advance; 
there are also reports that Russian companies are cir-
cumventing the sanctions by smuggling in the border 
region.20 Moreover, Russia itself was sanctioned by 
the West in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis and will 
show no interest in declaring the same instrument 
effective against North Korea. The EU’s calls for more 
Russian “compliance” with the sanctions imposed on 
Pyongyang therefore have little chance of success. 
Second, the potential for cooperation is limited by 
a lack of trust – mainly due to the Ukrainian crisis, 
but also because of reports that Pyongyang received 
supplies for its missile construction from and via Rus-
sia.21 And third, Moscow does not perceive the EU as 
an equal political actor in East Asia. From a Russian 
perspective, cooperation with Brussels therefore offers 
little potential for upgrading its own position in the 
region. Beyond coordinating with China, Moscow is 
more likely to try to enter into a dialogue with the 
Trump administration on the North Korean problem 
and to compartmentalise the heavily strained Rus-
sian-American relations. 
Despite the difficulties, it would make sense for 
the EU and Russia to sound out their potential for 
cooperation on the North Korean issue to a greater 
extent than hitherto, for example through expert dia-
logues involving official representatives in the “Track 
1.5” format. The immediate focus should be on how 
the extended negotiation process and implementation 
of the results agreed therein can be jointly supported. 
With perspective, it would then also be possible to 
determine what opportunities exist for cooperating 
on trans-Korean infrastructure and trade projects. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Regional_Perspectives 
 
 
 
20 Ian Talley, “U.N. Report Faults China, Russia for Sub-
verting North Korean Santions”, Wall Street Journal, 2 Febru-
ary 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-report-faults-
china-russia-for-subverting-north-korea-sanctions-151761 
0153 (accessed 6 July 2018). 
21 North Korea’s cooperation with smuggler networks from 
the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1980s and early 1990s is 
well documented; it is unclear, however, whether these net-
works are still active and/or whether they are tolerated or even 
supported by the Russian government. See Robert Schmuck-
er and Markus Schiller, “Nordkoreas Raketenprogramm – 
Bedrohung oder Bluff?”, SIRIUS 1, no. 4 (2017): 319–41. 
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Japan’s relations with North Korea are historically 
extremely strained. Not least due to this, North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles pose a serious 
military threat to the Japanese islands of the Korean 
peninsula. Since Japan itself does not maintain diplo-
matic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea and constitutionally limits its military clout 
to self-defence, it is diplomatically and militarily de-
pendent on America in the nuclear conflict. However, 
the threat perceptions and political goals of the two 
allies diverge to some extent. In addition, the nuclear 
conflict has a complex domestic dimension for the 
government in Tokyo. 
Relationships Burdened by History 
In Korea, colonisation by Japan (1910–45) was per-
ceived politically as foreign rule, economically as 
exploitation, and culturally as an attempt at assimila-
tion. Resistance against the former colonial power is 
therefore part of the founding myth of North Korea’s 
anti-imperialist state doctrine. When Japan provided 
military bases (such as Okinawa) and civilian supplies 
to the USA during the Korean War (1950–53), Tokyo 
was also considered an enemy of the North. While 
South Korea normalised its bilateral relations with 
Japan in 1965 – the two sides signed a basic treaty, 
and Japan granted donations and loans amounting to 
$500 million – North Korea increasingly became a 
nuisance and problem from a Japanese point of view. 
The terrorist Japanese Red Army used North Korea as 
a retreat; in the late 1970s Japanese citizens were kid-
napped there. 
Following the end of the Cold War in Europe, Japan 
and North Korea also sought normalisation, with the 
first official talks taking place in 1991. Japan offered 
an apology for its colonial rule, and North Korea 
belatedly fulfilled its obligation to have the nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon inspected by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. In 1992, however, bilateral 
talks were broken off because North Korea officially 
denied the kidnapping of Japanese citizens. It was 
not until ten years later, when Japan’s Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichirô travelled to Pyongyang and met 
Kim Jong Il, that the kidnappings were first acknowl-
edged by North Korea. Japan was informed that eight 
of the thirteen (confirmed) abductees had already 
died. Pyongyang’s admission of responsibility for the 
kidnappings, coupled with the exit permit for the five 
survivors, paved the way for signing the Pyongyang 
Declaration, in which Japan apologised for its colo-
nial rule and offered an economic aid package as 
compensation. In return, North Korea promised to 
solve missile and nuclear issues through dialogue, 
and to refrain from kidnappings in future. 
The nuclear crisis that intensified in 2002/2003 
once again alienated the two countries. North Korea’s 
declaration that it would participate in the six-party 
talks was followed in 2004 by a second visit by 
Koizumi, during which the two sides reaffirmed the 
Pyongyang Declaration. However, the hoped-for nor-
malisation was not achieved. After North Korea trans-
ferred two sets of human remains to Japan that were 
shown by DNA analysis not to be from any of the 
abduction victims, a new ice age began. From then 
on, discussions were only conducted at the working 
level, without any success. To this day, North Korea’s 
nuclear armament, its repeated nuclear weapons and 
missile tests, the clarification of the fate of all kid-
napped Japanese nationals, the sanctions imposed on 
North Korea, and the size of economic aid payments 
are irreconcilable points of contention.1 
One legacy of the colonial era is the Korean minor-
ity living in Japan, who is at least 500,000 strong. How-
ever, it does not form a homogeneous group since its 
loyalty is divided between North Korea (Chosen Sôren) 
and South Korea (Mindan).2 The Chosen Sôren group, 
 
1 Aurelia Mulgan, “Japan-North Korea Relations”, in Japan’s 
Foreign Relations in Asia, ed. James D. J. Brown and Jeff King-
ston (London: Routledge, 2018), 235. 
2 Ludgera Lewerich, Zainichi-Korian – Die koreanische Minder-
heit in Japan (University of Tübingen, March 2011), http:// 
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politically close to North Korea, is much the larger. 
In the absence of official diplomatic representations, 
their branches in North Korea are considered unoffi-
cial Japanese embassies. 
The four islands of the Japanese 
archipelago “should be sunken 
into the sea by the nuclear 
bomb of Juche”. 
For several years, Chosen Sôren supplied North 
Korea with goods, expertise, and luxury goods, and 
financially supported the regime. The Japanese 
authorities are therefore keeping close watch over it. 
The group has no direct influence on Japan’s Korean 
diplomacy. 
Real Threats 
North Korea’s missiles, which Japan must assume 
have nuclear capability, threaten the Japanese island 
archipelago. Japan is within range of several success-
fully tested (Nodong) short- and medium-range mis-
siles.3 According to official DPRK announcements, 
the former colonial power is their chosen destination: 
“The four islands of the Japanese archipelago should 
be sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of 
Juche.”4 Other possible targets are Japanese cities or 
American military bases such as Okinawa. However, 
catastrophic effects could also be expected from non-
nuclear attacks: North Korea could equip its missiles 
with chemical weapons. 
Japan had to accept the violation of its territorial 
sovereignty on several occasions. In 2016, North 
Korea tested over twenty ballistic missiles, three of 
which came down in waters belonging to Japan’s 
 
www.jdzb.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/PDF/veroeffentlichungen/ 
tagungsbaende/D61/15-p1340%20lewerich.pdf (accessed 
15 April 2018). 
3 Hirofumi Tosaki, The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Japan’s 
Deterrence Posture (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International 
Affairs, 2017), 3f., https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_ 
library/world/170314_tosaki.pdf (accessed 10 March 2018). 
4 “North Korea Threatens to Sink Japan’s Four Main Islands 
into the Sea with a Nuclear Bomb”, The Japan Times, 14 Sep-
tember 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/ 
14/national/politics-diplomacy/north-korea-threatens-sink-
japans-four-main-islands-sea-nuclear-bomb/ (accessed 
20 April 2018). 
exclusive economic zone. In 2017, eleven successful 
tests were conducted on missiles, five of which either 
struck Japanese waters or flew over Japanese terri-
tory.5 In its 2017 Defence White Paper, Tokyo rated 
this development a “new threat level for the region 
and Japan”.6 In January 2018, Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzô declared that North Korea’s development of 
nuclear weapons and missiles represented a threat 
to his country that was unprecedented in its gravity 
and acuteness.7 
Goals, Strategies, Options 
In its relations with Pyongyang, Tokyo’s political 
objectives are full denuclearisation, the cessation or 
prevention of proliferation, the unequivocal clarifi-
cation of the fate of the persons abducted from Japan, 
and an end to the colonial past.8 Militarily, it aims to 
protect its territory against North Korean attacks and 
associated blackmail attempts. However, Japan’s pos-
sibilities to react militarily or diplomatically or exert 
influence on North Korea are limited. 
Diplomatically, Tokyo traditionally pursues a strat-
egy of dialogue and pressure. However, in response to 
North Korea’s multiple missile launches the dialogue 
strategy was largely abandoned in favour of one of 
maximum pressure. Prime Minister Abe Shinzô, who 
is regarded as a hardliner in relation to North Korea, 
repeatedly stated that talks could only be resumed if 
North Korea took concrete steps towards the complete 
and irreversible dismantling of its nuclear programme, 
and clarified the fate of the kidnapped.9 According to 
 
5 Hiroyasu Akutsu, North Korea’s Missile Shower Cements 
Japan’s Defense Strategy (East Asia Forum, 2018), http://www. 
eastasiaforum.org/2018/03/03/north-koreas-missile-shower-
cements-japans-defence-strategy/ (accessed 23 March 2018). 
6 Ministry of Defence, Defense of Japan, Annual White Paper, 
2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2017.html 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
7 Itsunori Onodera, “Kitachôsen kiki wo kokufuku dekiru 
ka” [Can the North Korea crisis be resolved?], Gaikou 44 (July/ 
August 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000295526. 
pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
8 Masaharu Kohno, “Neutralize the North Korean Threat”, 
Brussels Forum 2018 (The German Marshall Fund), http:// 
brussels.gmfus.org/videos/brussels-forum-2018-neutralize-
north-korea-threat (accessed 13 March 2018). 
9 “Prospect of U.S.-North Korea Summit Prompts Jitters 
in Tokyo about Being Left Vulnerable”, The Japan Times, 
7 March 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/07/ 
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the Abe administration, it is essential to have unity 
between Japan and its coalition partners, in particular 
the United States, on whose military assistance and 
nuclear shield Japan’s security depends; efforts to 
establish such unity and repeatedly convince the 
coalition partners of the strategy of maximum pres-
sure was the Japanese government’s focus – until 
President Trump’s surprising turnaround at the Sin-
gapore Summit.10 In its role of “tough and cautious 
cop”, Tokyo pushed multilaterally for consistently 
pursuing the strategy of maximum pressure; while 
unilaterally or together with its allies, it advocated 
the implementation of the sanctions and gave deci-
sive support to international efforts to return North 
Korea to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and 
place the North Korean nuclear programme under 
the supervision and regulation of the IAEA.11 Japan is 
offering the IAEA 300 million yen (around 2.2 million 
euros) to implement the required denuclearisation.12 
As a proponent of a policy of far-reaching sanc-
tions against North Korea, Japan diplomatically in-
fluences third countries in Southeast Asia and Africa 
to actually implement the agreed punitive measures, 
as well as imposing its own sanctions, some of which 
are much stricter than the UN’s. While implementing 
international and national decisions, the Japanese 
authorities face the challenge of preventing sanctions 
violations emanating from within Japan, for example 
by Chosen Sôren. 
Militarily, Japan has invested in defending against 
ballistic missiles, increasing the necessary budget 
funds to 67.9 billion yen (around 500 million euros) 
in the 2017 financial year. This included the acqui-
sition of new ship-based systems for Japan’s AEGIS 
destroyers and land-based Patriot PAC III missile inter-
ceptors. Since 2017, trilateral missile defence ma-
 
national/politics-diplomacy/prospect-u-s-north-korea-summit-
prompts-jitters-tokyo-left-vulnerable/#.Ws3o8i_5y9Y (ac-
cessed 7 March 2017). 
10 Shinzô Abe, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at 
the Seventy-second Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly”, The Government of Japan, 20 September 2017, 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201709/_00010. 
html (accessed 9 April 2018). 
11 Sakata Yasuyo, The North Korean Dilemma and Japan (Power 
Point-Handout, March 2018). 
12 Julian Ryall, “Japan Offers to Pay £2m for Inspections of 
North Korea Nuclear Facilities”, The Telegraph, 11 March 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/11/japan-offers-
pay-2m-inspections-north-korea-nuclear-facilities/amp/ 
(accessed 15 March 2018). 
noeuvres have also been held with the US and South 
Korea. The government would also like to acquire the 
US Aegis Ashore System. The J-alert system was intro-
duced to warn the civilian population of possible 
attacks.13 
At the multilateral level, Japan sees itself as a part-
ner both in the bilateral security alliance with the 
US and in trilateral security cooperation with South 
Korea and the US. Japan is striving to expand both, 
and to promote communication within them.14 Not 
least in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
programme, Tokyo has tackled numerous security 
policy reforms in recent years, and expanded its own 
possibilities, both legal and military, for collective 
self-defence.15 In addition, an exchange of intelligence 
information was contractually agreed with South 
Korea in 2016; and Japan, as a member of the United 
Nations Command (UNC), is contributing to the 
defence of South Korea. Its UNC rear headquarters, 
which monitors compliance with the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) introduced in 1954, is based in 
Yokota, Japan. 
Dilemmas 
There are two fundamental concerns as regards the 
US – Japan’s indispensable security guarantor. On 
the one hand, if the USA actually countenances an 
attack on North Korea, Japan might get drawn into 
a war and possibly even become the first victim of a 
North Korean nuclear strike. On the other hand, it 
fears that an isolationist America could withdraw 
from the region. 
 
13 Sheila A. Smith, “What a U.S.-North Korean Summit 
Means for Japan”, Foreign Affairs, no. 3 (2018), https://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2018-03-14/what-us-north-
korean-summit-means-japan (accessed 25 March 2018). 
14 Hirofumi Tosaki, The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Japan’s 
Deterrence Posture (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International 
Affairs, 2017), https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/ 
world/170314_tosaki.pdf (accessed 10 March 2018). 
15 See Alexandra Sakaki, Japans Sicherheitspolitik: Richtungs-
wechsel unter Abe?, SWP-Studie 21/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, December 2014), 16. 
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From the Japanese perspective, 
the maximum pressure strategy 
should be continued. 
The unpredictability of President Donald Trumps’ 
foreign and security policy – as shown, for example, 
in the surprising agreement on a summit meeting 
with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, which was not pre-
viously agreed with the Abe government – deeply 
unsettles Japan. It has long suspected that the US and 
South Korea exclude Japan from dialogue with North 
Korea (Japan passing).16 Tokyo recognises the Singapore 
Agreement itself as a necessary first step in the diplo-
macy, but criticises it as inadequate and not suffi-
ciently specific on the denuclearisation objective. 
Japan still fears that the USA could reach an agree-
ment with North Korea on a ban on long-range mis-
siles that would exclude short- and medium-range 
missiles (which threaten Japan) since these cannot 
reach the USA. The (helpless) realisation that Japan’s 
allies, South Korea and the US, are holding summits 
with North Korea without insisting in advance that 
North Korea keep its promise to initiate denuclearisa-
tion heightens these concerns. From the Japanese 
perspective, the strategy of maximum pressure should 
be maintained until concrete agreements have been 
reached and North Korea has demonstrably taken 
appropriate steps.17 
Japan finds itself in a weak position vis-à-vis North 
Korea following the summit meetings between the 
presidents of China, South Korea and the US with Kim 
Jong Un. After initial reservations, North Korea is now 
in favour of the Japanese proposal that Prime Minis-
ters Abe Shinzô and Kim Jong Un also hold a summit 
meeting. However, the prospects of a North Korean-
Japanese agreement on establishing diplomatic rela-
tions, Japan paying reparations, and North Korea 
clarifying the kidnapping issue remain unfavourable. 
 
16 Kenji Isezaki, “kita no ‘zanshu sakusen’ wa dare mo 
kangaete inai? Nihon wa ‘kaya no soto’ na kitachousen 
mondai” [Does nobody think of North Korea’s “decapitation 
strategy”? The North Korea problem where Japan is left out], 
AERA, 13 March 2018, https://dot.asahi.com/aera/201803120 
0057.html?page=1 (accessed 15 March 2018). 
17 See Daniel Hurst, “The Trump-Kim Summit: The View 
from Japan”, The Diplomat online, 12 June 2018, https://the-
diplomat.com/2018/06/the-trump-kim-summit-the-view-from-
japan (accessed 28 June 2018). 
According to unofficial statements, Pyongyang con-
siders the kidnapping issue to have been resolved.18 
Japan’s pacifist constitution (Article 9) generally 
restricts its possibilities for military action. The Japa-
nese military is only allowed to defend itself. More-
over, Japan’s hands are tied – apart from diplomatic 
influence on the USA. However, as mentioned above, 
Japan is permitted to engage in collective self-defence 
as a result of its 2016 security policy reforms. This 
strictly defensive security policy orientation is deeply 
anchored in domestic policy, and a majority of Japa-
nese respondents to a January 2018 survey were not 
convinced that the North Korean conflict could be 
resolved militarily, even though the majority of the 
population considers North Korea to be a very serious 
threat. Nor did the respondents support the stationing 
of American nuclear warheads in Japan for protec-
tion.19 
At the same time, Japan’s tough attitude toward 
North Korea also has domestic causes. Abe Shinzô’s 
rise to prime minister is closely linked to his commit-
ment to fully explaining the fate of the kidnapped. 
He will therefore find it nearly impossible to enter 
into an agreement with North Korea without some 
concessions in solving the kidnapping problem. He is 
also instrumentalising the threat from North Korea 
to implement the constitutional reforms he seeks. In 
this respect, the confrontational strategy of maximum 
pressure is convenient for the Abe administration. No 
consideration is given to the sensitivities of the Korean 
minority living in Japan, which has to struggle with 
social marginalisation and internal identity conflicts.20 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Regional_Perspectives 
 
 
 
18 “Via Unofficial Route, North Korea Informed Japan 
Earlier in Year That Abduction Issue Had Been Resolved: 
Sources”, The Japan Times, 8 April 2018, https://www.japan 
times.co.jp/news/2018/04/08/national/politics-diplomacy/via-
unofficial-route-north-korea-informed-japan-earlier-year-
abduction-issue-resolved-sources/#.Wsy-3mb5xmA (accessed 
9 April 2018). 
19 “Views of the Japanese and American People on the 
North Korean Situation”, GENRON NPO, 8 January 2018, http:// 
www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5385.html 
(accessed 16 March 2018). 
20 See Thomas Awe, Patriotismus und Diaspora im Japan der 
Nordkoreakrise, KAS-Länderbericht Japan (Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung e.V. [KAS], December 2017). 
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North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme poses a 
unique challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. North Korea is the only non-nuclear-weapon 
state to have developed nuclear weapons after acced-
ing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only 
North Korea has declared its withdrawal from the 
NPT.1 In the last twenty years, North Korea alone 
has tested nuclear weapons. 
North Korea’s repeated negative precedent-setting 
is exacerbated by the fact that Pyongyang’s successful 
nuclear weapons programme runs counter to the 
generally positive development in the field of non-
proliferation. No state has been suspected of secretly 
developing nuclear weapons since the agreement on, 
and successful implementation of, the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) to settle the dispute 
over Iran’s nuclear programme in July 2015. If the 
international community managed to convince North 
Korea to abandon nuclear weapons, there would be 
exactly as many nuclear weapon states in the world 
today as there were some forty years ago, namely 
eight.2 
 
1 Just how extraordinary this step is can be seen by the 
fact that no other state has terminated its membership in 
a multilateral disarmament and arms control regime. Only 
Palestine withdrew its signature to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) at the beginning of 2018, but has since 
reversed the decision. See “Palestine: From a ‘Will-be’ Party 
to the CWC to a ‘Would-have-been’?”, The Trench, 16 January 
2018, http://www.the-trench.org/palestine-and-cwc-accession/ 
(accessed 5 June 2018); Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, “State of Palestine Joins the Organisa-
tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”, opcw.org, 
21 June 2018, https://www.opcw.org/news/article/state-of-
palestine-joins-the-organisation-for-the-prohibition-of-
chemical-weapons (accessed 5 August 2018). 
2 The other states possessing nuclear weapon are those 
recognised in the NPT (China, France, Russia, the UK and the 
USA) and those outside the NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan. 
South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have relin-
Dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-
gramme is therefore particularly important for the 
future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. A 
solution to the conflict, however, is also especially 
difficult. North Korea considers its security situation 
to be precarious; a partitioned state that is on the 
losing side in the competition between political sys-
tems, it has been formally at war with the USA since 
1950. North Korea’s authoritarian, repressive and 
strongly ideological political system and its struggle 
for economic self-sufficiency set the country apart 
from others possessing nuclear weapons and make 
it more difficult to influence from the outside. There 
are no North Korean actors other than the govern-
ment with whom a dialogue could be conducted. 
The regime’s extreme secrecy makes an independent 
assessment of its nuclear capabilities difficult. 
Two overlapping non-proliferation challenges need 
to be distinguished in dealing with North Korea: the 
international community must provide an appropri-
ate institutional reaction within the non-proliferation 
regime – essentially the NPT and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency; and substantial progress must 
be achieved in the country’s nuclear disarmament as 
well as preventing the proliferation of sensitive tech-
nologies to and from North Korea. 
North Korea and the 
Non-Proliferation Regime 
North Korea is no hermit state. The country is involved 
in a number of regional or global treaties and institu-
tions, and does not hesitate to use these forums to 
expand its political influence.3 To a limited extent, 
 
quished their existing arsenals and renounced the posses-
sion of nuclear weapons. 
3 Eric J. Ballbach, “North Korea’s Engagement in Inter-
national Institutions: The Case of the ASEAN Regional 
Oliver Meier 
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this also applies to treaties relevant to weapons of 
mass destruction.4 However, Pyongyang is not pre-
pared to constrain its own military capabilities under 
such treaties or to be more transparent about them. 
For example, North Korea is not a member of any 
treaty containing verification measures, such as the 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
From the outset, the country had been an outsider 
in the NPT, generally suspected of only joining in 
1985 in exchange for a Soviet technology transfer 
during the construction of the nuclear power plant in 
Yongbyon. North Korea is the first country the IAEA 
was able to catch red-handed, during a significant 
attempt at deception, independently and without the 
help of intelligence services.5 Pyongyang only accepted 
the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards, which are com-
pulsory for non-nuclear weapons states that are mem-
bers of the NPT, very late: in 1992.6 During the sub-
 
Forum”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 26, 
no. 2 (2017): 35–65. 
4 In the 1980s especially, North Korea acceded to a number 
of such agreements. These include in particular the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the related 
renunciation of nuclear weapons (accession 12 October 1985; 
declaration of withdrawal 10 January 2003); the Geneva Proto-
col for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare of 1925 (accession 8 December 1988), which prohibits 
the use of biological and chemical warfare agents; the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention, which comprehensively pro-
hibits the development and possession of biological weapons 
(accession 13 March 1987); the Space Treaty prohibiting the 
stationing of nuclear weapons in space (accession 5 March 
2009); the Antarctic Treaty and the associated renunciation 
of military use of the Antarctic (accession 21 January 1987); 
the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD Con-
vention), which prohibits the hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques (accession 8 November 1984), and 
the Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radio-
logical Emergency, adopted after the Chernobyl Accident 
(signatory state, accession 29 September 1986). 
5 See Trevor Findlay, Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and 
Non-Compliance Reporting (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Kennedy 
School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
last update 6 January 2018), 99, https://www.belfercenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/files/publication/proliferationalert-web.pdf 
(accessed 6 January 2018). 
6 In 1977 it had placed two research facilities under facil-
ity-specific safeguards. See International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, https://www. 
iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-
safeguards (accessed 5 June 2018). 
sequent inspections, the IAEA discovered that Pyong-
yang’s declaration was inconsistent and found in-
dications that North Korea had secretly reprocessed 
plutonium. 
In the course of this first nuclear crisis, North Korea 
declared its first withdrawal from the NPT on 12 
March 1993. Withdrawal is permitted under Article 
10 if “extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests” of the member state. Shortly afterwards, 
however, Pyongyang suspended the withdrawal pro-
ceedings. 
During the second nuclear crisis, North Korea 
declared on 10 January 2003 that this suspension had 
lapsed and that the country was thus no longer a 
member of the NPT as of 11 January. Some NPT mem-
bers, including Germany, continue to question the 
formal admissibility of these withdrawal announce-
ments. They argue, for example, that it was not pos-
sible simply to suspend the three-month notification 
period until the withdrawal announced in 1993 be-
came legally effective. The country is therefore in a 
diplomatic grey zone as regards its position under 
the NPT.7 
Recognising North Korea as a nuclear 
weapons state is out of the question 
because many states would see it as 
rewarding Pyongyang’s rule-breaking. 
The international community has repeatedly made 
it clear that it cannot recognise North Korea as a nu-
clear-weapon state.8 Such recognition would be legally 
inadmissible because, under the NPT, only countries 
which manufactured and detonated a nuclear weap-
on or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 
1967 can be nuclear-weapon states.9 It is also out 
of the question politically since it would be seen by 
many states as rewarding Pyongyang’s breaches of the 
 
7 Masahiko Asada, “Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of 
the North Korean Nuclear Issue”, Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 9, no. 3 (2004): 331–55. 
8 See, e.g., the final document of the NPT verification con-
ference from 2010: Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) (New York, 2010), para. 108, 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/390/21/ 
PDF/N1039021.pdf (accessed 5 June 2018). 
9 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
un.org, article 9(3), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/ 
nuclear/npt/ (accessed 9 August 2018). 
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rules. On the contrary, some states reacted to North 
Korea’s move with efforts to raise the hurdles for 
withdrawal from the NPT. Among other moves, the 
EU proposed that the UN Security Council should 
automatically be consulted on an application for 
withdrawal. 
In response to North Korea’s refusal to comply with 
its verification obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon 
state, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the case 
to the UN Security Council already in 1993. On 13 
June 1994, North Korea declared its withdrawal from 
the IAEA. The Vienna-based Agency, however, con-
siders the Safeguard Agreement with North Korea to 
be still in force, so that the country is in a grey zone 
with regard to its Safeguard Agreement as well. 
IAEA inspectors were in the country from 1992 
to 2003 (with interruptions) and then from 2007 to 
2009. Pyongyang significantly restricted their work. 
The IAEA initially attempted to implement the Safe-
guards Agreement, and subsequently monitored 
the shutdown of some of the nuclear facilities at the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex, as agreed in the 1994 
Agreed Framework and the six-party talks in 2007. In 
2009, all inspectors were forced to leave the country. 
They have yet to come back. Nevertheless, the IAEA 
is actively preparing to return to North Korea. For 
example, a small team of experts in Vienna is con-
tinuously collecting information on relevant activities 
in North Korea. 
North Korea is the only state that has successfully 
used nuclear technology acquired during NPT mem-
bership to develop nuclear weapons. As a conse-
quence, some NPT members proposed changing the 
rules of the non-proliferation regime so that nuclear 
technology acquired during NPT membership would 
remain under international control even after with-
drawal. However, such “fall-back safeguards” have 
not yet been agreed.10 
Nevertheless, the response by the members of the 
non-proliferation regime to North Korea’s multiple 
violations of the rules overall can be considered ap-
propriate and sufficiently quick. This is despite the 
fact that on substance, there has been no progress yet. 
North Korea is still not prepared to disarm unilaterally. 
 
10 Pierre Goldschmidt, “Securing Irreversible IAEA Safe-
guards to Close the Next NPT Loophole”, Arms Control Today 
45, no. 2 (2015): 15–19, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/ 
2015_03/Features/Securing-Irreversible-IAEA-Safeguards-to-
Close-the-Next-NPT-Loophole (accessed 6 June 2018). 
Does this make the non-proliferation regime 
meaningless for attempts to resolve the conflict? 
North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation 
In response to the first North Korean nuclear test on 
9 October 2006, the Security Council imposed sanc-
tions five days later and set up a panel of experts to 
monitor trade restrictions. North Korea was thus the 
first state to be sanctioned by the UN for violating 
non-proliferation obligations.11 Resolution 1718, 
adopted in 2006 after the first nuclear weapons test 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, obliged Pyongyang 
to “abandon all [...] existing weapons of mass destruc-
tion and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible manner”.12 The Security 
Council thus laid down a binding standard for all ne-
gotiations with North Korea, which it had reaffirmed 
in nine further resolutions by late 2017. 
The international community has not achieved its 
objective of disarmament. It has not even succeeded 
in enforcing the missile and nuclear test moratoria 
required by the UN resolutions. Between the adoption 
of the first resolution in 2006 and 2017, North Korea 
carried out five more nuclear tests. The missile pro-
gramme has accelerated. Since Kim Jong Un took over 
the leadership of the North Korean state in 2011, 
nearly 120 missiles have been tested. This represents 
about 75 percent of all tests carried out by the regime 
since its first test in 1986. Pyongyang achieved an 
important breakthrough in 2017 when it tested three 
missiles presumed to have intercontinental range. 
Even if sanctions have failed to achieve their primary 
goal of persuading North Korea to renounce weapons 
of mass destruction, they still fulfil important func-
tions from a non-proliferation perspective. The sanc-
tions decided by the United Nations give substance 
to the will of the international community. The dense 
network of trade restrictions has certainly slowed 
down North Korea’s nuclear programme and driven 
up its costs. 
 
11 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718 (2006), 
14 October 2006, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? 
symbol=S/RES/1718%20%282006%29 (accessed 28 August 
2018). 
12 Ibid. 
 Non-Proliferation: Containing a Rule Breaker 
 SWP Berlin 
 Facets of the North Korea Conflict 
 December 2018 
 43 
However, the proliferation of North Korean tech-
nology for weapons of mass destruction and means 
of delivery could not be completely prevented. 
In 2007, Israeli fighter planes destroyed a nuclear 
reactor under construction in Syria, which was to be 
built with North Korean support.13 It is also known 
that missile technology was delivered to Iran and 
Pakistan, and that an attempt was made to supply 
Syria with dual-use technology that can be used for 
the production of chemical weapons.14 However, to 
 
13 Ben Caspit, “The Story behind Israel’s Secret Strike on 
Syria’s Nuclear Reactor”, al-Monitor, 21 March 2018, https:// 
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/israel-strike-
nuclear-facility-syria-desert.html (accessed 25 March 2018). 
14 Michael Schwirtz, “U.N. Links North Korea to Syria’s 
Chemical Weapons Program”, New York Times, 27 February 
date there is no reliable evidence for recurrent reports 
that Iran and North Korea have also cooperated in the 
military use of nuclear technology.15 
The expert group’s reports also show how North 
Korea has managed over the years to build up an in-
ternational network that it uses, inter alia, to gener-
ate income. North Korean attempts to procure goods 
suitable for the production of nuclear, biological or 
 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-
korea-syria-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html (accessed 
5 June 2018). 
15 Jim Walsh, “Why North Korea and Iran Get Accused of 
Nuclear Collusion”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 February 
2018, https://thebulletin.org/why-north-korea-and-iran-get-
accused-nuclear-collusion11504 (accessed 24 March 2018). 
Chart 2 
North Korean nuclear tests, October 2006 to September 2017 
 
Note: Yield in 1,000 tonnes (kt) TNT equivalent. 
Magnitude (mb): Strength of the seismic waves triggered by the nuclear test. 
Source: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO),  
ROK Ministry of National Defence. © 2018, CSIS, Washington, D.C. 
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chemical weapons or delivery systems have also been 
repeatedly uncovered and analysed by UN experts. 
What Germany and the EU Can Do 
The example of North Korea shows how difficult it 
is in a globalised world to stop a state determined to 
develop nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass 
destruction). Even for a country as economically 
isolated as North Korea, it is now almost impossible 
to completely block access to critical technologies. 
Economic and political penalties will achieve little, 
as long as the leadership is prepared to pay the enor-
mous political and economic price for possessing 
nuclear weapons or, more precisely, to pass the eco-
nomic costs of the sanctions on to the population. 
In the face of such an irresponsible 
state, non-proliferation policy 
must above all be geared to 
damage limitation. 
When dealing with such an irresponsible state, 
non-proliferation policy must primarily be aimed at 
damage limitation. The greatest harm would be done 
by military escalation. Avoiding this scenario must 
therefore be the priority. However, undermining 
global standards can also have negative consequences, 
for example if the impression is created that the pur-
suit of nuclear weapons has paid off for North Korea, 
encouraging copycats to follow the same path.16 
Finally, from a non-proliferation perspective, the 
aim is to minimise the risk of proliferation of North 
Korean WMD technology. 
Germany’s non-proliferation policy focuses on 
strengthening global norms and multilateral organi-
sations with a view to eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction. For Germany, the NPT remains “the foun-
dation of the global nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation architecture, which must be strengthened 
and developed”, including and especially against the 
background of the nuclear crisis in North Korea.17 
 
16 Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, Charting a 
New Course on North Korea’s Nuclear Programme? The Options and 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, SWP Comments 19/2013 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013), http:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/ 
2013A31_hlp_mro.pdf (accessed 7 June 2018). 
17 Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um 
Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die 
Berlin rejects alternative approaches, such as the use 
of force to disarm North Korea. The same applies to 
the EU, whose policy of “critical engagement” aims to 
reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, to improve 
its human rights situation, and to maintain the nu-
clear non-proliferation regime.18 
However, Germany and the EU have few possibili-
ties to influence North Korea directly. Pyongyang has 
conducted negotiations on its nuclear programme 
either bilaterally with the USA or additionally with 
China and South Korea (four-party talks) as well as 
with Japan and Russia (six-party talks). Multilateral 
forums such as the United Nations, the Geneva-based 
Conference on Disarmament or meetings of the NPT 
States Parties were used to discuss how to deal with 
North Korea and establish a normative and legal frame-
work, but North Korea was not prepared to discuss, 
let alone resolve, the conflict within these bodies. 
Nothing is likely to change in this regard. The EU’s 
role has so far been limited to providing funding 
through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organisation. To make matters worse, the EU in re-
cent years has generally lost importance as an actor 
in the non-proliferation regime. 
For Germany, therefore, it is particularly important 
to realise its own interests in a peaceful resolution 
to the North Korean conflict by embedding conflict 
management multilaterally. 
First of all, it is a question of working within inter-
national bodies to ensure that the conflict over the 
North Korean nuclear programme is treated as a chal-
lenge to the international order and not just as a 
bilateral conflict between North Korea and the USA. 
The danger of a deal to the detriment of global non-
proliferation standards has increased with the out-
come of the summit between Donald Trump and Kim 
Jong Un on 12 June 2018. The summit agreement 
lacks clear references to the NPT.19 While North Korea 
 
Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale. Jahresabrüstungsbericht 
2017 (Berlin, 2017), 9. 
18 European External Action Service (EEAS), DPRK and 
the EU (Brussels, 26 June 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/4186/dprk-and-eu_en 
(accessed 25 March 2018). 
19 “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the 
United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong-un of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Sum-
mit” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 12 June 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-
statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-
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reaffirmed its commitment to the “complete denu-
clearisation” of the Korean peninsula, it did not 
commit to the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
disarmament as demanded by the UN Security Coun-
cil. This creates the impression that the USA indulges 
a notorious rule breaker, while applying maximum 
pressure towards Iran, which is complying with its 
international nuclear obligations.20 
Should the diplomatic path taken in Singapore by 
North Korea and the USA fail, Germany and Europe 
would certainly have an important role to play in 
continuing to advocate a peaceful solution. The rejec-
tion of military options is based not only on the 
humanitarian consequences of a war, but can also 
be justified from the non-proliferation perspective: 
of the nine military “counterproliferation” actions 
conducted to date, only one has led to a sustained 
“rollback” of a nuclear programme.21 Finally, Ger-
many would also be affected by an escalation since 
the NATO collective defence clause would presumably 
be invoked if North Korea attacked the American 
mainland.22 
US non-compliance with the Iran nuclear agree-
ment casts a long dark shadow over possible talks 
with Pyongyang. This makes it all the more crucial 
from a European perspective to do everything pos-
sible to ensure the continued successful implementa-
tion of the JCPoA. Thus, at least the countries directly 
involved in the Iran nuclear accord (Germany, France 
and the UK), and the EU, can prove their credibility as 
 
chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-
singapore-summit/ (accessed 29 June 2018). 
20 See Oliver Meier, Die Vereinbarung von Singapur unter-
miniert die globale nukleare Ordnung, SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 13 June 2013), https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/2018/die-vereinbarung-von-
singapur-unterminiert-die-globale-nukleare-ordnung/ 
(accessed 29 June 2018). 
21 Israel’s attack on a plutonium reactor under construc-
tion in Syria can be seen as a non-proliferation success. See 
note 13 and Martin B. Malin, “The Effectiveness and Legiti-
macy of the Use of Force to Prevent Proliferation”, in Arms 
Control in the 21st Century. Between Coercion and Cooperation, ed. 
Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 81–122 (100). 
22 But not if the conflict were to remain “limited” to the 
region in the Pacific: Bruno Tertrais, Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future, Research Paper 130 
(Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, April 2016), 
https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/ 
autres/2016/2016-tertrais-nato-washington-treaty.pdf 
(accessed 23 December 2017). 
partners in implementing international agreements. 
If there were to be an agreement leading to the dis-
mantling of the North Korean nuclear programme, 
Germany has declared its readiness to contribute tech-
nical expertise to such a process.23 
Finally, Berlin should work to ensure that the UN 
sanctions against North Korea are fully implemented, 
and to urge strict implementation from third states 
as well. North Korea continues to maintain economic 
relations in Africa and with countries elsewhere. The 
EU should offer these states further assistance in im-
plementing agreed sanctions, but should also threaten 
economic consequences if they refuse to do so. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
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23 See Heiko Maas, “Die Zukunft der nuklearen Ord-
nung – Herausforderungen für die Diplomatie”, Speech 
by the Foreign Minister at the Tiergarten Conference of 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Berlin, 29 June 2018), https:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/maas-fes-tiergarten-
konferenz/2112704 (accessed 29 June 2018). 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Frédéric Krumbein 
SWP Berlin 
Facets of the North Korea Conflict 
December 2018 
46 
In their scope, the crimes against humanity com-
mitted by state actors in North Korea are without 
comparison in today’s world. In addition to the 
threats to peace and security posed by North Korea, 
the human rights issue is the second major political 
challenge facing the international community given 
the sheer scale of the DPRK’s crimes. Against this 
backdrop, the question arises as to the role that 
human rights policy can play within efforts to peace-
fully resolve the conflict over North Korea’s nuclear 
programme. Can human rights policy make a con-
tribution to conflict resolution beyond its original 
mission? Or is there a conflict of objectives between 
resolving the nuclear issue and improving the human 
rights situation? To what extent does human rights 
policy offer Europe an opportunity for an independ-
ent role in the North Korean problem? 
North Korea’s Crimes against Humanity 
The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in 
North Korea set up by the UN Human Rights Council 
has identified systematic and widespread serious 
human rights violations on the basis of interviews 
with victims, former officials and witnesses and the 
analysis of numerous documents; it has comprehen-
sively documented them in a report almost 400 pages 
long.1 The Commission understands that the free-
doms of expression and religion are denied almost 
totally. The entire social life of North Koreans is com-
prehensively monitored and controlled by state secu-
rity agencies, social mass organisations and mass 
media. While the security apparatus creates a climate 
of fear through public executions, torture, ill-treat-
ment and arbitrary arrests, the propaganda machine 
 
1 UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014. 
educates citizens to show absolute loyalty towards 
the government, state and system. It stirs up hatred 
against official enemies of the state both at home and 
abroad. The triad of surveillance, terror and informa-
tion control effectively prevents any expression of 
ideological deviation, especially since a dissident’s 
next of kin are also threatened with internment in a 
camp in case of political offences. 
According to the findings of the UN report, hun-
dreds of thousands have died in political prison 
camps since the regime was founded. At a cautious 
estimate, between 80,000 and 120,000 political pris-
oners, “system unreliables”, refugees and Christians 
are still being held permanently in six Gulag camps, 
where they are subjected to forced labour, torture, 
arbitrary violence and sexual violence; people often 
die of hunger, cold, exhaustion or execution. In the 
DPRK’s totalitarian system, citizens’ political-social 
class determines the allocation of food, housing, medi-
cal care, and their career and life opportunities. This 
system is an important pillar for the leadership in that 
it rewards and favours loyal citizens, while it penal-
ises and marginalises those categorised as unreliable. 
In the great famine of the 1990s, the deliberate 
withholding of food was responsible for the deaths of 
several hundred thousand people from needy popu-
lation groups. To this day, chronic malnutrition is 
the cause of permanent physical and psychological 
damage.2 
The Response of the 
International Community 
The international community was relatively late in 
addressing the issue. It was mainly owing to the ini-
tiative of France, the other EU states and the USA that 
the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a resolu-
 
2 Ibid., 7–15. 
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tion on the human rights situation in North Korea for 
the first time in 2003, and that a UN Special Rappor-
teur on the human rights situation in North Korea 
was appointed the following year.3 In March 2013, the 
UN Human Rights Council, the body that succeeded 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, set up the 
aforementioned Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in North Korea (COI). On its recommendation, 
a UN office was set up in Seoul in 2015 to support 
the Special Rapporteur, with the task of documenting 
North Korean human rights violations and monitor-
ing the human rights situation in North Korea. This 
was followed in 2017 by the opening of an archive in 
Geneva for evidence of human rights violations by 
the North Korean state. 
In its final report, the COI came to the conclusion 
that the systematic and widespread human rights 
violations in North Korea were so serious that they 
had to be classified as crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity include, inter alia, arbitrary 
killings, torture, inhumane acts or acts of enforced 
disappearance directed in an extensive or systematic 
manner against the civilian population.4 According to 
the COI, the North Korean state or responsible actors 
in North Korea could in principle be subject to sanc-
tions under international law and/or be charged 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC).5 The UN 
Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly 
have endorsed this assessment in several resolutions 
and statements, as have the UN Secretary-General and 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.6 In 
 
3 Roberta Cohen, “The High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and North Korea”, in The United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights: Conscience for the World, ed. Felice D. 
Gaer and Christen L. Broecker (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2014), 293–310. 
4 Matthias Herdegen, Völkerrecht, 15th ed., (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2016), 469f.; Human Rights Council (HRC), Twenty-
fifth session, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission 
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014, 358. 
5 Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, Questions and Answers on 
the Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 17 February 
2014, 14–15, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ 
HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/coi-dprk-q-and-a.pdf (accessed 
5 June 2018). 
6 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Pillay Calls 
for Urgent Action on ‘Historic’ DPRK Report”, ohchr.org, 
18 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ 
Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=14258&LangID=E (accessed 
response to the COI report, the UN Human Rights 
Council and the UN General Assembly each adopted 
a resolution calling on the Security Council to refer 
the case to the ICC and consider appropriate sanctions 
against North Korea.7 However, on 22 December 2014 
the Security Council did not comply with this request 
due to the resistance of the permanent members 
China and Russia. The People’s Republic of China and 
Russia are generally sceptical about interference in 
the internal affairs of states, including the imposition 
of sanctions for human rights violations. Further 
meetings of the Security Council on the subject fol-
lowed, but did not agree on any concrete measures. 
For the time being, the judicial review of North 
Korea’s crimes against humanity proposed by the COI 
has thus not been pursued; it nevertheless remains 
a crucial option for action by the international com-
munity. 
The Security Council is the only UN body with 
effective means against human rights violations in a 
UN member state. First, the Council can categorise 
serious domestic human rights violations as threats 
to peace and impose economic (or even military) sanc-
tions under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.8 Second, it can initiate criminal pro-
ceedings against individuals. For this to happen, 
the Security Council would either have to submit the 
situation to the Prosecutor at the ICC in accordance 
with Chapter VII, or set up its own special tribunal 
for North Korea on the model of the special tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Uganda.9 In 
both cases, Kim Jong Un, the DPRK’s supreme leader, 
would probably also be brought to court: in its inves-
tigative report, the COI assigns him direct responsibil-
 
5 June 2018); United Nations Secretary-General, “Statement 
Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General 
on the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, un.org, 18 February 
2014, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-02-
18/statement-attributable-spokesperson-secretary-general-
commission (accessed 5 June 2018). 
7 The UN Human Rights Council in its Resolution 25/25 of 
28 March 2014, the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 
69/188 of 18 December 2014. 
8 Herdegen, Völkerrecht (see note 4), 332–33. This provision 
was first used in 1992 with Resolution 794 on intervention 
in Somalia. 
9 Ibid., 467–73. 
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ity for North Korea’s crimes against humanity, along 
with other leaders.10 
National law enforcement agencies 
could prosecute North Korea’s crimes 
against humanity. 
In contrast to resolutions of the UN Security Coun-
cil, those of the UN General Assembly are only recom-
mendations for states. However, it would be possible 
for national law enforcement agencies to prosecute 
North Korea’s crimes against humanity. While North 
Korea is not a party to the ICC’s Rome Statute and has 
not ratified most human rights treaties, like all states 
it must nevertheless adhere to the binding peremptory 
norms of international law (ius cogens). These encom-
pass the highest norms of international law, from 
which no deviations are allowed and which are bind-
ing for all. In human rights, these include prohibi-
tions on torture, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide.11 Because of their serious nature (violation of ius 
cogens), any state can punish these crimes, either by 
imposing coercive measures against the state of North 
Korea and/or by ordering its courts, on the basis of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction, to take criminal 
action against responsible actors from North Korea.12 
In Germany, the legal basis for this is the Völker-
strafgesetzbuch (International Criminal Code).13 
North Korea’s Human Rights Strategy 
Within the DPRK’s totalitarian system, terror, infor-
mation control and discrimination are indispensable 
instruments of rule. The idea of individual human 
rights and freedoms is alien to an understanding of 
the state that postulates the collective unity of leader, 
party and people. The DPRK opposes the universal 
claim of human rights by defending the principle 
of unlimited state sovereignty and the thesis that 
human rights are culturally relative.14 The DPRK had 
 
10 See HRC, Twenty-fifth Session, Report of the Detailed 
Findings (see note 4), 359. 
11 Herdegen, Völkerrecht (see note 4), 158f. 
12 Ibid., 301f. 
13 Ibid., 467–73. 
14 Soo-Am Kim, “Human Rights Awareness in the Mili-
tary-First Era: Content and Evaluation”, in Young-Sun Ha 
and Dongho Jo, Future of North Korea 2013 – Coevolutionary 
Strategy for the Advancement (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012), 
147–79. 
long succeeded in shielding its massive domestic 
human rights violations from the eyes of the world 
and avoiding a discussion on the subject. It continues 
to keep access to the country and its inhabitants ex-
tremely restricted.15 After establishing diplomatic 
relations with most EU member states through Kim 
Dae-jung’s sunshine policy, the DPRK embarked on a 
human rights dialogue with the EU, but broke it off 
after the EU tabled a resolution on the human rights 
situation in North Korea at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003. Pyongyang refused to cooper-
ate in any way with the COI introduced in 2013.16 
However, the DPRK could not ignore the fact that 
the UN and the international community were in-
creasingly addressing the issue. It initially attempted 
to soften the text of UN resolutions through diplomatic 
counter-offensives, such as preparing its own human 
rights report, which glossed over the situation in the 
country. In 2014, the People’s Republic reacted with 
comparatively constructive statements concerning the 
recommendations suggested in the Universal Periodic 
Review of the UN Human Rights Council, but without 
actually improving its human rights situation. It 
merely tried to soften criticism of the human rights 
situation by showing a little more willingness to en-
gage in dialogue.17 Thus, it offered the EU the oppor-
tunity to resume the human rights dialogue, broken 
off in 2003.18 However, Pyongyang quickly realised 
that due to the gravity of its crimes, it could not pre-
vent further discussion of its human rights situation; 
its strategy of dialogue turned into confrontation. 
In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons, there 
was the defamation of prominent critics, who were 
accused of having hostile intentions and serving the 
US. Marzuki Darusman, the former UN Special Rap-
porteur on North Korea, for example, was character-
 
15 In accordance with the precept attributed to Kim Jong 
Il: “We must envelop our environment in a dense fog to pre-
vent our enemies from learning anything about us”, quoted 
in Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North 
Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom (Lanham, Md.: Row-
man and Littlefield, 2009), 27. 
16 HRC, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights 
(see note 1), 4. 
17 David Hawk, “North Korea Responds to the UN Com-
mission of Inquiry”, 38North, 16 October 2014, http:// 
38north.org/2014/10/dhawk101614/ (accessed 5 June 2018). 
18 Roberta Cohen, “A Human Rights Dialogue with North 
Korea: Real or Illusionary?”, 38 North, 16 October 2014, http:// 
38north.org/2014/10/rcohen101614/ (accessed 5 June 2018). 
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ised as being a “puppet of US imperialism”.19 The 
regime seeks to discredit refugee reports through 
counter-statements.20 
More recently, there have been cautious signs of 
cooperation. North Korea ratified the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, allowed the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities to enter the country, and accepted – at 
least on paper – more than a hundred recommen-
dations from the UN Human Rights Council.21 
What Can Be Done? 
It is important to understand that the oft-assumed 
conflict of objectives between harsh criticism of 
human rights violations in North Korea and Pyong-
yang’s willingness to talk about security issues does 
not exist. There is no evidence to support the thesis 
that North Korea is less willing to negotiate whenever 
it is criticised for violating the rights of its citizens. 
The exclusion or deliberate ignoring of human rights 
issues at the recent American-North Korean summit 
in Singapore was thus not only unnecessary in terms 
of negotiation tactics, it also caused lasting damage 
to human rights policy concerns. This makes it all the 
more important to address the human rights situation 
clearly and consistently, because it makes it difficult 
for the regime to present itself as a “normal” nego-
tiating partner. For moral and political reasons, it is 
therefore necessary to maintain the human rights 
pressure on North Korea visibly and lastingly. It is 
unnecessary, however, for there to be appeasing con-
sideration of nuclear and security policy priorities, 
even though these do undoubtedly exist. In both the 
East-West conflict and the North-South conflict with-
 
19 “UN Official Says North Korea Must Abolish Cult of 
Kim, Not Just Prison Camps”, foxnews.com, 2 February 2015, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/02/02/ap-interview-un-
official-says-north-korea-must-abolish-cult-kim-not-just-
prison/; “North Korea’s Foreign Ministry Labels UN Human 
Rights Rapporteur as US Puppet”, TASS, 5 February 2015, 
http://tass.ru/en/world/775542 (both accessed 5 June 2018). 
20 Steven Borowiec, “North Korea’s New Tactic: Discredit 
Those Who Report Human-Rights Abuses”, Yale Global Online, 
24 March 2015, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/north-
koreas-new-tactic-discredit-those-who-report-human-rights-
abuses (accessed 6 June 2018). 
21 See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, A/72/394, 
19 September 2017, para. 18. 
in Korea, a separation between security policy and 
human rights issues has proved a viable approach. 
UN member states actively committed to human 
rights and UN bodies should therefore 
1) continue to collect the most detailed information 
possible on human rights violations in North 
Korea; 
2) continue to address and condemn them in all 
United Nations bodies; and 
3) prepare the prosecution and investigation of 
these crimes. 
In contrast to security policy, 
Europe can play an independent, 
perhaps even a leading, role in 
human rights policy. 
The EU and Germany, which are not parties to the 
conflict on the Korean peninsula and can therefore 
act neutrally, have a special responsibility to confront 
the DPRK with its crimes against humanity. In con-
trast to security policy, Europe can play an independ-
ent, and even a leading, role in human rights policy; 
however, Europe’s criticism of North Korea’s human 
rights violations should reward sustained progress 
in the area of human rights by far-reaching offers 
of assistance in food supply and in the health sector. 
Germany and the European Union have four 
special tasks: first, to provide financial and political 
support for the United Nations – including the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Seoul – and for human rights organisations investi-
gating human rights violations in North Korea; sec-
ond, to maintain pressure on North Korea by means 
of verdicts in the various UN bodies dealing with 
human rights. As part of the regular state review 
process, the human rights situation in North Korea 
will be reviewed again, for example at the 33rd session 
of the UN Human Rights Council in April and May 
2019.22 EU member states should coordinate their ap-
proach in the process and ensure that crimes against 
humanity are discussed and condemned. Third, 
the European Union should consider taking up the 
recommendation of the UN Commission of Inquiry 
for the creation of a special tribunal. Its establish-
ment will require a resolution by the UN General 
 
22 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), Cycles of the Universal Periodic Review – Third 
Cycle (2017–2021), 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/UPR/UPR_3rd_cycle.pdf (accessed 5 June 2018). 
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Assembly and participating states, unless the mem-
bers of the UN Security Council can agree to refer the 
case to the International Criminal Court. The prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction would allow such a 
measure.23 Fourth, the EU states should stress the 
importance of the human rights issue to the South 
Korean government. The human rights situation 
in North Korea must not be ignored in inter-Korean 
reconciliation. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Global_Challenges 
 
 
 
23 Ibid., 361; HRC, Thirty-fourth Session, Report of the Group 
of Independent Experts on Accountability, A/HRC/34/66/Add. 1, 
24 February 2017. 
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Diplomatic Approaches 
The North Korean nuclear problem has been on the 
international agenda since North Korea first threat-
ened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in 1993. Since then, the international com-
munity has left almost no instrument in the diplo-
matic toolbox unused. During this time, Pyongyang 
has learned from the experience of 25 years of talks 
and the conflicts over the dismantling or continua-
tion of its nuclear weapons programme, as have the 
most important actors on the international side. They 
are, in order of the intensity of their efforts, China, 
the USA, South Korea, Japan, the UN/IAEA, Russia 
and the EU countries. 
Overview 
Bilateral Negotiations 
(a) Only China has consistently pursued a bilateral 
approach, since other actors believe that the Korean 
nuclear problem is part of the NPT and the IAEA’s 
work and therefore multilateral in nature. China’s 
efforts must be seen in the context of its brotherhood-
in-arms in the Korean War and the ideological prox-
imity of both states, but above all the DPRK’s strategic 
importance for China’s position in East Asia as well as 
vis-à-vis the USA. No details have ever been disclosed. 
On several occasions, however, China has indicated 
that it has been surprised by the progress made in 
the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and launch missile pro-
gramme. Ultimately, China has never played a key 
role in attempts to find a solution and remained 
unsuccessful bilaterally. 
(b) Following the suspicion in 1992 that North 
Korea might be pursuing a nuclear weapons pro-
gramme, and following its withdrawal from the IAEA 
in 1994, the United States concluded an Agreed Frame-
work1 in the same year with the aim of establishing 
two light water reactors in North Korea through an 
international consortium (KEDO), thus obliging North 
Korea to fulfil its obligations as an IAEA member. The 
US Congress, however, refused to approve the financ-
ing of the American contribution; agreed oil deliv-
eries were often delayed; and construction work was 
held up. The CIA’s suspicion that North Korea was 
carrying out banned work on centrifuges for uranium 
enrichment was never fully dispelled, since IAEA 
inspectors did not have full access to suspicious facil-
ities at any time; North Korea therefore terminated 
the Agreed Framework in 2002, and also withdrew 
from the NPT in January 2003. 
Since 1994, the USA has also repeatedly conducted 
secret negotiations, which appeared to be on the verge 
of success, especially in 2007 – following bilateral 
talks in Berlin as well. In the former case, however, 
they were broken off by North Korea, in the latter by 
President George W. Bush who claimed North Korean 
commitments were insufficient. Informal talks on 
North Korea’s missile programme by US Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright and a possible visit by 
President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang in 2000 were 
unsuccessful. Parallel to its negotiations with China, 
South Korea, Japan, the UN and the IAEA on a joint 
strategy to tighten sanctions, the USA initiated fur-
ther bilateral secret talks with North Korea in New 
York, Norway and Switzerland in mid-2017. All of 
 
1 International Atomic Energy Agency, Agreed Framework 
of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Information Circular 
(INFCIRC)/457, 2 November 1994, https://www.iaea.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc 
457.pdf (accessed 29 May 2018). 
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these remained without a known result. All ap-
proaches have thus been unsuccessful.2 
All approaches have been 
unsuccessful. 
(c) Since 2000, South Korea has tried to initiate 
political talks through negotiations on economic 
cooperation within the framework of the “sunshine 
policy”, conceived as a Korean form of détente policy. 
However, North Korea was never willing to abandon 
its nuclear weapons programme. This approach was 
also unsuccessful. 
(d) In 2002 Japan attempted to use economic in-
centives to initiate talks on the release of kidnapped 
Japanese citizens and encourage North Korea to hold 
negotiations on its nuclear weapons programme. 
Japan remained unsuccessful. 
(e) Russia’s talks with Pyongyang, almost none of 
whose contents are publicly known, were also un-
successful. 
(f) The EU was likewise unsuccessful in its attempt 
to use the missile issue to engage with the nuclear 
weapons programme. An EU Troika delegation led 
by Swedish Prime Minister and EU Council President 
Göran Persson visited Pyongyang in May 2001 and 
received a commitment from Kim Jong Il to respect 
the moratorium on missile testing until 2003 and to 
initiate a human rights dialogue with the EU. The 
visit was of symbolic importance, demonstrating sup-
port for the sunshine policy of South Korean Presi-
dent Kim Dae-Jung.3 
Multilateral Negotiations 
(a) Discussions with the IAEA have been unsuccessful 
since North Korea has always evaded inspections of its 
nuclear facilities; meanwhile the IAEA still considers 
the Safeguards Agreements with North Korea to be 
legally binding. 
(b) In 1997, the USA and South Korea had first agreed 
four-party and then six-party talks with North Korea (in-
cluding China and South Korea, and later Japan and 
 
2 See the candid presentation by the chief US negotiator 
from 2005 to 2007 in Christopher Hill, A Diplomat at Work 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), especially chap. 19. 
3 Matthias Wet, “Drei Europäer im Schurkenstaat”, Die Zeit, 
no. 20 (10 May 2001), https://www.zeit.de/2001/20/Drei_ 
Europaeer_im_Schurkenstaat/komplettansicht (accessed 
29 May 2018). 
Russia). With the withdrawal of North Korea from 
the NPT, their platform ceased to exist. A restart of 
the six-party talks in 2007 led to a new agreement 
to end the North Korean programme in exchange for 
economic aid and normalisation negotiations with 
the US.4 In 2009, however, the DPRK declared that the 
agreement had failed after the UN Security Council 
criticised its missile programme.5 North Korea has 
now made its nuclear weapons programme an official 
state goal. The EU supported both KEDO (since 1997) 
and the 2007 agreement, but never attempted to nego-
tiate itself.6 After Kim Jong Un’s acceleration of the 
nuclear weapons and missile tests, the Chancellor and 
politicians of some EU states and Russia7 publicly con-
sidered how they might act as mediators, but were 
given no encouragement by North Korea. 
(c) The first and only North Korean initiative took 
place in 2017/18. In June 2017, newly elected South 
Korean President Moon Jae-in had invited the North 
to participate in the Winter Olympics in February 
2018, probably to neutralise the risk of North Korean 
disruption during the Games and to revive the sun-
shine policies of former South Korean presidents. 
North Korea reacted surprisingly positively. There was 
a joint North/South Korean team at the games; an 
agreement for talks in Panmunjom, near the ceasefire 
line; and then an agreement for a meeting between 
 
4 Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks, 
“Text of the Feb. 13, 2007, Six-Party Agreement”, stratfor.com, 
13 February 2007, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/text-
feb-13-2007-six-party-agreement (accessed 29 May 2018). 
5 UN Security Council, “Security Council Condemns 
Launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Agrees to 
Adjust Travel Ban, Assets Freeze, Arms Embargo Imposed in 
2006”, un.org, 13 April 2009 (SC/9634), http://www.un.org/ 
press/en/2009/sc9634.doc.htm (accessed 29 May 2018). 
6 Emanuele Scimia, “Will EU Be Part of New Six-Party Talks 
on N Korea?”, atimes.com, 23 July 2017, http://www.atimes. 
com/will-eu-part-new-six-party-talks-north-korea/ (accessed 
29 May 2018). 
7 “Sweden Offers to Mediate between US and North Korea”, 
Radio Sweden, 14 August 2017, https://sverigesradio.se/sida/ 
artikel.aspx?artikel=6755887; David Brunnstrom and Denis 
Pinchuk, “Russia Offers to Mediate between US and North 
Korea as Fears of Conflict Escalate”, Independent, 26 December 
2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/north-
korea-crisis-russia-mediation-united-states-un-conflict-
a8129356.html; Julian Borger, “Merkel Offers German Role 
in Iran-style Nuclear Talks with North Korea”, The Guardian, 
10 September 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/sep/10/merkel-backs-iran-style-diplomatic-solution-for-
north-korea (all accessed 25 June 2018). 
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Moon and Kim Jong and an offer to President Donald 
Trump for a summit that was forwarded by South 
Korea. Trump accepted – the deadline was set for 
12 June in Singapore. In preparation, CIA Director 
Michael Pompeo (already appointed the future US 
Secretary of State) led secret talks in Pyongyang, and 
Kim surprisingly travelled to Beijing and Dalian 
on 25–27 March and 7–8 May 2018. The Chinese 
leadership declared its support for Kim’s proposal 
to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.8 
As both sides were receptive to 
discussions, the summit took place on 
12 June 2018 in Singapore. 
North Korea had already announced at the South/ 
North Korean summit in Panmunjom on 27 April – 
at which both sides had pledged to settle their con-
flicts – that it would shut down a nuclear test area. 
This step, whether genuine or not, took place on 
24 May 2018 in the presence of international media 
representatives.9 After Trump’s new security advisor 
John Bolton had announced that only the “Libyan 
solution” – complete nuclear disarmament of North 
Korea before American consideration – could be 
considered a result of the Trump-Kim Summit, North 
Korea declared that under such conditions the meet-
ing would make no sense, and Trump cancelled it.10 
However, both sides remained disposed for talks, 
and the summit finally took place in Singapore on 
12 June 2018 amidst considerable media attention. In 
a joint statement, both heads of state expressed their 
willingness to work towards the denuclearisation of 
 
8 Steven Lee Myers and Jane Perlez, “Kim Jong-un Met with 
Xi Jinping in Secret Beijing Visit”, New York Times, 27 March 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/asia/kim-
jong-un-china-north-korea.html; see also Lily Kuo, “Kim 
Jong-un Paid ‘Unofficial’ Visit to Beijing, Chinese State 
Media Confirms”, The Guardian, 28 March 2018, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/28/kim-jong-un-paid-
unofficial-visit-to-beijing-chinese-state-media-confirms 
(both accessed 29 May 2018). 
9 Nina Belz and Corina Gall, “Video soll Sprengung des 
Atomkraftgeländes in Nordkorea beweisen”, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 24 May 2018, https://www.nzz.ch/international/ 
nordkorea-soll-atomtestgelaende-zerstoert-haben-nzz-
ld.1387967 (accessed 25 May 2018). 
10 Donald J. Trump, “Letter to Chairman Kim Jong-un”, 
whitehouse.gov, 24 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/letter-chairman-kim-jong-un/ (accessed 
25 May 2018). 
the Korean peninsula.11 Ever since, negotiations on 
implementation have been ongoing. 
Miscellaneous “Tracks” 
There have been numerous attempts to establish 
contacts with North Korea through non-official or 
semi-official channels: from Jimmy Carter, who at-
tempted to do so in 1994 via the Stockholm Institute 
for International Peace Research (SIPRI), to former 
US diplomats in Kuala Lumpur in 2016; among the 
German approaches, the efforts of the members of the 
German parliament Hartmut Koschyk (from 1998 to 
2009 Chairman of the German-Korean Parliamentary 
Group of the German Bundestag) and Johannes Pflug 
deserve special mention. Both frequently visited 
Pyongyang and conveyed North Korean offers of 
talks.12 Political foundations that went to North Korea 
with development projects in the 1990s also offered 
channels for discussion. Perhaps most interesting was 
the Federal Foreign Office’s cultural policy “track” via 
the Goethe Institute: it established a reading room in 
Pyongyang in 2004. About twenty to thirty visitors 
came daily; however, North Korea did not allow free 
access. Germany therefore closed the reading room 
again in 2009. 
Economic Incentives 
Only South Korea has made a substantial attempt to 
make progress on the nuclear issue through economic 
relations. Seoul sought to build trust by investing in 
the Kaesong industrial zone where up to 53,000 North 
Koreans work, in a way that was advantageous for 
 
11 For the text: “Trump and Kim’s Joint Statement”, Reuters, 
12 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-
usa-agreement-text/trump-and-kims-joint-statement-
idUSKBN1J80IU. For further statements by the two heads of 
state, see, e.g.: David Jackson, “U.S.-North Korea Summit: 
Trump, Kim Jong-un Sign Unspecified Document after Hours 
of Talks”, USA Today, 12 June 2018, https://eu.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2018/06/11/singapore-donald-trump-kim-
jong-un-denuclearization-summit/689817002/; Brian Stelter, 
“Trump Goes on Media Tour after Singapore Summit”, 
CNN, 12 June 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2018/06/12/media/ 
trump-post-summit-interviews/index.html (all accessed 
29 June 2018). 
12 See “Nordkorea will mit Deutschland und EU koope-
rieren” (dpa/Leu), Die Welt, 30 October 2014, https://www. 
welt.de/politik/ausland/article133805697/Nordkorea-will-mit-
Deutschland-und-EU-kooperieren.html (accessed 29 May 2018). 
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North Korea. The project was started in 2004, inter-
rupted in 2013 and terminated in 2016 by South 
Korea until further notice due to North Korea’s con-
tinued weapons testing.13 
There are extensive, albeit limited, economic rela-
tions with China, which also invests and employs 
North Korean guest workers in Northeast China. How-
ever, Beijing is not primarily concerned with 
resolving the nuclear conflict, but with stabilising 
North Korea by initiating economic reforms along 
Chinese lines. Beijing also wants to consolidate its 
influence to prevent an uncontrolled collapse of the 
Pyongyang regime, which could have adverse con-
sequences for China’s interests.14 
Other initiatives for economic reforms fizzled out: 
the establishment of the Rajin-Sonbong Special Eco-
nomic Zone with the help of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) in 1992;15 the Russian 
proposal for a pipeline through North Korea to supply 
the South Korean market; attempts by Japan and Ger-
many to establish economic relations in the 1990s. 
The latter failed both due to the difficult investment 
conditions and the intensification of the political 
conflict. None of these approaches was tied to termi-
nating the nuclear weapons programme. 
UN Sanctions 
Economic and political sanctions are part of the 
diplomatic toolbox. However, there have always been 
doubts as to whether China would fully implement 
sanctions resolutions. With 90 percent of North 
Korea’s foreign trade passing through China, Beijing’s 
stance is crucial – even though a 2017 study by the 
Royal United Services Institute found that not a single 
 
13 “What Is the Kaesong Industrial Complex?”, BBC, 10 Feb-
ruary 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-22011178 
(accessed 29 May 2018). 
14 Stephan Haggard and Weiyi Shi, Chinese Investment in 
North Korea: Some Data, Part I and II (Washington, D.C.: Peter-
son Institute for International Economics, 30 June 2014), 
https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/ 
chinese-investment-north-korea-some-data-part-i, and 
1 July 2014, https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-
transformation/chinese-investment-north-korea-some-data-
part-ii (both accessed 29 May 2018). 
15 UNDP, D.P.R. Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Economic & Trade Zone, 
1998, http://www.asiabriefing.com/store/book/dpr-koreas-
rajin-sonbong-economic-trade-zone-271 (accessed 29 May 
2018). 
sanction measure has been fully implemented.16 
However, Kim Jong Un’s summit initiative could be 
linked to the fact that China began to implement 
sanctions more consistently so as to improve its own 
relations with US President Trump. 
Threats of War 
The threat to shift the conflict from the diplomatic to 
the military front is also a means of diplomacy. It has 
been used by all US presidents since Bill Clinton (“the 
end of your country as we know it”). George W. Bush 
counted North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” in 
2002; Donald Trump threatened “fire and fury”. The 
DPRK – under Kim Jong Il as well as under Kim Jong 
Un – has resorted to this much more frequently. The 
latter said that he would “turn the USA into a heap 
of ash”.17 There were, and are, preparations for war 
on both sides, meaning that the risk of war remains 
unchanged, at least as a result of misunderstandings 
or knee-jerk reactions. 
Conclusions 
After more than 25 years of diplomatic efforts to end 
and dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons and 
launch missile programme, North Korea is de facto a 
nuclear power. However, the regime is in a dilemma: 
 
16 Andrea Berger, A House without Foundations. The North 
Korea Sanctions Regime and Its Implementation, Whitehall Report 
3–17 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
and Security Studies [RUSI], June 2017), https://rusi.org/sites/ 
default/files/201706_whr_a_house_without_foundations_ 
web.pdf; George A. Lopez, “Sanctions and Incentives in 
North Korea: A Challenging Environment”, Peace Policy, 21 
March 2012, https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/03/21/sanctions-
and-incentives-in-north-korea-a-challenging-environment/ 
(accessed 29 May 2018). 
17 George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union 
Address”, 29 January 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse. 
archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html; Peter 
Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ 
against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.”, New York Times, 
8 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/ 
asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-
nations.html; Gavin Fernando, “North Korea Threatens to 
Turn Washington and Seoul into a ‘Heap of Ash’”, news.com. 
au, 23 August 2016, https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/ 
north-korea-threatens-to-turn-washington-and-seoul-into-a-
heap-of-ash/news-story/f1851e5cde3ef6cf88697b57a8a1f11f 
(all accessed 25 June 2018). 
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on the one hand it wants to remain a nuclear power 
in the long-term for its protection; on the other, it 
cannot hope for economic recovery while the sanc-
tions regime lasts. 
There are several possible explanations for the failure 
of diplomacy: 
a) The value North Korea attaches to the programme is so 
high that no concessions can outweigh it. In fact, North 
Korea’s decades of fixation on its “opponent”, the 
USA, are an indication that Pyongyang’s policy is 
determined by existential fear and the conviction 
that only nuclear weapons provide sufficient secu-
rity for the country’s leadership. 
b) Sanctions have so far not been sufficiently tough, and 
North Korea has been able to rely on China, as an ally in-
terested in the survival of the regime, to protect the country 
from the worst effects of the sanctions. Indeed, China 
could presumably bring down the regime in Pyong-
yang with just a few measures. One can speculate 
about the reasons why this does not happen: fear 
of refugee flows; fear of continued destabilisation 
in the region; perhaps even fear of an alliance 
between a united Korea and the US. As a result of 
its agreements with Trump, China tightened up the 
application of its sanctions, showing what impact 
this could have on the DPRK. After the Trump-Kim 
summit, however, it has returned to its former 
loose handling. 
North Korea is also constantly 
learning from, and successfully using, 
the experiences it has had 
with its counterparts. 
c) The diplomatic instruments are exhausted. In fact, North 
Korea has repeatedly responded to proposals for 
talks and models for nuclear disarmament, thereby 
fragmenting the united front of its interlocutors, 
and has then let the discussion initiatives fail with 
the same regularity – and with corresponding 
recriminations.18 Like the international community, 
North Korea is constantly learning from, and suc-
cessfully using, the experiences it has had with its 
counterparts. Just one example of this is Pyong-
yang recently leaving it to South Korea to transmit 
its offer of talks to the USA, either to undermine 
 
18 See, e.g.: “Antwort des Sprechers des Außenministe-
riums der DVR Korea”, 12 April 2016, https://aip-berlin.org/ 
tag/six-party discussion/ (accessed 29 May 2018). 
the unity of the opposing side or, in the case of 
an American refusal, to be able to deny the offer 
entirely. Similarly, because of his visits Kim 
brought China back into play, from which it had 
been excluded by the North/South Korean-Ameri-
can cooperation; he thus avoided North Korean 
dependence on Trump. 
Prospects and the Role of Germany 
or the EU 
The North Korean talks-initiative can be understood 
as an attempt by Kim Jong Un to find at least one way 
out of the country’s economic difficulties in the face 
of declining growth. Perhaps he was even trying to 
find a viable way out of the North Korean dilemma 
with the USA. Kim has most likely reached his first 
goal: he has gained a weakened China as a partner. 
China has had the experience of first being instru-
mentalised by Trump against North Korea, only to 
be subsequently targeted by US punitive measures. 
It will therefore be in no hurry to distance itself from 
the policy of reconciliation with North Korea; the 
third summit with Kim took place on 18 June, and in 
the UN Security Council China has rejected American 
complaints against North Korean sanctions violations. 
As agreed in Singapore, Kim did have the remains of 
55 US soldiers missing in the Korean War transferred 
to the USA. The actual technical discussions about 
denuclearisation, on the other hand, are making no 
progress; both sides have resumed the traditional ex-
change of accusations and suspicions.19 Trump is 
therefore left empty-handed following his tactic of 
making dramatic spontaneous gestures, but is refrain-
ing from developing a strategy for the North Korean 
nuclear problem.  
 
19 “FM Spokesman on DPRK-U.S. High-level Talks”, 
KCNA Watch, 8 July 2018, https://kcnawatch.co/newstream/ 
1531000080-429116112/fm-spokesman-on-dprk-u-s-high-
level-talks/; “Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and South Korean Foreign 
Minister Kang Kyung-wha at a Press Availability”, 8 July 
2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/ 
283888.htm; Friederike Böge, “Trotz Trump-Kim-Deals: 
Neue Raketen aus Nordkorea?”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
31 July 2018, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/trotz-
trump-kim-deals-neue-raketen-aus-nordkorea-15715865.html 
(all accessed 31 July 2018). 
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The USA has been weakened in the 
North-East Asian force field; the risk 
of war has not diminished. 
In South Korea, President Moon must now make 
an effort to achieve success with his own peace policy 
and may therefore be prepared to set aside the nu-
clear issue and make concessions. In Japan and Tai-
wan, doubts about the reliability of their American 
ally will continue to grow. Result: the US has been 
weakened in the North East Asian force field; the risk 
of war has not decreased. 
However, there is room for an ironic dystopia: 
Foreign Minister Pompeo declared on 25 June that 
there was no time frame for talks with Pyongyang.20 
In other words, if North Korea refrains from further 
nuclear and missile tests, denuclearisation can be 
negotiated endlessly. And in September, Trump and 
Kim could appear together before the UN General 
Assembly and declare peace. 
To date, all diplomatic approaches to solving the 
North Korean nuclear problem have been unsuccess-
ful. If the North Korean-American talks do not pro-
duce any results, the only dynamic that can be ex-
pected from a tightening of the sanctions is likely to 
be an aggravation of the situation. Yet this path can 
only be pursued with Beijing’s support – a scenario 
made unlikely by the launch of the Trumpsian trade 
war against China. It is hard to see what the EU and 
Germany could contribute here. Only if future talks 
develop might the EU be asked again to participate 
financially in projects in North Korea – like with 
KEDO in its day. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Global_Challenges 
 
 
 
20 Elise Labott, “Exclusive: Pompeo Says No Timeline on 
North Korea Negotiations”, CNN politics, 25 June 2018, https:// 
edition.cnn.com/2018/06/25/politics/pompeo-exclusive-north-
korea/index.html (accessed 1 July 2018). 
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Sanctions against North Korea 
Since the Korean War broke out in 1950, North Korea 
has been subject to economic sanctions. In general, 
three forms can be distinguished: export restriction 
on goods and services to the destination country (em-
bargo); the curtailment of exports from the destina-
tion country (boycott); and, finally, measures against 
international financial transactions. In addition, there 
are travel bans, exclusion from organisations or from 
prestigious events, such as the Olympic Games. Sanc-
tions can be imposed on a state collectively, but also 
on individuals or organisations. North Korea was sub-
ject to forms of sanctions both unilaterally by individ-
ual states (such as the US, South Korea or Japan) and 
by the EU, and collectively by the UN Security Coun-
cil, i.e. in a way that is formally binding on all UN 
member states. 
Unilateral Sanctions by the US 
Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the USA imposed a comprehensive export embargo 
on North Korea; since then, the country has, as an 
enemy state, been subject to extensive sanctions 
almost throughout its entire history. 
Although the US does not maintain a complete 
trade embargo, it has restricted trade relations con-
siderably in a number of areas. All imports from 
North Korea are subject to authorisation and there are 
no financing possibilities for exports to North Korea. 
Accordingly, bilateral trade is minimal and, with a 
few exceptions, does not go beyond food, medicines 
and other humanitarian goods.1 President Trump 
 
1 Office of Foreign Assets Control (ed.), North Korea Sanc-
tions Program. Department of the Treasury (Washington, D.C., 
2 November 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 
sanctions/Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf (accessed 
12 March 2018). 
announced a further tightening of unilateral sanc-
tions on 23 February 2018, affecting one person, 
28 ships and 27 companies from North Korea, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and four other states 
alleged to have helped North Korea to undermine the 
collective sanctions imposed by the Security Council.2 
In 2017, Washington also imposed secondary sanc-
tions in connection with North Korea’s nuclear weap-
ons and missile programmes (as previously in the case 
of Iran). These were directed against a Chinese bank, 
the Bank of Dandong, which had laundered money 
for a Chinese company operating in North Korea, and 
was therefore excluded from the American financial 
market. The sanctions were apparently also intended 
to discourage other banks from engaging with North 
Korea. Given the paramount importance of the US 
financial system, secondary sanctions have a particu-
larly severe impact on banks and other financial 
institutions. 
Collective Sanctions by the 
UN Security Council 
Collective sanctions by the UN Security Council, which 
are explicitly mentioned in Article 41 of the Charter, 
were imposed only twice during the East-West con-
flict before 1990 (against Rhodesia and South Africa), 
but have been used several times since then. Since 
2006, the Security Council has repeatedly dealt with 
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests and for the 
first time imposed sanctions against a state that devel-
oped nuclear weapons in violation of a treaty. The 
Security Council decided on the following measures 
 
2 “North Korea Sanctions: Trump Announces ‘Largest 
Ever’ Package”, The Guardian, 23 February 2018, https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/23/north-korea-sanctions-
trump-announces-largest-ever-package (accessed 12 March 
2018). 
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against North Korea,3 the implementation of which is 
in principle binding on all member states: 
a) prohibiting the supply of heavy weapons or tech-
nologies to North Korea that it could use for its 
missile and nuclear weapons programmes (these 
weapons systems and technologies are defined 
and listed); 
b) prohibiting the export of luxury goods to North 
Korea (the definition was left to the member 
states); 
c) limiting energy supplies to North Korea, currently 
at an annual limit of 500,000 barrels of petroleum 
products and four million barrels of crude oil; 
d) boycotting North Korean exports, a boycott which 
has been progressively stepped up and now affects 
almost all of the country’s exports, in particular 
coal, textiles, food and iron, machinery, agricultural 
products and electrical goods; 
e) freezing the accounts and property of North Ko-
rean citizens and organisations which the Security 
Council has determined are participating in North 
Korea’s programmes; 
f) immediately expelling all North Korean workers 
abroad, or by the end of 2019 at the latest; taxing 
the remuneration of these workers was an im-
portant source of foreign currency for North Korea. 
Overall, the sanctions imposed on North Korea 
by the Security Council add up to a comprehensive 
sanctions regime with significant potential for 
damage. 
Unilateral Sanctions by the EU 
The EU imposed economic sanctions against North 
Korea for the first time in 2006, in connection with 
the implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1718. Since 2009 it has also adopted its own measures 
against North Korea that go beyond those set out by 
the Security Council, in particular a ban on the ex-
port of certain sensitive technologies and measures 
against exponents of the North Korean regime and its 
nuclear weapons and missile programme. Some of 
 
3  The following resolutions refer to North Korea’s missile 
and nuclear weapons tests: SR 1695 of 15 July 2006 (in re-
sponse to the – failed – test of a long-range Taepodong-2 
rocket), SR 1718 of 14 October 2006 (first test of a nuclear 
explosive device) and SR 1874 of 12 December 2009, SR 2087 
of 22 January 2013, SR 2094 of 7 March 2013, SR 2270 of 
2 March 2016, SR 2321 of 30 November 2016, SR 2356 of 
2 June 2017, SR 2371 of 5 August 2017, SR 2375 of 11 Sep-
tember 2017 and finally SR 2397 of 22 December 2017. 
the most recent unilateral sanctions imposed by the 
EU in April 2018 concerned five North Koreans and 
21 organisations or companies due to their involve-
ment in illegal activities; they are now subject to 
travel restrictions, and their accounts and assets have 
been frozen.4 
China’s Sanctions 
For geographical and political reasons, China’s atti-
tude to sanctions is particularly significant: China 
is formally North Korea’s only ally; much of North 
Korea’s foreign trade is conducted via the 1420 kilo-
metre border between the two states, which is mostly 
easy to access; China accounts for about 90 percent 
of North Korea’s imports and exports, especially the 
critical deliveries of oil and food. In addition, China 
plays an important role in North Korea’s access to 
international financial markets and, not least, as a 
lender who has so far been willing to finance Pyong-
yang’s foreign trade deficits. 
China has agreed to all of the Security Council’s 
sanctions and claims to have implemented them. In 
practice, it appears that China temporarily tightened 
restrictions on both imports from North Korea (espe-
cially coal) and exports to it (e.g. food and oil), especially 
in 2017, but has since loosened them again. Beijing is 
thus pursuing a flexible sanctions strategy, which on 
the one hand should make North Korea aware of its 
dependence on China and put Pyongyang under po-
litical pressure, but on the other also seeks to avoid 
a dramatic deterioration in political relations or even 
destabilisation of the regime. 
Sanctions: Objectives and Results 
What should sanctions do, and what can they achieve? 
First of all, three categories of target need to be dis-
tinguished: first, the states, governments and their 
peoples to be influenced; second, the societies of the 
sanctioning countries, to whom governments want 
to demonstrate their concern and ability to act; and 
third, any third countries that need to be discouraged 
from supporting the punishable behaviour of the tar-
geted state, so that unity will emphasise the binding 
nature of the violated principles, norms and rules. 
 
4 European Council (ed.), EU Restrictive Measures against North 
Korea, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ 
history-north-korea/ (accessed 13 August 2018). 
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The Objectives of the Sanctions Policy 
Sanctions are intended to induce North Korea’s 
regime to abandon its undesirable programmes due 
to their unacceptably high cost. The impact of sanc-
tions on the development of (nuclear) weapons of 
mass destruction and delivery systems, as well as on 
economic activity in general, is difficult to determine 
precisely. While it is reasonable to assume that the 
sanctions delayed and hampered progress in North 
Korea’s missile and WMD programmes, there is no 
tangible evidence of this. 
The US government justifies its unilateral sanctions 
on the following grounds: North Korea (1) contrib-
uted to the illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
(2) threatened regional security in East Asia and world 
peace, (3) supported international terrorism, (4) is a 
Marxist-Leninist state with a Communist government, 
and (5) was active in international drug trafficking, 
smuggling and other criminal activities as well as 
money laundering and counterfeiting.5 
The objectives of the UN Security Council are out-
lined in the resolutions on North Korea as follows: 
the country should refrain from further nuclear and 
missile tests or “other provocations”, cease all nuclear 
activities and disarm its nuclear weapons, other 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 
programmes “immediately”, “completely, verifiably 
and irreversibly”. The demands of the West and the 
Security Council had been largely identical, right 
down to the wording (for example, with the call 
on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons pro-
gramme “completely, verifiably and irreversibly”), 
until Donald Trump seemed to move away from 
them after the summit meeting with Kim Jong Un. 
Effects on North Korea 
North Korea’s economy has been in a severe structural 
crisis since the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, which caused massive famines in 
the mid-1990s with several hundred thousand deaths, 
and has not yet been overcome. To use Marxist termi-
nology: the fundamental contradiction of the current 
situation in North Korea is that there is a rigid totali-
tarian system of rule founded on violence, facing an 
 
5 Dianne E. Rennack, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. 
Economic Sanctions, R41438 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 14 January 2016), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
row/R41438.pdf (accessed 5 June 2018). 
economy and a society that is dynamically changing 
towards capitalist practices. 
So far, the overall impact of sanctions on North 
Korea has been limited, and there was little evidence 
of major disruption up to 2017.6 According to the 
CIA World Fact Book, North Korea’s overall economic 
performance has stagnated in recent years, but this 
is probably mainly due to the country’s structural 
problems. According to estimates by South Korea’s 
Bank of Korea, North Korea’s gross domestic product 
recovered by 3.6 percent in 2016 (after shrinking 
by 1.2 percent in the previous year). The growth im-
pulses observed in recent years probably stem pre-
dominantly from the rapid transformation of the 
economy and society into a proto-capitalist market 
system. 
North Korea’s exports peaked in 2013 at 3.63 bil-
lion US dollars, but have since declined; in 2016, 
the country only received 2.86 billion US dollars. 
A similar picture emerges from the import figures: 
North Korea’s imports fell from a peak of US$4.37 
billion in 2013 to US$3.20 billion in 2016.7 In the 
wake of the tightened Security Council sanctions and 
their more vigorous implementation by China, Chi-
nese statistics show a sharp decline in trade between 
North Korea and China (in both directions, i.e. im-
ports and exports) since September 2017.8 
The Achilles’ heel of the North Korean economy 
is its energy supply, especially crude oil. The inter-
national community significantly tightened its sanc-
tions in 2017: currently there is an upper limit of four 
million barrels for crude oil (roughly equivalent to 
China’s deliveries to North Korea in 2016 via the Dan-
dong-Sinuiju pipeline) and 500,000 barrels per year 
 
6 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hard Target: Sanc-
tions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea (Stanford, Cal.: 
Stanford University Press, 2017). 
7 For comparison: South Korea’s exports in 2017 amounted 
to $552.3 billion and imports to $448.4 billion; North Korea’s 
foreign trade thus amounted to less than one percent of 
South Korea's. Data from: Trading Economics (ed.), North 
Korea Exports 2001-2018, https://tradingeconomics.com/north-
korea/exports (accessed 22 March 2018); CIA World Factbook, 
Korea, North, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 22 March 2018), and 
idem, Korea, South, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (accessed 7 June 2018). 
8 Jeremy Page, Andrew Jeong and Ian Talley, “North Korea 
Feels Sting of Sanctions – At a Border Crossing, Garments 
and Seafood Aren’t Coming Out, Fewer Chinese Goods Go 
In”, Wall Street Journal, 2 March 2018. 
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for petroleum products (such as petrol), compared to 
imports previously estimated at 2.2 to 4.5 million 
barrels per year.9 
Sanctions and counter-measures 
are interactive, repetitive processes 
of adaptation. 
Targeted financial sanctions have had an impact in 
the past. In 2006, the US Treasury Department appar-
ently succeeded in identifying accounts of the North 
Korean leadership at a bank in Macau (Banco Delta 
Asia). The institution was accused of complicity in 
money laundering, which led the bank and the Chi-
nese authorities to block the accounts and freeze 
the funds. However, Pyongyang soon succeeded in 
getting the account closures lifted as an advance 
payment for the resumption of the six-party talks 
in 2007.10 
North Korean Counter-Measures 
This last example of an apparently effective sanction 
measure pinpoints the fundamental problem of sanc-
tions: a regime targeted by sanctions can try to cir-
cumvent them, undermine them or have them lifted, 
and it can redistribute within its own society the costs 
and burdens that the sanctions cause or pass them on 
to third parties. Sanctions and counter-measures are 
thus interactive, repetitive processes of adaptation. 
These competitions take place in transnational mar-
kets with lucrative profit opportunities, which natu-
rally also attract (organised) criminals. 
North Korea’s largest dependency probably lies in 
its interaction with the international financial system 
for handling its foreign trade and for financing its 
 
9 Stephan Haggard, “‘UN Security Council Imposes Tough 
New Sanctions on North Korea’, UNSC Resolution 2397” 
(Washington, D.C.: The Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 29 December 2017), https://piie.com/blogs/north-
korea-witness-transformation/un-security-council-imposes-
tough-new-sanctions-north-korea (accessed 22 March 2018). 
10 The sixth round of the six-party talks began in February 
2007. For the “Banco Delta Asia”-complex see John McGlynn, 
“Banco Delta Asia, North Korea’s Frozen Funds & US Under-
mining of the Six-Party Talks: Obstacles to a Solution, Part 
III”, Asia-Pacific Journal 5, no. 6 (June 2007): 1–13, and idem, 
“Financial Sanctions & North Korea: In Search of the Evi-
dence of Currency Counterfeiting & Money Laundering 
Part II”, Asia-Pacific Journal 5, no. 7 (2007): 1–39. 
foreign trade deficit. The country’s foreign exchange 
reserves are likely to be permanently strained, given 
its structural foreign trade deficits and precarious 
creditworthiness. In the past, however, the regime 
has repeatedly managed to tap new sources of foreign 
exchange income. This involved considerable crimi-
nal machinations, not least under the cover of diplo-
matic immunity.11 North Korea gains access to the 
international financial system to carry out these activ-
ities through an extensive network of bank accounts 
abroad. 
In its energy supply, North Korea has already re-
placed considerable quantities of petroleum products 
with indigenous coal or electricity. It could probably 
also reduce demand and consumption to an even 
greater extent.12 Strategic stocks would also be a 
(short-term) alternative to imports. In the medium 
term, the regime might also be able to resort to coal 
liquefaction, a technology the country appears to 
possess. Coal deposits are abundant.13 
North Korea has so far been able to systematically 
and comprehensively undermine international sanc-
tions.14 The fact that many UN member states have 
inadequately implemented the sanctions resolutions 
of the Security Council has made it easy for the coun-
try to earn foreign currency through exports and fi-
nance imports despite the boycott and embargo meas-
ures. A study by Andrea Berger for the Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 
(RUSI) in London came to the conclusion that “not a 
single component of the UN sanctions regime against 
North Korea currently enjoys robust international im-
 
11 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Illicit, North Korea’s Evolving 
Operations to Earn Hard Currency (Washington, D.C.: Com-
mittee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2014), https:// 
www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL.pdf (accessed 
22 March 2018). 
12 Peter Hayes and David von Hippel, Sanctions on North 
Korean Oil Imports: Impact and Efficacy, NAPSNet Special Reports 
(5 September 2017), https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-
special-reports/sanctions-on-north-korean-oil-imports-
impacts-and-efficacy/ (accessed 22 March 2018). 
13 Pierre Noel, “North Korea: An Oil Embargo Probably 
Wouldn’t Work”, Politics and Strategy, the Survival Editors’ Blog, 
6 September 2017, https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20 
strategy/blogsections/2017-6dda/september-87a1/the-problem-
with-a-north-korean-oil-embargo-883b (accessed 22 March 
2018). 
14 Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1874 (2009), 5 March 2018, 4f., http://www.un.org/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/171 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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plementation”.15 Another study found violations of 
the sanctions regime in 49 countries, including Ger-
many and Japan. In its activities to undermine the 
sanctions regime, North Korea has relied on a net-
work of Koreans and non-Koreans in several countries 
in East and Southeast Asia, but also elsewhere; it has 
made extensive use of the possibilities of diplomatic 
immunity.16 
The Sanctions Policy against North Korea: 
Significance and Problems  
Economic sanctions are the only realistically available 
means of exerting pressure on North Korea in deal-
ing with its WMD, nuclear weapons and missile pro-
grammes. They are also highly problematic. They 
are the only available means insofar as it is hard to 
imagine how Pyongyang could be persuaded to give 
up its atomic capabilities without pressure, i.e. by 
incentives and conciliation alone. At the same time, 
however, any attempt to force North Korea to give up 
by military means would entail unacceptable escala-
tion risks: the ten million inhabitants of Seoul live 
mostly within reach of North Korean artillery, not to 
mention weapons of mass destruction. 
From the regime’s point of view, the 
sanctions are aimed at what is prob-
ably its most important foundation 
for securing power and dominance. 
By demanding that North Korea abandon its nuclear 
weapons, the sanctions are aimed at what the regime 
probably considers to be its most important founda-
tion for securing power and domination, and at an 
element of its identity as a nation-state: in Pyong-
yang’s eyes, its position as a nuclear power, now en-
shrined in the constitution, gives it equal status. To 
date, however, North Korea has barely come under 
serious pressure from the sanctions due to the lax 
implementation practices of many member states. 
As mentioned above, China has played and continues 
to play a decisive role in this, because a large part of 
North Korean foreign trade is conducted across the 
 
15 Andrea Berger, A House without Foundations. The North Korea 
Sanctions Regime and Its Implementation, Whitehall Report 3–
17 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies [RUSI], June 2017), Executive Summary. 
16 Ibid.  
Chinese-North Korean border. From the point of 
view of the People’s Republic, however, the question 
is: what consequences would an effective economic 
blockade of North Korea have on China? Should 
North Korea’s current regime subsequently collapse, 
China might be confronted with millions of refugees, 
political chaos, and extensive arsenals of conventional 
weapons and WMD in its immediate vicinity. More-
over, the regime in Pyongyang would still have enough 
time to react militarily to an economic blockade. 
Ultimately, the sanctions regime lacks being em-
bedded in a plausible political strategy. It is unclear 
how Pyongyang should be persuaded to abandon its 
nuclear weapons through sanctions; whether sanc-
tions could decisively weaken or even overthrow the 
regime is also uncertain. However, if the sanctions 
only serve the purpose of forcing Pyongyang back to 
the negotiating table, the question arises as to what 
incentives and compensatory measures could per-
suade the regime to abandon its nuclear weapons. By 
meeting with the North Korean leader in Singapore, 
the American president has not only upgraded Kim 
and the North Korean regime in the world’s eyes, he 
has also deprived the United Nations sanctions regime 
of its foundations. How can the US hope to be persua-
sive in calling on third states to implement the sanc-
tions regime against North Korea more decisively 
if they themselves negotiate with Pyongyang at the 
highest level? North Korea was thus once again in 
a position to weaken the sanctions regime through a 
(genuine or sham?) willingness to engage in dialogue. 
  
 Online dossier: Additional resources 
and SWP publications on this topic 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Global_Challenges 
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Based on the experience of the Korean War and North 
Korea’s repeated violations of UN Security Council 
resolutions, treaties and agreements, experts in Wa-
shington assume that the regime in Pyongyang will 
behave similarly in future. According to this logic, the 
Kim family developed its nuclear missile programme 
not only for its own protection, but also as a means 
of “blackmailing” the US and its allies.1 Without a 
verifiable disarmament process, Pyongyang will in 
future be able to push ahead with the proliferation 
of nuclear and missile technology and exacerbate this 
global problem, as it already has in individual cases.2 
In addition, the US cannot accept North Korea’s nu-
clear armament without compromising the security 
promises it has made to Seoul and Tokyo. And finally, 
why should the USA expose itself to the risk of a nu-
clear war with a strengthening North Korea rather 
than disarm the country while it is still relatively 
weak? 
During their terms in office Foreign Minister Rex 
Tillerson and Security Advisor Herbert McMaster used 
the threat of military intervention as a lever to force 
North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons. Their suc-
cessors Mike Pompeo and John Bolton were more 
 
1 “‘The North Koreans have shown, through their words 
and actions, their intention to blackmail the United States 
into abandoning our South Korean ally, potentially clearing 
the path for a second Korean War,’ General McMaster said, 
suggesting that the assumption that North Korea wanted a 
nuclear weapon only to assure survival may be wrong.” 
David E. Sanger, “Washington Eyes a Cold Eye War Strategy 
against North Korea”, New York Times, 29 November 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/north-korea-
nuclear-strategy-deterence.html (accessed 5 June 2018). 
2 See U.S. Department of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Feb-
ruary 2018), 12; Kathleen J. McInnis et al., The North Korean 
Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report, R44994 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service [CRS], 6 November 2017), 12f. 
calculating, recognising it as a means of choice: a 
military operation could bring about not only dis-
armament in North Korea, but also a regime over-
throw.3 After all, according to an assessment by the 
Pentagon in February 2018, North Korea was “only a 
few months away” from being able to attack the USA 
with a nuclear missile.4 
Even after the Singapore summit, it remains 
unclear whether Kim Jong Un is willing to disarm at 
all – despite statements to the contrary and despite 
considerable costs that the prestigious rise to nuclear 
power imposes on his regime and the country. In-
stead, he might want to push ahead with his nuclear 
weapons programme, intending “complete denu-
clearisation” only to mean a US withdrawal from 
the Korean peninsula. The US, on the other hand, 
has declared its willingness to negotiate, but must 
also reckon with a possible breakdown or failure of 
talks. In that case, a new strategy of deterrence and 
containment would be necessary,5 whose implemen-
tation would require resuming not only the suspended 
manoeuvres with South Korea, but also the prepara-
tions for a possible military operation. 
 
3  In extreme cases, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are 
considered inextricably linked to the regime and the latter’s 
demise is equated with denuclearisation. See Greg Jaffe, “The 
Hawkish Views of Bolton and Pompeo Could Mark a Turning 
Point for Trump”, Washington Post, 24 March 2018, https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-
hawkish-views-of-bolton-and-pompeo-could-mark-a-turning-
point-for-trump/2018/03/23/227fd322-2eb9-11e8-8ad6-fbc502 
84fce8_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1d6568c06482 
(accessed 5 June 2018); Michael Paul, “Brennpunkt Nord-
korea: Donald Trump gegen Kim Jong-un”, Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik 63, no. 1 (2018): 41–51 (50). 
4 U.S. Department of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 
(see note 2), 11. 
5 See Robert Einhorn, Singapore and Beyond: Options for De-
nuclearizing North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, June 
2018). 
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Given this assessment of the situation, three main 
military options for action by the US and its allies 
in East Asia6 will be discussed here: first, expanding 
deterrence and defence; second, a limited military 
pre-emptive intervention; and third, a preventive war. 
Expanding Deterrence and Defence 
The preferred means of deterrence and defence 
against a North Korean missile attack is the expansion 
and improvement of missile defence systems in the 
US, Japan and South Korea. North Korea’s missile test 
in July 2017 prompted Seoul to accelerate the deploy-
ment of US THAAD defence systems. The modernisa-
tion and system integration of THAAD and Patriot 
defence systems in South Korea has continued even 
after bilateral military manoeuvres were cancelled 
by Trump in June 2018. US cooperation with Tokyo 
includes the further development of an interceptor 
rocket manufactured by the US company Raytheon 
(Standard Missile, SM) into the type SM-3 Block IIa 
for the Japanese navy. These interceptors are also in-
tended for land-based defence systems (Aegis Ashore) 
in Akita and Yamaguchi, respectively in the north 
and south of the main island of Honshu; they are 
expected to be operational in 2023.7 
However, if interceptor missiles on American or 
Japanese ships are ever actually deployed against 
a North Korean missile, this could reveal existing 
deficits in missile defence or lead to unwanted con-
sequences.8 After all, US defensive systems have so 
far not been very successful against ballistic long-
 
6 See Michael Paul and Elisabeth Suh, North Korea’s Nuclear-
Armed Missiles. Options for the US and Its Allies in the Asia-Pacific, 
SWP Comment 32/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, August 2017). 
7 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Approves Missile Defense Sys-
tem amid Nkorea Threat”, Chicago Tribune, 19 December 
2017; Tony Capaccio, “US Upgrading Missile Defense Even as 
War Games Halted”, Bloomberg News, 27 June 2018; Damien 
Sharkov, “North Korea Attack Threat ‘Has Not Changed’, 
Says Japan as It Boosts Missile Defense”, Newsweek, 28 June 
2018. 
8 See Michael Elleman, “Can the US Prevent North Korea 
from Testing an ICBM?”, 38 North, 27 January 2017, 
https://www.38north.org/2017/01/melleman012717/; Dave 
Majumdar, “There May Be No Way to Shoot Down North 
Korea’s Ballistic Missiles”, War is Boring, 31 August 2017, 
https://warisboring.com/there-may-be-no-way-to-shoot-down-
north-koreas-ballistic-missiles/ (all accessed 5 June 2018). 
range missiles and are by no means “97 percent” 
effective, as President Trump believes.9 
Improving South Korea’s defence with new ballistic 
missiles capable of a greater range, the relocation of 
US fighter aircraft or the presence of US aircraft car-
rier groups and submarines can only contribute to 
stabilising the precarious situation; it cannot substan-
tially change the situation itself. The dispute over 
nuclear arms can ultimately only be resolved diplo-
matically or militarily – without this, the expansion 
of deterrence and defence means tacit acceptance of 
the status quo. 
Before any military deployment to North Korea, a 
sea blockade would be conceivable as a combination 
of forced sanctions and military escalation.10 This 
would create the possibility of effectively preventing 
not only shipping that circumvents sanctions, but 
also the import and distribution of components for 
North Korean armaments and proliferation – even 
though this would take some considerable effort. 
However, this would require an (unlikely) decision 
by the UN Security Council; otherwise it would be an 
act of war in violation of international law, and the 
North Korean response already declared for this even-
tuality would be a legitimate act of self-defence.11 
Military Pre-emptive Intervention 
Kim’s readiness to attend talks was attributed to 
“Trump’s credible threat” that “the next missile he 
[Kim] points at America will not leave the launch 
pad.”12 Preventing the imminent launch of a North 
Korean missile would require pre-pre-emption by 
sabotaging the missile’s launch and control system 
or destroying the launch base along with the missile 
by air-to-air missiles or cruise missiles. If the US Presi-
 
9 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Downing North 
Korean Missiles Is Hard. So the U.S. Is Experimenting”, New 
York Times, 16 November 2017, and Editorial, “The Danger-
ous Illusion of Missile Defense”, ibid., 11 February 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/opinion/illusion-missile-
defense.html (accessed 5 June 2018). 
10 See Peter J. Brown, “If Summits Fail, US Naval Blockade 
of North Korea Looks Doomed”, Asia Times, 24 April 2018, http:// 
www.atimes.com/article/if-summits-implode-us-naval-blockade-
of-north-korea-looks-doomed/ (accessed 5 June 2018). 
11 “North Korea Says Naval Blockade Would Be ‘Act of 
War’, Vows Action”, Reuters, 14 December 2017. 
12 Paul-Anton Krüger, “Atomdeal mit Iran. Zurück auf 
null”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 March 2018, 7. 
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dent’s statement is interpreted more broadly to mean 
that a North Korean missile would not reach the US, 
there would be two additional options: 
1) During the ascent phase, the downing of the missile 
by fighter aircraft (F-35), drones (MQ-9 Reaper)13 or 
air-to-air missiles of the US armed forces or their 
allies14 (drones whose lasers could damage the 
missile are also under discussion), 
2) during the flight phase, the interception of incoming 
warheads over the Pacific by interceptor missiles 
from Vandenberg/California.15 
The advantage of all three variants is that neither 
ground troops nor Special Forces – and thus relatively 
few visible preparations – would be necessary to 
destroy the missile. At the same time, this would de-
monstrate to North Korea that the USA has the capa-
bilities and willingness to escalate further. 
In each case, military intervention 
is the most dangerous and least 
promising option for the USA. 
Nevertheless, military intervention is, in each case, 
the most dangerous and least promising option for 
the Trump administration. At best, the imminent 
launch of a long-range missile directed against the 
USA can be pre-emptively prevented and the missile 
and/or its infrastructure destroyed as an act of antici-
patory self-defence.16 Subsequent attacks against the 
nuclear infrastructure, however, would not be cov-
ered under the law and would also be risky. Com-
mand and control installations, missile launch bases 
and nuclear weapon development sites are scattered 
 
13 A drone based defence system could be deployed by 
2020 and fight up to five ICBM launches. See Richard L. 
Garwin and Theodore A. Postol, Airborne Patrol to Destroy DPRK 
ICBMs in Powered Flight (Washington, D.C.: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology [Science, Technology, and National 
Security Working Group], November 27–29, 2017), 2. 
14 Japan plans to include the procurement of stand-off 
weapons in its defence budget for 2018, which is problematic 
in the context of the Japanese constitution and the US’s 
defence commitment. 
15 See Sanger and Broad, “Downing North Korean Missiles 
Is Hard” (see note 9). 
16 Preparations for the launch of a long-range rocket can 
be interpreted by the US as an imminent attack, entitling it 
to pre-emptive self-defence. On the wide range of positions 
under international law, see Peter Rudolf, Zur Legitimität mili-
tärischer Gewalt (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
2017), 17–26. 
widely over the country. Many facilities and depots 
are located in underground tunnel systems in the 
north-eastern mountainous regions. Some may be 
unknown due to a lack of reconnaissance.17 It is 
therefore nearly impossible to destroy all sites and 
mobile rocket transporters using missiles, air strikes 
or the Special Forces.18 Not even a “decapitation 
strike” against the Kim regime’s chain of command 
can completely eliminate the risk of a North Korean 
use of nuclear weapons.19 
The more logistical preparations are necessary, 
and the more visible they are, the more plausible a 
North Korean first strike becomes. Even a limited use 
of weapons against missile systems can escalate the 
conflict. If the North Korean air defence considers 
incoming fighter planes and drones to be missiles 
designed to execute a decapitation strike, the regime 
may be tempted to shoot them down and launch a 
counterattack. If the deployment was seen as an over-
ture to the overthrow of the regime – for example 
because of misleading signals, such as a misinterpreted 
tweet by Donald Trump20 – Kim Jong Un could sub-
sequently order an attack on US bases in South Korea 
and Japan or Guam. 
Almost half the population of South Korea (25.6 
out of 47 million) and 200,000 US citizens live in the 
Seoul metropolitan area. It is within range of North 
Korean artillery and biological and chemical weap-
 
17 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tiny Satellites 
from Silicon Valley May Help Track North Korean Missiles”, 
New York Times, 7 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
07/06/world/asia/pentagon-spy-satellites-north-korea-missiles. 
html (accessed 5 June 2018); Mark Bowden, “How to Deal 
with North Korea”, The Atlantic, (July/August 2017); McInnis 
et al., The North Korean Nuclear Challenge (see note 2), 29f. 
18 Despite intensive “scud hunting” in 1991 during the 
Gulf War, most rocket transporters remained intact when 
the fighting ended. See Robert Beckhusen, “The U.S. Military 
Is Not Prepared to Hunt This Many North Korean Missiles”, 
War is Boring, 5 March 2018. 
19 Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda, “Command and Control 
in North Korea: What a Nuclear Launch Might Look Like”, 
War on the Rocks, 15 September 2017, https://warontherocks. 
com/2017/09/command-and-control-in-north-korea-what-a-
nuclear-launch-might-look-like/ (accessed 5 June 2018). 
20 Jeffrey Lewis, “This Is How Nuclear War with North 
Korea Would Unfold”, Washington Post, 8 December 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/this-is-how-
nuclear-war-with-north-korea-would-
unfold/2017/12/08/4e298a28-db07-11e7-a841-
2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.927553ece 98d (ac-
cessed 5 June 2018). 
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ons, whose use would be expected as a response. 
Besides missile attacks on US bases in Japan, such 
attacks on Japanese cities are also conceivable. The 
impact of even large-scale intervention using air 
strikes and Special Forces would be limited: it could 
only delay, but not stop, the development of long-
range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 
Finally, the ultimate military option remains com-
prehensive prevention. This would result in the start 
of a second Korean war. 
Preventive War 
The US is preparing for all options. These include 
the preventive use of military power to eliminate the 
nuclear weapons programmes of so-called rogue 
states.21 By contrast, the White House is no longer 
 
21 This is a widely accepted option in the US. See Rudolf, 
Zur Legitimität militärischer Gewalt (see note 16), 22; Scott D. 
Sagan and Allen S. Weiner, “Bolton’s Illegal War Plan”, New 
considering limited “bloody nose” strikes. Any attack 
is supposed to be “massive and overwhelming”. In 
February 2018 Senator James E. Risch said at the 
Munich Security Conference that such a war would 
be “very, very short”.22 President Trump appears to 
believe that he can order such a comprehensive mili-
tary operation at any time.23 
 
York Times, 7 April 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/04/ 
06/opinion/john-bolton-north-korea.html (accessed 5 June 
2018). 
22 Daniel Larison, “Denuclearization Is Not Worth a War”, 
The American Conservative, 26 February 2018, http://www. 
theamericanconservative.com/larison/denuclearization-is-
not-worth-a-war/; David Nakamura, “White House Writes Off 
‘Bloody Nose’”, Washington Post, 27 February 2108; Matthias 
Naß, “Trump und die ominöse ‘Phase zwei’”, Zeit Online, 
28 February 2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-
02/nordkorea-beziehung-usa-donald-trump-phase-zwei-5vor8 
(both accessed 5 June 2018). 
23 Draft bill H.R. 4837 was drawn up by the US House of 
Representatives on 18 January 2018 against this possibility 
(“To prohibit the introduction of the Armed Forces into hos-
Chart 3 
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In any scenario, the goal would be to disarm the 
North Korean regime by force. This would require not 
only the air force, navy and Special Forces, but also 
ground troops, and prior coordination with China 
(and Russia).24 In practical terms, such a massive mili-
tary operation, combined with extensive logistical 
preparations, would mean regime overthrow and 
occupation of the country. It would probably spell 
the return of the Iraq scenario under aggravated con-
ditions, and even after the end of the armed conflict, 
devastating political and humanitarian repercussions 
could be expected in the region and beyond. 
The deployment of American and allied forces re-
quires the prior consent of the South Korean govern-
ment.25 However, an agreement between Washington 
and Seoul is relatively unlikely, particularly since the 
consequences are quite clear. In the first few days of a 
conventional conflict alone, 30,000 to 300,000 people 
would be expected to die. There would be millions 
of victims in Korea if biological and chemical warfare 
agents were used and if North Korea chose the path of 
nuclear escalation escalated nuclear to avoid defeat.26 
But the USA could also use nuclear weapons at 
an early stage. There is already a debate about using 
nuclear weapons to destroy with a high degree of 
certainty the weapons potential that is presumably 
hidden deep under the mountains.27 For targets 
 
tilities in North Korea without a declaration of war or 
explicit statutory authorization, and for other purposes”). 
24 See Jesse Johnson, “Pentagon Says Securing North 
Korean Nukes Would Require U.S. Ground Invasion”, Japan 
Times, 5 November 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 
2017/11/05/asia-pacific/pentagon-says-securing-north-korean-
nukes-require-u-s-ground-invasion/; Oriana Skylar Mastro, 
“Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea. What to Expect 
If Things Fall Apart”, Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-12-12/why-
china-wont-rescue-north-korea (all accessed 5 June 2018). 
25 “No military action on the Korean Peninsula shall 
be taken without prior consent of the Republic of Korea.” 
Quoted in “Address by President Moon Jae-in at the National 
Assembly Proposing the Government’s Budget Plan for 
FY 2018 and Plans for Fiscal Operations”, 1 November 
2017, http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/ 
Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=150872 (accessed 5 July 
2018). 
26 McInnis et al., The North Korean Nuclear Challenge 
(see note 2), 3, 19. 
27 “Selective, judicious, limited use of nuclear explosives 
on the most difficult North Korean targets, indeed, may offer 
the only military option that can prevent mass casualties 
in North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the United States.” 
outside of North Korean cities, using nuclear weapons 
to cause only limited collateral damage may be theo-
retically possible.28 However, it would make the USA 
an international pariah. Weighed up rationally, the 
foreseeable political costs of a US nuclear strike far 
outstrip the possible military benefits. 
Beyond anticipatory self-defence, 
the threat of military intervention 
is not credible. 
In short, beyond anticipatory self-defence, the 
threat of military intervention is not credible. Surely 
no one wants a second Korean war. President Trump’s 
belligerent rhetoric has confirmed the North Korean 
regime in its assessment of the USA as an aggressor 
(and thus underpinned the legitimacy of the Kim re-
gime), but the escalatory risks of a US military inter-
vention are too great for decision-makers in Seoul and 
Washington. 
Summary 
When the probable consequences are weighed up 
rationally, a US military operation against North 
Korea becomes too risky and too unlikely to succeed. 
A preventive US military operation without Seoul’s 
consent is politically and militarily not even feasible. 
However, after a potential failure of the talks with 
Pyongyang, Washington may be forced to increase 
pressure again and return to a strategy of deterrence 
and containment. Considering the argumentation 
patterns mentioned at the beginning of this article, 
this would presumably amount to a new spiral of 
violence between North Korea and the USA, in the 
course of which the US government would ultimately 
see itself forced to intervene militarily. Incidentally, 
similar approaches to deterrence and containment as 
well as scenarios for mostly sea- and land-based mis-
sile defence are also conceivable in the case of a mili-
tary escalation in the Iran conflict. 
 
Quoted in Danny Lam, “The Case for Using Military Force 
against North Korea”, The Conversation, 14 January 2018, 
http://theconversation.com/the-case-for-using-military-force-
against-north-korea-89747 (accessed 5 June 2018). 
28 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Coun-
terforce. Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear 
Deterrence”, International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017):  
9–49 (31). 
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A military operation against North Korea would in 
all probability escalate both in terms of the means 
chosen and the geographical range. Given China’s 
geographical proximity, national interests and mili-
tary capabilities, it would be involved whatever 
happened. European NATO states (and Russia) might 
also have to intervene further down the line of the 
conflict. But even without any direct military involve-
ment, war would have unforeseeable consequences 
for Europe and the world. 
A second Korean war would claim many millions 
of victims and burden international relations for 
decades to come. Almost any diplomatic approach 
to resolving the conflict is therefore preferable to 
the options for military intervention outlined above. 
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Like many authoritarian regimes, North Korea long 
perceived digitisation and the Internet primarily as 
a threat to its regime. This was changing by the late 
1990s.1 Since then, the digital infrastructure has been 
expanded and various computer science courses and 
IT research laboratories have been set up to promote 
digitisation. In addition to developing its own soft-
ware, an isolated intranet (Kwangmyong), digital 
mobile communications UMTS (since 2013) and the 
increased training of IT experts, the regime has in-
vested in its own hardware developments so as to 
become independent of Western products.2 Never-
theless, in digital terms North Korea is considered 
a developing country, with only 1,024 active IP 
addresses communicating with the global Internet.3 
Secret services began their first field tests in cyber-
space around 2009. Since then, the complexity of 
Pyongyang’s cyber abilities, motives and strategies 
have constantly increased.4 Head of state Kim Jong 
 
1 Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy and Ethan Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber 
Operations: Strategy and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, December 2015), 51, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea%E2%80%99s-cyber-
operations (accessed 7 June 2018). 
2 Jean H. Lee, “Quiet Digital Revolution under Way in North 
Korea”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July 2011, https://www. 
smh.com.au/technology/quiet-digital-revolution-under-way-
in-north-korea-20110725-1hvrq.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
3 “North Korean Network Observer”, 2018, https:// 
nknetobserver.github.io/ (accessed 7 June 2018). 
4 Attributing cyber activity to an originator is a complex 
undertaking and not an exact science that provides hard 
evidence. Digital traces can easily be manipulated, and attri-
bution is often politically motivated. As this analysis is based 
exclusively on the few publicly available and sometimes con-
tradictory sources, inaccuracies cannot be ruled out. To com-
pensate, sources and statements are documented as accurately 
as possible. This analysis will place what little information 
is known about North Korea’s activities in cyberspace in a 
strategic context from a social science perspective. As with 
Un understands cyber warfare as an “all-purpose 
sword” of considerable strategic value.5 
North Korea’s Strategic Use of Cyberspace 
North Korea has no published cyber strategy and has 
never publicly confirmed that it is developing offen-
sive cyber capabilities.6 Its interest in covert cyber 
operations can be derived from the military situation 
on the Korean peninsula and the specifics of digital 
space. A conventional war with the militarily and 
economically superior South Korea and the US is im-
possible to win for North Korea. From Pyongyang’s 
point of view, covert cyber operations could provide 
a way out of the military stalemate.7 
  
 Timeline of Cyber Operations 
attributed to North Korea 
http://bit.ly/SWP18DNK_Cyber_Operations 
  
Since North Korea is barely digitised, it offers much 
less attack surface in cyber space than high-tech na-
tions. There is almost no interconnected critical infra-
structure that has to be defended. The economy and 
 
all intelligence activities, the number of unreported cases 
is undoubtedly much higher. 
5 Thus Kim Jong Un in 2011, according to South Korean 
intelligence sources. David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick 
and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North 
Korean Cyberpower. No More”, New York Times, 15 October 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-
korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
6 Choe Sang-Hun, Paul Mozur, Nicole Perlroth and David E. 
Sanger, “Focus Turns to North Korea Sleeper Cells as Possible 
Culprits in Cyberattack”, New York Times, 16 May 2017, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/asia/north-korea-cyber-
sleeper-cells-ransomware.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
7 Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber Operations 
(see note 1), 24–27. 
Matthias Schulze 
Cyberspace: Asymmetric Warfare 
and Cyber-Heists 
 Cyberspace: Asymmetric Warfare and Cyber-Heists 
 SWP Berlin 
 Facets of the North Korea Conflict 
 December 2018 
 69 
the military are only marginally dependent on digital 
sensors and communication channels. At least theo-
retically, North Korea is therefore relatively easy to 
defend in cyberspace. However, as an extremely iso-
lated country it is cut off from the vital international 
exchange of information on cyber security. This also 
affects the IT security of its own developments.8 
Nevertheless, due to these asymmetrical advantages, 
North Korea has little to lose, but much to gain, 
in cyberspace.9 It is still difficult to attribute cyber 
operations to a particular originator because digital 
traces can easily be forged, so the risk of detection 
is low. The Internet also overcomes geographical dis-
tances that used to offer protection, and thus allows 
a global projection of power. Compared to high-tech 
military equipment, the technical and human re-
sources for cyber operations are comparatively cheap 
and easy to obtain. Only the development of expertise 
and well-trained personnel is time-consuming. Some 
of the development tools for cyber operations are 
freely available, while malware and knowledge of 
software vulnerabilities can be accessed via global 
“grey markets”. The “dual use” nature of digital tech-
nologies also allows synergy effects with areas such as 
espionage, propaganda, disinformation or obtaining 
funds. 
The disruption of digital systems is a 
means of weakening an opponent’s 
will or punishing him for 
unwanted actions. 
Two types of North Korean cyber activities can 
be distinguished: repeated disruptive actions below 
the escalation threshold of an armed attack to serve 
political goals in peacetime; and strategic cyber opera-
tions in the event of war to disrupt enemy command 
infrastructure. Asymmetric measures in peace are 
aimed at provocation and expanding the scope for 
foreign policy action, without causing a military 
counter-reaction. The disruption of digital systems 
can thus be understood as a means of coercion to 
weaken an opponent’s will or to punish an opponent 
for unwanted actions. The intensity of these cyber 
 
8 John E. Dunn, “Flaw Spotted in North Korea’s Red Star 
Operating System”, Naked Security, 7 December 2016, https:// 
nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/12/07/flaw-spotted-in-north-
koreas-red-star-operating-system/ (accessed 6 June 2018). 
9 Sanger, Kirkpatrick and Perlroth, “The World Once 
Laughed” (see note 5). 
operations seems to correlate with times of relative 
tension and symbolic events such as national holi-
days.10 Civilian infrastructures are often affected by 
industrial espionage, but these rather low-threshold 
hacks are also repeatedly carried out against military 
facilities in South Korea.11 
Planning for cyber operations in military confron-
tations is based on a strategy derived from the maxim 
“quick war, quick end”.12 In line with this concept, 
cyber operations could be used for electronic war-
fare – for example, to disrupt enemy communication 
networks or the Global Positioning System (GPS) – so 
as to generate a surprise impact in the early phases of 
a conflict.13 The aim would be to disrupt enemy mili-
tary operations as well as to provide digital support 
for one’s own armed forces. Strategic cyber operations 
could also be used to disrupt the opponent’s public 
infrastructure, such as through power outages, or to 
launch diversionary manoeuvres.14 Defensive use is 
also conceivable. However, it remains unclear whether 
North Korea can actually successfully conduct such 
operations against countries with highly developed 
cyber capabilities such as South Korea; the empirical 
evidence is lacking. 
Structure and Organisation 
The South Korean government estimates that North 
Korea has up to 6,000 state hackers at its disposal, 
although their expertise varies widely. Around 5,000 
of these are supposedly active as trainers and instruc-
tors.15 They are apparently assigned to two organisa-
 
10 Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, “The Dynamics 
of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists, 2001–11”, 
Journal of Peace Research 51 (2018): 347–60 (355–57), https:// 
doi.org/10.1177/0022343313518940 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
11 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korean Hackers Stole U.S.-South 
Korean Military Plans, Lawmaker Says”, New York Times, 10 
October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/world/ 
asia/north-korea-hack-war-plans.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
12 Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber Operations 
(see note 1), 32. 
13 “APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor”, 
fireeye.com, 20 February 2018, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/ 
threat-research/2018/02/apt37-overlooked-north-korean-
actor.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
14 Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber Operations 
(see note 1), 32. 
15 Paul Mozur and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea’s Rising 
Ambition Seen in Bid to Breach Global Banks”, New York 
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tions: the General Staff Department of the Armed 
Forces (GSD), which deals with strategic cyber 
operations planning in the event of conflict, and the 
Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which is re-
sponsible for espionage and other measures in peace-
time. The latter was founded in 2009 to bundle vari-
ous capacities such as electronic warfare, foreign 
espionage, covert operations and various IT research 
laboratories for the development of malware under 
one roof. RGB, in particular Bureau 121 with its 
Cyberwarfare Guidance Bureau, is regarded as a 
globally active cyber actor. 
Obviously, due to the sanctions regime, North 
Korean IT experts are dependent on the expertise and 
infrastructure of other actors. A large part of North 
Korea’s Internet traffic, for example, is handled by 
Chinese service providers.16 Cyber operations are also 
regularly performed via hijacked servers abroad. 
The IT security company Recorded Future has tracked 
North Korean Internet activities to China, India, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nepal, Kenya and Indonesia.17 
IT specialists living abroad and working in legal IT 
companies could operate as digital guerrilla forces in 
the event of conflict.18 The South Korean police esti-
mates that about 10,000 North Korean software devel-
opers are legally resident in China and regularly 
transfer money to North Korea.19 
IT experts belong to the social elite. 
IT experts belong to the social elite as sought-after 
professionals who earn high wages and enjoy privi-
leges – a lucrative career option for many North 
Korean citizens. The rush for the few places for study-
ing computer science is correspondingly high.20 
 
Times, 25 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/ 
technology/north-korea-hackers-global-banks.html (accessed 
6 June 2018). 
16 Jose Pagliery, “A Peek into North Korea’s Internet”, 
money.cnn.com, 22 December 2014, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2014/12/22/technology/security/north-korean-internet/ 
index.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
17 “North Korea’s Ruling Elite Are Not Isolated”, Recorded 
Future Blog, 25 July 2017, https://www.recordedfuture.com/ 
north-korea-internet-activity/ (accessed 6 June 2018). 
18 Sang-Hun, Mozur, Perlroth and Sanger, “Focus Turns 
to North Korea Sleeper Cells” (see note 6). 
19 Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, North Korea’s Cyber Operations 
(see note 1), 55. 
20 Lee, “Quiet Digital Revolution under Way in North 
Korea” (see note 2). 
Overview of North Korean 
Cyber Operations 
Uniquely, North Korean cyber operations cover 
the entire spectrum of possible applications: power 
projection, financial gain, political and economic 
espionage, signalling, and propaganda. The opera-
tions can be described as cost-efficient and as less 
delicate than those of other actors. Nevertheless, 
more complex ransomware operations as well as self-
developed “zero-day exploits” – malware against 
which there are no patches – are now also part of 
the repertoire.21 North Korea’s level of knowledge 
has reached the level of Western actors. 
North Korean hackers are willing to learn and 
regularly follow the “best practices” of other groups, 
for example by replicating and modifying malware 
and procedures. The first steps in this direction were 
relatively simple “denial of service” attacks. On 4 July 
2009, a botnet with around 20,000 bots paralysed the 
websites of government institutions in the US and 
South Korea. South Korean intelligence attributed the 
incident to North Korea.22 
Since then, North Korean cyber operations have 
become technically more sophisticated, complex and 
ambitious. On 20 March 2013, the “DarkSeoul” mal-
ware deleted over 32,000 hard disks from numerous 
South Korean television stations and banks. This led 
to the temporary failure of a multitude of websites, 
ATMs and online banking services.23 The South Ko-
rean government believes this was the work of the 
Pyongyang regime.24 
Digital traces of the “DarkSeoul” incident were also 
found in Sony Pictures 2014’s Hack.25 In early Novem-
 
21 “APT37 (Reaper)” (see note 13). 
22 “N. Korean Ministry behind July Cyber Attacks: Spy 
Chief”, Yonhap News, 30 October 2009, http://english. 
yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/10/30/86/0401000000 
AEN20091030002200315F.HTML (accessed 6 June 2018). 
23 Symantec Security Response, “Four Years of DarkSeoul 
Cyberattacks against South Korea Continue on Anniversary 
of Korean War”, symantec.com, 26 June 2013, http://www. 
symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-
cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-
korean-war (accessed 8 March 2018). 
24 Kim Zetter, “The NSA Acknowledges What We All 
Feared: Iran Learns from US Cyberattacks”, WIRED, 2 October 
2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/02/nsa-acknowledges-
feared-iran-learns-us-cyberattacks/ (accessed 8 March 2018). 
25 Mathew J. Schwartz, “‘Wiper’ Attacks: How Sony Hack 
Compares”, Bank Info Security, 9 December 2014, 
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ber, a hacker group called “Guardians of Peace” 
had called for a stop to the release of Sony Pictures’ 
comedy “The Interview” about the assassination of 
Kim Jong Un. On 24 November, while Thanksgiving 
was celebrated in the US, malware deleted a lot of 
data from the production company’s PCs and stole 
sensitive internal documents that were later pub-
lished.26 US President Obama directly blamed North 
Korea for the incident. A similar event occurred later 
the same year in Great Britain, where, over protests 
from Pyongyang, the production of a multi-part 
drama series about North Korea was in the planning 
stages. A hacker attack on the production company 
ended the project.27 Both cases are examples of the 
successful use of cyber capabilities to exert political 
pressure on Western states. 
North Korea has been using cyber operations for 
digital bank robbery since at least 2016. ATMs are 
hijacked, data for access to online banking stolen or 
bank transactions manipulated. A cyber incident at 
the Central Bank of Bangladesh in February 2016, 
which is attributed to the “Lazarus” group, is striking. 
Western secret services are increasingly certain that 
there is a direct connection between Lazarus and 
North Korea. Lazarus attempted to steal 851 million 
US dollars from counterfeit SWIFT wire transfer 
requests, but made technical mistakes, stopping most 
of the triggered financial transactions. Nevertheless, 
81 million US dollars were stolen.28 
Since then, similar incidents have occurred across 
the world. According to Kaspersky, a group called 
“Bluenoroff”, which is said to have a connection 
to “Lazarus”, is attempting to pick up user data from 
bank customers worldwide with so-called “watering 
hole” attacks: customers are asked to enter their pins 
on fake websites where their data is “phished”.29 The 
 
https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/wiper-attacks-how-sony-
hack-compares-a-7655 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
26 “A Breakdown and Analysis of the December, 2014 Sony 
Hack”, Risk Based Security, 5 December 2014, https://www. 
riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/a-breakdown-and-analysis-of-
the-december-2014-sony-hack/ (accessed 6 June 2018). 
27 Gordon Corera, “UK TV Drama about North Korea Hit 
by Cyber-attack”, BBC News, 16 October 2017, http://www. 
bbc.com/news/technology-41640976 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
28 Lazarus under the Hood, Kaspersky Lab, April 2017, 
https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/ uploads/ 
sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_ 
final.pdf (accessed 6 June 2018). 
29 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Tries to Make Hacking a 
Profit Center”, New York Times, 27 July 2017, 
malware used has been found in over thirty countries 
and shows some indicators of Lazarus involvement.30 
Ransomware encryption trojans are also used to make 
hard disks unreadable and unlock them again for a 
ransom in a crypto currency (such as Bitcoin). The 
“WannaCry” incident in 2017, which affected more 
than 250,000 computers worldwide, was attributed 
to North Korea by the US by the end of the year.31 
The rise in value of the hitherto unregulated crypto 
currencies makes them interesting for a country like 
North Korea, which sees them as an opportunity to 
circumvent international financial sanctions. In early 
2018, according to the IT company Recorded Future, 
there were growing reports of hacker incidents at Bit-
coin Exchanges – companies that store customers’ 
digital currency – in South Korea and Japan.32 In 
other cases, Bitcoin wallets were stolen directly from 
users via malware, or their computers were converted 
into so-called “mining” of crypto currencies in a bot-
net. The extent of North Korea’s involvement has not 
yet been verified. 
Prospects 
Given the favourable cost-benefit ratio, North Korea’s 
cyber activities threaten to become more complex, 
and the appetite for risk by hackers in the service of 
the regime threatens to increase. Even though Pyong-
yang’s cyber operations usually do not achieve the 
damaging effect of an armed attack, misperceptions 
and escalation spirals pose a risk of potentially global 
collateral effects. 
Germany, although not a strategic target of North 
Korea, has already been affected. For example, the 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/asia/north-korea-
hacking-cybersecurity.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
30 Symantec Security Response, “Attackers Target Dozens 
of Global Banks with New Malware”, symantec.com, 12 Feb-
ruary 2018, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ 
attackers-target-dozens-global-banks-new-malware-0 (ac-
cessed 6 June 2018). 
31 Thomas P. Bossert, “It’s Official: North Korea Is Behind 
WannaCry”, Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2017, https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/its-official-north-korea-is-behind-
wannacry-1513642537 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
32 Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Priscilla Moriuchi, 
“North Korea Targeted South Korean Cryptocurrency Users 
and Exchange in Late 2017 Campaign”, Recorded Future, 16 
January 2018, https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-
cryptocurrency-campaign/ (accessed 6 June 2018). 
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“WannaCry” malware software paralysed Deutsche 
Bahn display systems, “Bluenoroff” is active in the 
field of (industrial) espionage, and “DarkSeoul” mal-
ware has been found on German computers.33 It 
cannot be ruled out that critical coverage of North 
Korea could trigger a reaction similar to the Sony 
hack. Germany could also move into focus for North 
Korea if a NATO defence case was declared. Since 
2017, the Alliance has argued that a cyber incident 
with the damaging effect of an armed attack could 
lead to precisely that. In the event of such an esca-
lation, Korean IT guerrilla forces abroad could target 
Western IT infrastructures and worldwide services 
to create chaos. 
Financially motivated cyber operations against in-
ternational finance flows, such as the Lazarus attack 
on the SWIFT network in 2016, are particularly wor-
rying in this respect. It should be assumed that North 
Korea will maintain its lucrative, financially motivated 
operations, whether in the form of ransomware or 
the theft of digital currencies, so long as a sufficiently 
high Bitcoin price justifies the expense. It would be 
sensible to proactively adjust to new developments in 
digital currencies and to develop resilience plans for 
cyber incidents during symbolic events and holidays. 
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33 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 
Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2017 (Bonn, August 
2017), https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/ 
BSI/Publikationen/Lageberichte/Lagebericht2017.pdf?__blob= 
publicationFile&v=3 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
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The focus of the North Korean conflict is on the 
DPRK’s nuclear armament and the threat it poses. 
However, it is often overlooked that in and around 
North Korea there is a conglomerate of further 
conflicts, most of which are intertwined. As in an 
attempt to untangle a complicated knot, trying to 
untie one problem and remove it from the tableau 
of international politics can have unintended side-
effects on other conflicts. A cautious approach is 
needed, which takes into account the effects of any 
move on the other actors and issues, so that progress 
can be made towards the goal of a sustainable and 
controlled resolution to the various conflicts – step 
by step, and patiently. 
US President Donald Trump wants to take a differ-
ent path. His policy ignores intricacy and complexity, 
and is clearly based on the assumption that the US has 
the influence and instruments needed to resolve the 
North Korea conflict by quickly clearing up the vari-
ous individual problems and directly influencing the 
key actors. His abrupt turn from the war rhetoric of 
“fire and fury” to the Singapore peace summit resem-
bles the proverbial attempt to cut the Gordian knot. 
The brief analyses gathered here give rise to scepti-
cism as to whether such an approach can be success-
ful. They show how high the hurdles are that have to 
be overcome, and how protracted the processes are 
that have to be gone through to achieve the desired 
goal of nuclear disarmament of North Korea. 
Historical Legacies and 
Path Dependencies 
Donald Trump sees his summit meeting with Kim 
Jong Un as a new beginning in relations between the 
US and the DPRK. He argues that the past does not 
have to determine the future.1 The two heads of state 
would open a new chapter in bilateral relations and 
thus put an end to the historical legacy. 
This optimistic view of conflict resolution runs 
counter to the historically-based perspective of most 
other actors, especially in Asia. Historically inherited 
burdens make conflict management more difficult. 
The division of Korea and the fact that to this day 
there is no peace treaty to end the Korean War are 
two of these historical legacies, which must be elimi-
nated or overcome on the way to lasting peace. 
The national trauma of colonial foreign rule (by 
Japan) and the experience of a three-year hot war 
(1950–53) and a 65-year Cold War (1953–2018) with 
the United States remain significant, and still guide 
the actions of North Korea’s foreign policy elites. Over 
the past decades, North Korea’s realistic and pragmatic 
diplomats have learned that Pyongyang does not 
necessarily have to reciprocate investments made by 
external powers into a peace process, and that it is 
possible to balance foreign powers against each other. 
China, on the other hand, and especially its national-
ist military, has not forgotten the blood toll it shed 
for a former vassal state in the Korean War, and views 
the Korean peninsula from a strategic perspective. 
Given the absence of political reconciliation, North 
Korean demands for reparations, and the unresolved 
fates of abducted Japanese citizens, the Japanese-
Korean relationship continues to be strained. 
 
1 “The past does not have to define the future. Yesterday’s 
conflict does not have to be tomorrow’s war”, President Trump 
said at the post-summit press conference. The White House, 
Press Conference by President Trump, Sentosa Island, Singa-
pore, 12 June 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-conference-president-trump (accessed 
17 July 2018). 
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Interdependencies between the 
Various Sets of Problems 
Each of the conflict situations subsumed under the 
term “North Korea conflict” is difficult to solve and 
the conflicts are interlinked in many ways. Changes 
in one policy area can have different effects – both 
intended and unintended – on other problem areas. 
Example security guarantees. North Korea wants assur-
ances from the USA that will reduce threats to its 
security. In Singapore, Donald Trump accommodated 
North Korea interests by promising such security 
assurances. As tangible proof, Washington suspended 
its joint military exercises with South Korea. This 
unexpected decision not only astonished Seoul and 
Tokyo,2 but also fulfilled one of China’s and Russia’s 
main demands. The effect was to reduce incentives 
for them to comprehensively enforce the North Korea 
sanctions regime. 
Example North-South communication. Summit diplo-
macy during the months of April, May and June 2018 
had been triggered by the rapprochement between 
North and South Korea. However, opening further 
channels – including economic ones – will de-in-
centivise North Korea from alleviating the pressure 
of sanctions by making concessions on nuclear dis-
armament. 
Example US-Chinese rivalry. A rapprochement be-
tween North Korea and the United States potentially 
calls into question China’s claim to great power status 
and thus automatically affects China’s already tense 
trade and geopolitical relations with the US. For Bei-
jing, the aim will be to avoid losing control in foreign 
policy and to improve bilateral relations with North 
Korea. However, this further reduces America’s ability 
to use pressure to persuade North Korea to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons programme. 
The list of interferences between the political, 
economic and security dimensions could go on. It 
is clear, however, that taking a holistic view of the 
various conflict situations is more adequate than 
identifying single measures to unravel this knot of 
interests. It is no coincidence that past diplomatic 
initiatives have been based on such a gradual reci-
 
2 Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon and Seoul Surprised by Trump 
Pledge to Halt Military Exercises”, New York Times, 12 June 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/world/asia/trump-
military-exercises-north-south-korea.html (accessed 29 July 
2018). 
procal approach, which included the possibility to 
adjust policies. 
Conflicting Interests 
The key security problem between the USA and North 
Korea remains unsolved. While North Korea believes 
that only nuclear deterrence can guarantee its own 
safety, the USA is not prepared to accept a North Ko-
rean nuclear threat to its mainland. The Singapore 
Summit Joint Statement avoids this problem, with 
North Korea again promising the “complete denucle-
arisation” of the Korean peninsula, but neither de-
fining the content of this concept, nor specifying the 
steps towards achieving this goal. 
The two sides also avoided including the diverse 
and sometimes conflicting interests of the other par-
ties involved in the conflict. In addition to nuclear 
disarmament, the South Korean government wants 
to improve relations with its Northern neighbour and 
reduce conventional threats. For many in Seoul, de-
escalation is probably more important than denucle-
arisation. As mentioned above, China sees the conflict 
from a national defence and geopolitical angle. From 
Beijing’s perspective, it must seem absurd that the 
Trump administration is inflicting punitive tariffs on 
China while at the same time expecting its support 
for US policy towards North Korea. Tokyo, moreover, 
fears that too rapid a rapprochement between Pyong-
yang and Washington will result in a shift in the 
region’s military balance to its own disadvantage. 
Russia regards the North Korea conflict as an oppor-
tunity to strengthen its own position in the region 
and at the same time reduce US influence. The inter-
national community faces the risk that a bilateral 
agreement between North Korea and the US could 
undermine the authority of the multilateral non-
proliferation regime. 
North Korea and the US will have to take into 
account these historical path dependencies, substan-
tive interferences and political interests if they are to 
seek a comprehensive and sustainable win-win solu-
tion to the conflict. North Korea presumably has little 
interest in such an approach, since its policy is pri-
marily focused on the USA and China. There is a risk 
that the Trump administration will tackle the North 
Korean conflict primarily from the perspective of a 
nuclear superpower that wants to prevent the club of 
nuclear powers from expanding, and in particular to 
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allow a challenger of the US’s regional supremacy to 
join the group of nuclear weapons possessors. 
Germany and Europe: Only Onlookers? 
What does this mean for the role of Germany and 
Europe in dealing with the conflict? First of all, it 
should be noted that the EU and its member states, 
including Germany, are not states bordering North 
Korea. As a result, they are not directly involved in 
the Korean conflict. Logically, therefore, they did 
not participate in the six-party talks (2003–2009), 
in which China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea and the USA tried in vain to find a diplomatic 
solution to the nuclear conflict. Nevertheless, North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile programme threatens 
Europe in many ways. Thus, Europe and Germany 
face the difficult task of asserting their own influence 
to resolve the conflict peacefully, even though they 
possess only limited influence. 
Risks and Consequences for Europe 
With the alleged testing of a hydrogen bomb on 
3 September 2017 and three intercontinental missile 
tests in July and November of the same year, North 
Korea demonstrated the significant progress it has 
made in developing nuclear weapons and missile 
capabilities. The nuclear threat emanating from 
North Korea does not only apply to its neighbouring 
states and the American mainland. Proliferation risks 
are a political challenge for the entire international 
community. It is therefore only superficially true to 
claim that Europe and Germany are uninvolved third 
parties in this conflict. In fact, they also have to tackle 
the military, economic and political threats posed 
by North Korea. 
Military and Defence Policy Implications 
Europe is geographically closer to North Korea than 
North America is and finds itself within the range of 
North Korean intercontinental missiles. While Europe 
has not yet been the object of North Korean threats 
and is not in the focus of North Korea’s nuclear doc-
trine, the DPRK may well seek to use military threats 
to influence debates in the United Nations, NATO or 
the EU. In the past, Pyongyang has repeatedly tried to 
create different zones of (in)security among allies of 
the US by explicitly designating certain states as po-
tential targets of its nuclear weapons or by exempting 
them from nuclear threats.3 Moreover, an accidentally 
launched or misguided intercontinental missile could 
reach Europe. North Korean cyber attacks are another 
threat, which can cause not only financial losses, but 
could also damage critical infrastructure. 
It is still largely unknown that, to this day, the Euro-
pean sending states that fought in the Korean War 
under UN supreme command are formally obliged to 
guarantee the Korean Armistice Agreement under UN 
Security Council Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950. Bel-
gium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom provided combat troops. Den-
mark, Italy, Norway and Sweden supplied humani-
tarian aid. France and the UK are still represented in 
the UN High Command (UNC) Rear in Yokota. The 
UNC monitors compliance with the Status of Forces 
Agreement. 
Apart from such rather hypothetical considera-
tions, Europe’s greater concern is the defence implica-
tions of a direct North Korean threat to the United 
States. An attack on the island of Guam off the Asian 
mainland (south of the Tropic of Cancer) or on Hawaii 
would not necessarily legally trigger NATO’s collective 
defence mechanism. Such attacks would nevertheless 
require the Alliance to respond politically. An attack 
by the DPRK on the US mainland, on the other hand, 
would trigger consultations on collective defence 
under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Even a 
North Korean threat of such an attack against the US 
could necessitate allied consultations under Article 6.4 
 
3 See, e.g., Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Development 
of a Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Washington, D.C.: US-Korea 
Institute at SAIS, 2015), https://www.38north.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/08/NKNF_Nuclear-Weapons-Strategy_ 
Bermudez.pdf; Léonie Allard, Mathieu Duchâtel and François 
Godement, Pre-empting Defeat: In Search of North Korea’s Nuclear 
Doctrine, Policy brief 237 (London: European Council on For-
eign Relations, November 2017), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ 
ECFR-237-In_search_of_North_Koreas_nuclear_doctrine.pdf 
(both accessed 27 July 2018). 
4 Bruno Tertrais, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, 
Meaning and Future, Research Paper 130 (Rome: NATO Defense 
College, Research Division, April 2016), https://www. 
frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/autres/2016/2016-
tertrais-nato-washington-treaty.pdf (accessed 23 December 
2017). 
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Chart 4 
North Korean missile tests 1984–2017 (missile tests per year in respective category) 
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Economic Consequences of a Korean War 
A military conflict in Northeast Asia would have a 
global impact on trade, industry and the financial 
markets. With a share of around 23 percent of the 
global economy (2017), North Korea’s neighbouring 
countries China, Japan and South Korea form Asia’s 
economic centre of gravity, if not of the world econo-
my. Asia’s industrial supply and service chains play 
a key role in supplying world markets. Moreover, 
Asian, European and American industrial production 
depends on a smooth supply of critical components 
from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. For the EU and 
Germany in particular, foreign trade with Northeast 
Asia – their most important non-European trading 
partner, ahead of North America – is of existential 
importance. 
Accordingly, the foreseeable economic conse-
quences of a second Korean war would be bleak. In 
real economic terms, reduced or even discontinued 
imports and exports would result in lost sales, pro-
duction cuts and employment losses for Asia’s trading 
partners. A flight from shares and financial stocks 
would put a strain on the world’s financial markets. 
A world stock market crash would probably be un-
avoidable, which would inevitably further curb 
demand in the economy as a whole through negative 
wealth and expectation effects. In all likelihood, the 
global economy would inescapably slide into a deep 
recession. 
The Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 
The recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons 
state possessing ballistic missiles, politically or de fac-
to, could boost the proliferation of WMD and missile 
technology. There is, first, a risk that North Korea 
itself could spread nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons, as well as means of delivery and technolo-
gies for their production. This risk exists above all 
in the Near and Middle East, where North Korea has 
already entered into such cooperation agreements. 
The findings of the UN Panel of Experts, according to 
which North Korea recently attempted to support the 
Syrian chemical weapons programme, are worrying.5 
 
5 Michael Schwirtz, “U.N. Links North Korea to Syria’s 
Chemical Weapons Program”, New York Times, 27 February 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-
Such arms and technology exports contribute to de-
stabilising the region and affect Europe’s security. 
The “worst case” scenario would be the transfer 
of North Korean WMD to state or non-state actors 
willing to pay. In the event of a political collapse of 
the DPRK, state agencies could also lose control over 
WMD, which could subsequently end up on grey or 
black markets.6 
Second, there is the risk that tendencies towards 
developing nuclear weapons options in other (espe-
cially neighbouring) states might intensify. In South 
Korea, opposition politicians are already calling for 
the country to be armed with its own nuclear weap-
ons. They argue that against the background of North 
Korean threats of nuclear blackmail and the impon-
derables of American politics – both a withdrawal 
of US troops and unilateral US military strikes against 
North Korea are conceivable – South Korea can only 
regain a freedom of action with its own nuclear weap-
ons.7 Should South Korea actually decide in favour 
of nuclear weapons, Japan and Taiwan may also be 
tempted to follow suit. A multipolar unconstrained 
nuclear arms race in Asia could be the outcome, which 
would increase the risk of nuclear weapons use. 
Erosion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
A further danger emanating from North Korea is the 
weakening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and other instruments of the non-proliferation 
regime, on whose effectiveness Germany and Europe 
continue to rely. The emergence of further nuclear 
powers, especially within the Western community 
of states, would shake the global non-proliferation 
architecture. 
Even the de facto acceptance of North Korea as a 
nuclear power would have grave consequences for 
the non-proliferation regime. From the point of view 
of many non-nuclear-weapon states, it is difficult 
enough to tolerate the existence of five nuclear 
 
korea-syria-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html (accessed 
24 March 2018). 
6 Robert J. Peters and W. Seth Carus, “Interagency and 
Intra-agency Aspects of US Elimination Activities”, The Non-
proliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 101–14. 
7 Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, “‘South Korea 
Goes Nuclear’: How South Korea Became a Nuclear Weapon 
State“, in While We Were Planning. Unexpected Developments 
in International Politics. Foresight Contributions 2018, ed. Lars 
Brozus, SWP Research Paper 5/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, September 2018), 31–35. 
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powers within the NPT and three outside it, since this 
violates the principle of equality between states. If the 
DPRK – a former NPT state party which violated its 
treaty obligations by acquiring military nuclear exper-
tise and technologies during its membership – also 
becomes a nuclear-weapons state, some non-nuclear-
weapons states might wonder whether a permanent 
renunciation of this most powerful of all weapons 
still makes sense. Trust in the NPT’s effectiveness in 
preventing regional armament dynamics would have 
proved deceptive. It would also show that a deter-
mined proliferator can achieve its goals even against 
the resistance of the major powers. In this respect, 
a de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear 
weapons state would send a fatal signal. It is highly 
uncertain whether the NPT would be able to with-
stand the resulting strain in the long term.8 
Implications for the 
Transatlantic Relationship 
The nuclear conflict over North Korea has implica-
tions for the transatlantic relationship in several re-
spects. First, the question of Europe’s solidarity arises 
in response to North Korean threats against its NATO 
ally, the US. In this sense, Washington expects Europe 
to actively participate in the current sanctions regime. 
Second, the issue of how the US fulfils its mutual 
defence agreements with South Korea and Japan, and 
how it involves its allies in its political deliberations 
and security policy decisions, also directly affects Wa-
shington’s relationship with its transatlantic allies. 
Fears in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan of a potential 
American troop withdrawal, leaving them abandoned 
or unintentionally involved in a military conflict – 
whose collateral damage would occur above all in 
Asia – at heart mirror European fears regarding 
NATO’s relationship with Russia. 
Third, the way America handles the nuclear crisis 
has repercussions for its transatlantic relations. North 
Korea could become another friction point in the 
 
8 However, US military threats against the nuclear weapon 
state North Korea also undermine the thesis that nuclear 
weapons represent an effective protection against military 
pressure. An American pre-emptive strike against a nuclear-
armed North Korea would shake to the core any belief in 
the protective effect of nuclear weapons. See Oliver Meier, 
“Nukleare Abschreckung gerät ins Wanken”, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 31 January 2018, http://www.fr.de/politik/ 
meinung/gastbeitraege/atom-doktrin-nukleare-abschreckung-
geraet-ins-wanken-a-1437589 (accessed 27 May 2018). 
relationship between the USA and its European allies, 
alongside trade policy, climate policy, sanctions against 
Russia and the Iran nuclear accord. 
Finally, the unresolved North Korean conflict could 
accelerate the American “pivot to Asia”. The fact that 
some in the Trump administration see North Korea, 
which may have several dozen nuclear weapons, as a 
greater national security threat than Russia, which 
possesses almost half of the world’s nuclear weapons, 
seems strange to many in Europe. 
Human Rights Violations in North Korea 
The crimes against humanity committed by the North 
Korean state and in its name against its own people 
are only indirectly related to the nuclear crisis. It has 
been laid open, however, that a threat of external 
destruction by WMD goes hand in hand with a totali-
tarian claim to power internally, which denies indi-
vidual life and human rights to its dissenters. Never-
theless, it is Europe’s moral and political responsibil-
ity to raise its voice against North Korea’s human 
rights violations, to improve the situation on the 
ground and to prosecute perpetrators. A determined 
commitment to human rights is ultimately a matter 
of Europe’s political credibility, precisely because 
Europe can act vis-à-vis North Korea as an actor with-
out power-political self-interest and because the crimes 
against humanity committed in North Korea are, in 
their scope, without comparison in today’s world.9 
Europe’s Relations with the DPRK 
The EU is pursuing a policy of critical engagement 
with the DPRK.10 The EU and the world expect North 
Korea to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible 
denuclearisation; to reduce tensions with its neigh-
bours; to return to the NPT; to comply with global 
non-proliferation rules; and to improve its human 
rights situation. To emphasise these demands, the EU 
exerts pressure at the bilateral and multilateral level, 
and maintains a sanctions regime whose scope and 
 
9 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014. 
10 See European External Action Service (EEAS), “DPRK 
and the EU” (Brussels, 26 June 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/4186/dprk-and-eu_en 
(accessed 27 July 2018). 
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rigidity goes beyond the UN’s. This policy of critical 
engagement also means that communication and 
dialogue channels are kept open, and cooperation in 
humanitarian affairs, development, education and 
research is continued. Economic relations between 
North Korea and EU member states are kept to a 
minimum. However, EU sanctions are not the only 
reason; North Korea also lacks attractiveness as a 
trading and economic partner. 
The DPRK approaches Europe, which is historically 
unburdened by the Korean conflict, with much less 
mistrust than its former opponents in war, the US and 
South Korea, or its former colonial power, Japan. More-
over, Pyongyang still remembers the good coopera-
tion with its former allies in Central and South-east-
ern Europe. Today, all EU member states except 
France and Estonia have diplomatic relations with 
the DPRK. Germany, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
have embassies in Pyongyang. Sweden and Switzer-
land continue to be present in the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission for monitoring the Korean 
Armistice Agreement on the southern side of the de-
marcation line. Until their expulsion, Poland (1995) 
and the former Czechoslovakia (1993) had assumed 
this task on the northern side. Europe is thus at least 
symbolically represented in terms of security policy on 
the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that Europe carries no military or economic weight in 
the DPRK. The EU, Switzerland and EU member states 
are important only as humanitarian actors. 
In comparison to today, the EU played a much 
more important role at the turn of the millennium, 
when it pursued an independent North Korea policy. 
Alongside the USA, South Korea and Japan, the 
EU was a regular member of the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organisation’s Executive Board, 
whose mandate was to implement the dismantlement 
of North Korea’s then-nuclear programme and in 
return construct two light water reactors in the coun-
try. Most EU member states, including Germany, 
established diplomatic relations with the DPRK from 
2000 onwards, under the positive impression of the 
first inter-Korean North-South Summit. And in 2001, 
the troika of EU Council President Göran Persson, 
High Representative Javier Solana and EU Commis-
sioner for External Relations Chris Patten negotiated a 
missile moratorium with Kim Jong Il. At the time, the 
EU’s North Korea policy was regarded as a successful 
application of the European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). 
However, in the wake of the second nuclear crisis 
that began in 2002, the EU was pushed to the side-
lines. As a non-neighbouring state without a regional 
military presence, the EU lacked political weight. 
North Korea also had a lower priority for Europe than 
conflicts in the Near and Middle East, which were geo-
graphically closer. Another obstacle to Europe taking 
a stance was the intra-European differences over the 
appropriate response to North Korean nuclear arma-
ment. Given this lack of internal consensus, and with-
out a clear stance of its own, Europe has behaved 
mostly passively and reactively in the North Korean 
conflict. Moreover, in the current situation, the states 
involved in the six-party talks either reject a direct EU 
involvement in a diplomatic conflict resolution or are 
ambivalent about such an involvement. Against this 
background, the question arises as to what a genuinely 
European contribution to solving the nuclear crisis – 
beyond the expected financial and transformational 
aid – might look like. 
European Instruments and 
Elements of Action 
From the analyses presented here, various approaches 
can be determined that could contribute to the con-
flict over North Korea’s nuclear programme being 
tackled in a way that serves Europe’s interests: namely 
peacefully, and orientated towards a strengthened 
global order and an improved human rights situation 
in North Korea. Constructive influence is conceivable 
at the global, transatlantic, intra-European and bi-
lateral levels. 
The Global Level 
In all multilateral contexts, the EU should treat North 
Korea’s rule violations as a problem of global order – 
by making clear to all actors that agreements with 
the DPRK must not harm global non-proliferation, 
disarmament and human rights regimes. A formal 
recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state 
would send a fatal signal, because it would increase 
the risk that other proliferation candidates might 
follow in North Korea’s footsteps. The demand that 
the DPRK return to the NPT must therefore be main-
tained at all costs. IAEA inspectors should be involved 
in the verification of a denuclearisation process as 
early as possible. In the long term, the DPRK should 
be actively encouraged to accede to other multilateral 
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disarmament treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. With regard to human rights, it is crucial 
that the political pressure exerted by the international 
community on North Korea also be maintained. 
Human rights issues vis-à-vis North Korea must be 
treated separately from security policy to avoid a 
conflict of objectives between these issues. 
In the US, the temptation may be great to strike a 
“deal” with North Korea that reflects specific Ameri-
can security interests at the expense of global rules or 
the security interests of third countries. However, the 
benchmark for negotiations with North Korea should 
be the disarmament standards laid down in the nu-
merous UN Security Council resolutions. They must 
not be diluted. Thus, a bilateral US-North Korea arms 
control agreement that eliminates the (intercontinen-
tal) missile threat to the US, but does not eliminate 
the dangers posed to South Korea and Japan by North 
Korean short- and medium-range missiles, must be 
rejected internationally. 
The US (and possibly other permanent Security 
Council members) may also be tempted to organise 
the disarmament of North Korea’s weapons of mass 
destruction in a way that excludes the rest of the 
international community. There is no doubt that 
certain denuclearisation steps in North Korea would 
have to be carried out by nuclear-weapon states them-
selves, to protect proliferation-sensitive information. 
Multilateral institutions such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) 
should, however, be involved to the highest degree 
possible in order to achieve the greatest possible 
transparency in disarmament and thus maximise 
confidence that the disarmament process is effective 
and conforms with international law. Furthermore, 
North Korea’s willingness to involve international 
organisations in conflict management at an early 
stage could be an indicator of its willingness to admit 
inspectors – for example, if the CTBTO monitored 
the closure of the North Korean nuclear test site.11 
One role for Europe would be to draw attention to 
the lessons learned from the verified disarmament 
of weapons of mass destruction in other states. In this 
 
11 “Nuclear Test-ban Body Says Ready to Verify Korean Site 
Closure If Asked”, Reuters, 16 May 2018, https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-ctbto/nuclear-test-ban-
body-says-ready-to-verify-korean-site-closure-if-asked-idUSK 
CN1IH2E4 (accessed 17 May 2018). 
context, it is obvious that disarmament processes are 
particularly problematic if they are not voluntary or 
if they are accompanied by a regime change. Against 
this background, Europeans should also work to en-
sure that a possible agreement on the disarmament 
of North Korean weapons of mass destruction is co-
operative and takes a long-term perspective. 
For moral and political reasons, human rights 
policy must maintain pressure on North Korea in 
the long term, meaning that it must gather the most 
detailed information possible on human rights vio-
lations in the DPRK, address and condemn North 
Korea human rights violations in all UN bodies, and 
prepare to investigate and prosecute the crimes, for 
example within the framework of a special tribunal. 
This is Europe’s primary responsibility, since it is not 
directly involved in the conflict and considering the 
Trump Administration’s obvious lack of interest in 
human rights issues. 
 
The Transatlantic Level and NATO 
NATO’s European members should urge the United 
States not to strike North Korea militarily. Preventive 
strikes against North Korea violate international law 
and would carry unforeseeable escalation risks. NATO 
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly 
warned against military responses to the global threat 
posed by North Korea.12 
It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, 
the Alliance could or should participate in containing 
or deterring North Korea. NATO missile defence sys-
tems cannot offer protection against North Korean 
ballistic missile attacks.13 The issue of whether, and 
at what threshold, North Korean cyber attacks should 
trigger deliberations and decisions by the Alliance 
also needs to be addressed. The effectiveness of cyber 
deterrence seems to be limited; and due to North Ko-
rea’s asymmetric advantages, cyber counter-measures 
against it would probably not be worthwhile. 
 
12 “NATO Chief Calls North Korea ‘Global Threat’ during 
Japan Visit”, The Japan Times (Tokyo), 30 October 2017, https:// 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/30/national/politics-
diplomacy/nato-chief-calls-north-korea-global-threat-japan-
visit/ (accessed 17 May 2018). 
13 Robin Emmott, “North Korean Threat Highlights NATO 
Missile Shield ‘Weak Link’”, Reuters, 12 September 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nato/ 
north-korean-threat-highlights-nato-missile-shield-weak-link-
idUSKCN1BN1RW (accessed 17 May 2018). 
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Moreover, allies have quite different views on the 
security role of the Alliance and Europe in East Asia. 
As a nuclear and former colonial power, France, for 
example, is prepared to become more involved in 
Asia than many other European states, which are 
more concerned about Russia’s significance for Euro-
pean security. From a German perspective, it would 
therefore make sense not to avoid the debate about a 
possible role for the Alliance in East Asia, but, on the 
contrary, to conduct it thoroughly and in a balanced 
manner. 
The European Level 
Europe’s critical engagement policy is a promising 
starting point for a coherent and sustainable foreign 
policy towards the DPRK. It avoids the restrictions 
and escalation risks associated with a policy based 
on conditions and linkages, and makes it possible for 
Europe to apply pressure and offer incentives vis-à-vis 
North Korea in a flexible manner. However, the wide 
range of perspectives among Europeans with regard 
to North Korea’s non-compliance with international 
norms and rules is problematic. 
In recent years, Europe’s North Korea policy has 
been passive and reactive, not least because of in-
consistent assessments and proposed solutions. An 
independent European position and approach has 
been barely apparent. However,the above remarks 
on the risks and implications stemming from North 
Korea should have made one thing clear: “North Ko-
rea matters”. In future, it will therefore be important 
for Europe: 
1) to give the nuclear conflict the high priority it 
deserves; 
2) to formulate an independent policy based on 
Europe’s interests; and 
3) to clearly articulate and pursue this policy 
vis-à-vis the relevant actors. 
To effectively counter the risks of nuclear prolifera-
tion originating from North Korea, the current UN 
and EU sanctions regimes must be implemented with 
self-discipline and (more) commitment. The Council 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
should ensure their full and comprehensive imple-
mentation by EU member states. European offers 
that could contribute positively to conflict resolution 
could also be coordinated and specifically brought 
into play by the EU. In particular, the EU should 
create the necessary conditions for providing suffi-
cient financial, personnel and technical support for 
a possible disarmament mission. Europeans could 
contribute specific capabilities here, as they have in 
the negotiations with Iran and the disarmament of 
Syrian chemical weapons, for example. 
In addition, North Korea could and should be a 
reason to reflect on a more coherent and ambitious 
European policy to prevent the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction. Against the background of 
the crisis surrounding the nuclear agreement with 
Iran, it is also time to revise the strategy adopted in 
2003 for combating the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. The strategic autonomy that the 
EU aspires to must not be limited to the expansion 
of military means, but should also aim to improve its 
diplomatic capacity to act. Approaches to preventing 
attacks in cyberspace, for example, are also advisable. 
The Bilateral Level 
Towards third countries: The EU should use its economic 
influence to promote the more effective implementa-
tion of sanctions against North Korea. In the past, it 
has already tried to use its economic power through 
so-called non-proliferation clauses to oblige its trad-
ing partners to adhere to non-proliferation policy 
norms and rules.14 Similarly, with third countries that 
still have comparatively good economic or political 
relations with North Korea (Ukraine, Egypt, Namibia), 
Europe could link improved economic and trade rela-
tions to strict compliance with the sanctions imposed 
on North Korea. 
Towards North Korea: The EU should fully implement 
the UN’s North Korea sanctions regime and, where ap-
propriate, adopt its own restrictive measures. At the 
same time, it is a specific task for EU member states 
to keep channels of communication with North Korea 
open and to expand them in the event of an under-
standing. The DPRK must always be told what a 
peaceful North Korea could expect from Europe in 
terms of economic, cultural and scientific relations. 
Beyond the human rights policy towards North 
Korea that should be pursued at the UN level, a 
human rights dialogue should be conducted at the 
 
14 Since the mid-2000s, so-called “non-proliferation 
clauses” have been adopted as standard in EU trade and 
cooperation agreements with third countries. See, e.g., 
Gerrard Quille, “A New Transatlantic Approach? A View 
from Europe”, in Arms Control in the 21st Century. Between 
Coercion and Cooperation, ed. Oliver Meier and Christopher 
Daase (New York: Routledge, 2012), 190–207 (196ff.). 
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bilateral level. The EU and Germany should submit 
to the DPRK proposals and assistance for capacity-
building in the judiciary and the administration of 
justice, similar to its proposals formerly made to 
China and Vietnam. 
Towards South Korea: South Korea and the EU em-
phasise similar issues in the North Korean conflict, 
prioritising a peaceful and cooperative conflict reso-
lution. Seoul is looking for partners at “all tables”, 
inter alia because of its precarious security situation. 
Germany’s experience with reunification has always 
been a point of contact for a dialogue between Berlin 
and Seoul. In particular, Europe can provide diplo-
matic backing and support in the search for peace 
and détente. Its expertise and capabilities in accom-
panying a peace, disarmament and transformation 
process are of real relevance here. Conversely, how-
ever, the EU should also warn South Korea not to rely 
on building up its own nuclear weapons capacity if 
the rapprochement fails. 
Towards Japan: While Japan is pursuing a policy of 
maximum pressure on North Korea, Europe’s com-
parative advantage lies above all in its diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang. These different perspec-
tives do make it difficult for the EU and Japan to 
adopt a uniform stance on North Korea, but they also 
provide an opportunity for auspicious joint resolution 
proposals at the UN level. In their joint statement on 
the strategic partnership of 6 July 2017, Prime Minis-
ter Abe Shinzô and EU Council President Donald Tusk 
reaffirmed their intention to intensify their bilateral 
North Korea dialogue and jointly called on the inter-
national community to comply with UN Security 
Council resolutions. In the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil, the two partners want to introduce joint resolu-
tions.15 
Towards China: In principle, China is not averse to a 
stronger European commitment. Beijing is particularly 
looking for partners to better resist the pressure of the 
Trump administration. The Chinese leadership would 
certainly welcome European support for its “double 
freeze” proposal – i.e. a simultaneous moratorium 
on North Korean missile and nuclear tests on the one 
hand and US-South Korean military exercises on the 
other. Europe can try to leverage Beijing’s desire for 
partnership and good economic relations, when urg-
 
15 European Council, “Statement by Prime Minister Abe, 
President Tusk and President Juncker on North Korea, 6 July 
2017”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/07/06/eu-japan-dprk/ (accessed 20 April 2018). 
ing China to implement sanctions more stringently. 
Such an approach would also be perceived positively 
by Washington. 
Towards Russia: Even if Moscow does not count the 
EU as an important player in East Asia, Europe should 
continue to push for the strict implementation of UN 
sanctions against North Korea. The EU and Russia 
could also explore – for instance informally – how 
large their potential for cooperation on North Korea 
is. Joint support of the negotiation process and imple-
mentation of its results should be the priority. With 
a view to the future, there might even be options for 
cooperating on trans-Korean infrastructure and trade 
projects. 
The EU and its member states have multiple oppor-
tunities to promote a peaceful solution to the North 
Korean conflict. Above all, Europe can build on its 
strengths. Its diverse and good relations with the par-
ties involved in the conflict form a sound basis for 
working in coordination towards a diplomatic solu-
tion. However, a classic mediation role for the EU and 
Germany offers little chance of success, since neither 
the USA nor North Korea actually see a need for Euro-
pean mediation. However, Europeans, while remain-
ing in the background themselves, could offer to open 
channels of communication, assist with bringing the 
conflict parties together, organise informal discussion 
forums – all with a view to improving US-North 
Korean understanding. 
Europe’s economic strength is an asset that may 
help persuade China or third countries from outside 
the region to comply more strictly with the UN Secu-
rity Council’s sanctions decisions. Should an agree-
ment be reached with North Korea on a disarmament 
process, Europe could provide expertise and funding 
to support and promote such a process, which will 
take a long time to implement. 
Finally, Europe is a highly credible advocate of in-
ternational law-based solutions of regional conflicts. 
Even if North Korea – and increasingly also the US – 
perceive the world through a purely power-political 
lens, the norms laid down in multilateral regime are 
likely to provide the only available solid foundation 
for a diplomatic solution on which conflict parties 
can agree. Europe’s extensive experience with the 
peaceful coexistence of nuclear powers, the contain-
ment of regional conflicts, and management of bor-
der conflicts is not a blueprint for the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. But it could nonetheless serve as a 
source of inspiration in the search for diplomatic 
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ways out of a seemingly unsolvable conflict situation. 
This European wealth of experience and the diplo-
matic expertise associated with it are welcome in 
Northeast Asia as contributions towards a peaceful 
conflict resolution. 
In dealing with the North Korean conflict, Europe 
can play an important role not despite but because of 
its distance from the conflict – by acting as a mod-
erator, mediating talks, and objectively demonstrat-
ing dangers, thus assuming tasks which the conflict 
parties and regional states concerned are no longer 
able to fulfil in this heated and confrontational situa-
tion. Europe’s geographical distance to East Asia may 
thus facilitate, rather than complicate, European 
involvement. 
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Abbreviations 
ABC atomic, biological, chemical (weapons) 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CNN Cable News Network 
COI Commission of Inquiry 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DMZ Demilitarised Zone 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
EEAS European External Action Service 
ENMOD 
Convention 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques 
EU European Union 
FM Foreign Ministry 
G20 Group of 20 
GPS Global Positioning System  
GSD General Staff Department of the Armed Forces 
(North Korea) 
HRC Human Rights Council 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICC International Criminal Court (UN) 
IP Internet Protocol 
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
IT Information Technology 
JCPoA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
KAS Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 
KCNA Korean Central News Agency 
KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-
zation 
NAPSNet Nautilus Peace and Security Network 
Nato North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NLL Northern Limit Line 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OHCHR UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
PC Personal Computer 
RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau (North Korea) 
RK Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies 
SAIS (The Paul H. Nitze) School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies (The Johns Hopkins University, 
Washington, D.C.) 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 
SM Standard Missile 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SR (UN) Security Council Resolution 
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication 
TASS Russian News Agency 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense  
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
UN United Nations 
UNC United Nations Command 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNO United Nations Organization 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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